Reports of the Consultative Committees on third party access to natural gas networks by unknown
p.... 
~ 
>  X 
w 
w 
{.) 
4  I  1 /. 1/  ;;;._ 
Reports  of 
the  Consultative  Committees 
on  Third  Party Access  to 
Natural Gas  Networks 
***  *  * 
*  *  *  *  * * * 
May  1991 
COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
Directorate-General  for  Energy 
,  I  ....  . 
/  I  , COMMISSION 
OF  THE  EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES 
Foreword 
am  pleased  to  present 
Consultative  Committees  on 
natural  gas  networks. 
here  the 
access  by 
reports  by  the 
third  parties  to 
The  creation  by  the  Commission  of  these  Committees,  one 
made  up  of  representatives  of  the  Member  States  and  the 
other  of  representatives  of  the  gas  companies  and 
consumers,  Is  explicitly  mentioned  In  the  Communication 
by  the  Commission  to  Councl I  COM{89)334  which 
accompanied  the  draft  directive  on  gas  transit,  now 
adopted  by  Councl I. 
This  consultation  seemed  necessary  In  order 
beyond  the  stage  of  transit,  ways  of  making 
European  market  of  1992  a  rea I I ty  In  the 
sector,  of  strengthening  competition  and 
consumer  choice. 
to  explore, 
the  greater 
natura  I  gas 
of  wIdenIng 
The  task  of  the  CommIttees  was  to  IdentIfy  the  maIn 
technical,  economic  and  administrative  elements  to  be 
taKen  account  of  In  the  formulation  of  a  Community 
po 1 1 cy  on  whether,  and  how,  thIrd  partIes  shou I d  have 
access  to  gas  networks. 
This  tasK  of  analysis  and  clarification  has  been 
successfully  concluded.  I  would  I Ike  to  thank  all 
comm 1 ttee  members  for  havIng  partIcIpated  actIve  I y  In 
dIscuss I on,  for  sharIng  theIr  expertIse  and  for 
expressing  the·lr  different  points  of  view  on  this 
Important  and  complex  subject. 
The  reports  bring  an  Indispensable  contribution  to  the 
debate  on  the  IncreasIng  of  competItIon  In  the  sector 
concerned  and  constitute  a  basis  on  which  to  formulate 
the  guIdIng  pr Inc I pIes  of  poI Icy  for  the  _European  gas 
market. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
The  European  Commission,  in  its Communication  to  the  Council  COM  (89) 
334  final  - SYN  206  dated  September  6,  1989,  decided  to  pursue 
consultations withal I  interested parties,  In  order  to examine  In  depth 
whether  third  party  access  to  the  European  gas  transport  system  needed 
to  be  organized,  and,  If  so,  under  what  conditions,  In  order  to 
guarantee  the maintenance  of  security of  supply  and  quality of  service 
to consumers.  It  decided,  for  this purpose,  to set up  two  consultative 
committees. 
The  one  consultative  committee  on  natural  gas  consisted  of 
representatives of  the  gas  Industry,  such  as  Integrated utilities,  gas 
producers,  distributors,  as  well  as  large  Industrial  users  and  small 
consumers  and  was  called  Professional  Consultative  Committee  on  Gas 
(PCCG).  The  other  committee  on  gas  consisted of  representatives of  the 
member  states  and  their  suppleants  and  was  called  Comlte  Consultatlf 
Etats  Membres  Gaz  (CCEMG).  The  members  of  the  CCEMG  are  shown  In 
Appendix  A. 
This  report  is dedicated to the work  of  the  CCEMG. 
An  effort  has  been  made  to  reflect  the  views  of  the  delegates  as  they 
expressed  them;  however,  when  a  point  was  presented  by  more  than  one 
representative,  In  more  than  one  occasion,  It  has  only  been  mentioned 
once  in  the  text  In  an  effort  to avoid  dupl lcatlon. 
1.1  Mandate  of  the  CCEMG 
The  Committee  was  asked  to  assist  the  Commission  In  Identifying  the 
various  elements  (technical,  economic  and  administrative)  to  be  taken 
Into  account  before  the  Commission  considers  if  and  unde~  what 
conditions  a  system  of  third  party  access  to  the  natural  gas 
transmission  and  distribution networks  might  be  implemented. 
Several  members  of  the  CCEMG  emphasized  that  Third  Party  Access  (TPA) 
should  be  considered  In  the  context  of  the  significance of  natural  gas 
as an  energy  source  for  EEC  member  states,  as well  as  In  the context of 
a  broader  energy  policy of  the European  Community. 
The  members  of  the  CCEMG  met  several  times  to  discuss  and  express,  on 
the  basis of  issues  papers  prepared  by  the Commission,  their  views  on 
the  following  topics: 
Effects of  TPA  on  gas exploration and  production. 
Effects of  TPA  on  gas  transportation. 
Effects of  TPA  on  gas prices,  consumption  and  competition. 
Modalities of  the  Implementation of  TPA. - 4-
2.0 DEFINITIONS 
ThIrd  Party  Access  or  TPA  is  a  term  used  throughout  thIs  report  to 
denote,  In  general,  the  ability of  third parties  (producers,  consumers, 
gas  merchants,  or  distributors)  to  receive  and  pay  for  transport  and 
related services provided  to  them  by  a  gas  company.  Definitions of  the 
types  of  access  that  may  be  made  available  to  these  parties  are 
provided  In  Appendix  B.  It  is  Important  to .point  out  that  TPA  ought 
not  be  confused  with  the  Transit  of  natural  gas  across  COmmunity  gas 
networks  and  that  these  definitions  are  provided  and  used  throughout 
this report  as working  hypotheses only. 
The  terms  •open  access••  and  "third  party  access•  are  used  to  denote 
service provided on  a  "first come- first served"  basis versus  the  term 
•common  carrIer"  wh 1  ch  Is  used  to  denote  servIce  prov 1  ded  on  a  "pro 
rata"  basis. 
It  was  unanImous I  y  accepted  that  common  carr I  age  wou I  d  not  be  an 
acceptable  form  of  TPA  because  It  would  endanger  the  continuity  of 
supply  of  existing  customers.  It  was  therefore  decided  that  such  a 
system  should  be  rejected  and  was  excluded  from  further  consideration 
in  this  report.  This  did  not  Imply  that  other  forms  of  TPA  might  not 
effect, whether  beneficially or  detrimentally,  the continuity of  supply 
of existing customers. 
The  term  "open  access"  Is  used  to  denote  that  all  possible  users 
(producers,  distributors,  smal I  and  large  users)  have  access  to 
pipeline services,  versus  the  term  "third party access"  that  Is  used  to 
denote  access  to  these  services  only  to  certain  types  of  users  (for 
example,  only  large consumers  and  distributors). 
Throughout  this  report  the  term  •third  party  access•  or  TPA  Is  used 
gener I  ca I I  y  to  mean  any  form  of  access  to  pIpe I I  ne  servIces,  such  as 
open  access or  third party access. 
3.0  UPSTREAM  EFFECTS  OF  TPA  ON  GAS  (EXPLORATION  AND  PRODUCTION) 
With  respect  to  the  upstream  effects  on  gas,  a  number  of  delegates 
submitted  that  exploration  and  production  of  oil  and  gas  Is  a  high 
risk,  capital  intensive  activity.  In  addition,  the  development  of  gas 
fields  reQuires  additional  Infrastructure  In  the  form  of  pipelines that 
are  necessary  to  connect  the  gas  field  with  the  market.  Thus,  the 
large  Investments  that  are  reQuired  frequently  necessitate  the 
existence of  long  term  supply  contracts  as  a  precondition.  A delegate 
from  a  state  that  Is  a  major  Internal  gas  exporter  mentioned  that  the 
development  of  small,  marginal  fields would  have  been  very  dl.fflcult  In 
his country without  the existence of  long  term  gas sales  ag~eements and 
certainty  of  sale  In  the  short  term.  Her  role  as  exporter  within  the 
European  Community  would  have  been  and  would  be  hindered  considerably. 
It  was  further  submitted  that  In  a  TPA  regime,  gas  distributors would 
be  more  uncertain  as  to  their  market  share  In  the  long  term  and  hence 
less  wi I ling  to  enter  Into  long  term  contracts.  This  in  turn  could 
Increase  the  r lsks  and  uncertaint les  for  producers.  There  would  be - 5  -
reduced  Incentives  to  or  Interest  In  developing  smaller  marginal 
fields,  particularly  where  a  developed  Infrastructure  doesn't  already 
exist.  In  the presence of  higher  risks,  producers would  reQuire  higher 
return  for  theIr  Investments  and  thus,  hIgher  prIces.  Interest  In 
exp lor at I  on  wou I  d  concentrate  In  the  I  arger  more  lucratIve  fIe Ids, 
leaving  smaller  marginal  fields  unexplolted.  This,  It  was  argued, 
could  have  a  negative effect on  both  prices and  security of supply. 
Another  delegate submitted  that  an  Integrated Community  policy would  be 
needed  in  order  to  achIeve  a  European  gas  market.  Elements  of  such 
policy should  Include: 
a  strategy  for  exploration,  product I  on  and  storage  of  gas  that 
would  permit  producing  member  states  to  make  Investment  decisions 
within a  Community  perspective; 
a  Community  policy for  gas  purchases; 
a  pol Icy  on  security of  supply  that,  In  case of supply  difficulties 
wIthin  the  EEC,  wou I  d  coordinate  the  actIons  of  a I I  produc 1  ng 
member  states,  as opposed  to  Individual  national  measures. 
Some  delegates argued  that  their countries were  highly  dependent  on  gas 
imports  and  that  all  of  this  imported  gas  was  supplied under  long  term 
contracts.  One  delegate  added  that  a  TPA  regime  would  Impose 
unnec~ssary  risks  with  respect  to  security  of  supply.  Another 
undesirable  effect  of  TPA  would  be  the  possible  Increase  of  prices 
caused  by  a  fragmented  market  supplied  by  an  oligopoly.  Others  drew 
attention  to  the  existing  •take  or  pay  obligation•  of  gas  supply 
contracts and  pointed out  that,  under  any  TPA  scheme,  these obi lgatlons 
would  have  to  be  respected  and  protected  In  order  to  avoid  the 
posslbl I lty  of  serious  financial  problems  they  may  cause  to  the 
ut Ill  t les. 
Another  representative,  drawing  on  their actual  exper-Ience  of operating 
TPA,  commented  that  many  of  the  theoretical  drawbacks  referred  to  by 
other  delegates  were  not  borne  out  In  practice.  Evidence  In  his 
country  showed  that  TPA  had  no  detrimental  effect on  the development  of 
marginal  fields  of  wharever  size.  He,  supported  by  other  delegates, 
argued  that  there  was  nothIng  spec I  a I  about  the  gas  1  ndustry  1  n  Its 
need  to make  major  long  term  Investments  In  exploration and  production. 
Many  Industries  faced  similar  Investment  decisions  and  Infrastructure 
constraints  on  their  ability  to  deliver  their  products  Into  final 
markets.  It  was  his  view  that  long  term  supply  contracts,  which 
committed  100X  of  the  reserves  of  a  field  and  Its  associated 
Infrastructure,  were  not  an  essential  precondition before  any  offshore 
gas  development  cou I  d  go  ahead,  though  they  were  des I  rab I.e  In  many 
circumstances  and  would  not  certainly be  ruled  out  by  TPA.·  Nor  was  It 
for  risk  taking  Industries,  such  as  the  oil  Industry,  to  be  protected 
by  monopo 1  y  ret  a I I I  ng  companIes  before  they  cou I  d  prof 1  tab 1  y  produce 
and  deliver  gas.  The  existence  of  TPA  In  their  country  has  nor 
prevented  long  term  contracts from  being  signed where  this was  the best 
way  of  developing  a  field  (and  most  new  gas  supplies  continued  to  be 
contracted on  a  long  term  basis)  but  It also allowed  both  producers  and 
consumers  the  flexibility  to  opt  for  shorter  term  arrangements,  where 
this was  mutually beneficial. - 6  -
4.0  EFFECTS  OF  TPA  ON  GAS  TRANSPORTATION 
With  respect  to gas  transportation and  access  to transportation offered 
to  third parties,  the  first  delegate  to  make  submissions  on  this  topic 
pointed  out  that  it  is  not  necessary  or  possible  to  find  identical 
solutions for  alI  twelve  member  states with  respect  to open  access.  It 
would  be  more  Important,  he  submitted,  to establish  simple  principles 
applicable  to  all  twelve  member  states,  and.  then  let  the  Individual 
states  Implement  them  In  a  way  that would  be  most  appropriate  for  them. 
WIth  respect  to  transportation  and  transportatIon  capacIty  a 
representative  commented  that  In  his  country  TPA  would  be  Incompatible 
with  nat lonal  leglslat ion.  He  added  that  present  transport  capacity 
would  only  be  sufficient  for  national  needs  and  would  be  insufficient 
to  accommodate  TPA.  He  further  argued  that  new  pipe I ine  investments 
would  be  significant  and  could  not  be  authorized  without  some  market 
guarantee  and  that  the  notion  of  TPA  Is  Incompatible  with  the 
obi igatlon to supply  the publ lc. 
Another  delegate  pointed  out  that  there  is  a  need  to  improve  the  gas 
system,  particularly  its  capacity  In  order  to  be  able  to  cope  with 
supply  difficulties.  He  further  argued  that,  as  demand  Is  expected  to 
Increase,  contracts  should  be  more  aligned  to  market  demands.  Short 
term  contracts  should  not  be  excluded  and  transporters  should  try  to 
cater  to  consumers'  needs,  shou 1  d  not  d 1  scr lm i nate  between  customers 
and  could  only  prioritize  sales  to  certain  ••strategicn  customers,  as 
defined by  member  states,  in  cases of  emergencies or  shortfall. 
Another  delegate  argued  that  gas  transportation  Is  not  an  Independent 
operation.  Changing  transportation  principles  would  affect  the  whole 
gas  procurement- transmission- distribution  chain.  Looking  at  the 
European  gas  supply  situation,  he  observed  that  when  there  exists  an 
oligopoly  of  supply,  a  fragmented  demand  may  lead  to  higher  prices. 
TPA  might  also  lead  to unnecessary  and  excessive  regulation.  The  need 
for  TPA  needs  still  to  be  proven  and  answers  should  not  be  given  In  a 
political  vacuum.  In  the  presence  of  existing  antitrust  legislation, 
both  at  the national  and  Community  level,  and  In  a  free market  economy, 
there  Is  no  need  to  regulate.  He  further  added  that  relevant 
legislation  In  his  country  was  liberal  and  allows  anyone  who  wants  to 
build  a  network  to do  so.  There  were  no  Import  monopolies.  There  are 
no  legal  Impediments  to  build  new  pipelines  or  prevent lng  a  pipeline 
operator  to make  pipeline capacity available to third parties. 
Other  delegate~  pointed  out  that  the  uncertainty  of  pipeline 
investments under  TPA  could  become  a  serious problem  for  countries that 
are  attempting  to  introduce  natural  gas  In  new  markets  and  questioned 
the  possibility of  a  Community  wide  gas  supply  system.  lt.was  further 
suggested  that special  attention should be  paid to the member  states at 
the  periphery of  the  Community  with  new  Immature  gas  markets  requiring 
significant  front  end  Investments.  Such  systems  should  be  allowed  a 
transition  period  of  sufficient  time  In  order  not  to  jeopardize  the 
financial  vlabl I lty of  such  Investments. - 7  -
The  next  delegate  pointed  out  that  Implementation  of  TPA  would  pose  a 
number  of  problems  (such  as  higher  risk  Investments  in  production  that 
could  lead  to  the  construction  of  sub-optimal  size  plpel ines,  the 
provision  and  pricing  of  back-up  services,  the  difficulties  of  the 
young  gas  companies).  He  considers  that  these  problems,  that  at  first 
view  don't  appear  to  be  unsurmountable,  have  to be  examined  carefully, 
particularly  concerning  security  of  supply,  and  that  they  cannot 
obscure  the  advantages  of  stronger  competItIve  pressures  and  a  more 
flexible gas market  for  the consumers. 
5.0  DOWNSTREAM  EFFECTS  OF  TPA  CCQNSUNPTIQN.  PRICES  AND  COMPETITION> 
In  the  context  of  natural  gas  production,  TPA  would  make  It  possible 
for  certain  customers  or  distribution  companies  to  select  purchasing 
gas  from  the producer  (or  the gas merchant,  or  broker) of  their  choice, 
In  principle  anywhere  Inside  or  outside  the  Community,  depending  on 
transmission  capacity  availability.  Such  a  scheme  would  also offer  a 
wider  choice  to  gas  users  and  could  also  Introduce  a  higher  degree  of 
competition at  the  level  of  natural  gas production. 
With  respect  to  consumption  of  natural  gas  In  the  Community,  the 
observation  was  made  by  all  participants that  demand  for  gas  had  grown 
significantly  In  the  past  twenty  five  years.  The  growth  still 
continues  and  most  participants  acknowledged  that  It  will  be  more 
difficult  to meet  future  demand  and  that  more  reliance will  have  to be 
placed  on  Imports  In  the  future,  as  Indigenous  Community  reserves  and 
production  will  not  be  able  to  meet  the  growth  In  consumption.  In 
this  regard,  as  one  delegate  pointed  out,  attention  should  also  be 
placed  to  another  objective  of  European  energy  policy,  namely 
diversification. 
Another  delegation  pointed out  that,  up  to  now,  the  natural  gas market 
has  been  a  buyer's  market,  but  the  expanded  use  of  natural  gas 
Indicates  that  the market  Is moving  towards  a  seller's market.  In  such 
a  case,  one  could  quest ion  the  consequences  of  Introducing  TPA  and 
argue  that  direct  access  for  the producers  to the end  user  market  would 
not  necessar I I  y  I  ead  to  lower  gas  prIces,  but  may  In  fact  gIve  the 
producers  the opportunity to charge prices higher  than  today. 
Delegates  of  member  states  with  little or  no  experience  with  natural 
gas  systems  that  are  stIll  under  development  expressed  reservation 
about  the  potential  benefits  of  a  TPA  regime  and  Its  potential  to  do 
better  than  present  schemes.  One  delegate  pointed  out  that  In 
embryonic  systems  relying  on  one  supplier  and  one  gas  company,. the 
Introduction of  TPA  might  create difficulties with  respect  to security 
of  supply  and  back-up  services  and  he  added  that  some  degree of  market 
protection  Is  necessary. 
Regarding  the  Impact  of  TPA  on  the  level  of  security of  supply  to  the 
final  consumer,  as  It  was  pointed  out  earlier,  there  were  two  main 
views  expressed.  One  was  that  TPA  might  not  have  a  positive effect on 
supply security. - 8  -
On  the other  hand,  another  delegate submitted  that  this  Is  not  the case 
In  his  country  and  added  that  his  experience  was  that  there  was  no 
effect on  supply  security to the customers  In  his country,  particularly 
the  smaller  customers.  He  further  submitted  that,  the  type  of  TPA 
chosen  would  be  Important.  If  properly structured,  It  should  stimulate 
new  supp I I  ers  to  enter  the  market  and  thus  enhance  both  supp I  y  and 
competition.  It  should  also  allow  consumers  to  choose  the  level  of 
security  that  may  be  the  most  appropriate.  for  their  needs  and/or 
consumption  pattern. 
The  general  feel"lng  of  the participants was  that  competition  In  general 
Is  beneficial.  However,  there  were  different  views  expressed  with 
respect  to  the  necessity  to  Introduce  TPA  In  order  to  achieve  more 
competition.  A number  of  delegates  challenged  the  general  expectation 
that  the  Introduction  of  more  competition  through  TPA  would  lead  to 
lower  prices.  It  was  also  pointed  out  that  a  fragmented  demand  may 
lead  to  higher  prices.  One  delegate  stated  that  observing  price 
developments  In  countries  where  some  form  of  TPA  has  been  Introduced, 
leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the  usefulness  of  TPA  to  obtain  lower 
prices  Is  yet  unproven.  Another  representative questioned whether  more 
competition  would  to  be  consistent  with  other  goals of  European  energy 
policy,  such  as  security of  supply.  In  this  regard  the  same  delegate 
expressed  the  view  that  some  basic competition  rules might  be  necessary 
to  govern  the  gas  market.  As  gas  market  share  Increases,  he  submitted 
that  there would  be  a  need  for  prices to remain  competitive  In  order  to 
a I low  ·gas  to  maIntaIn  and  even  Improve  Its  present  market  share.  As 
another  delegate  pointed  out,  competition  could  be  achieved  In 
different  ways,  for  example,  with  competitive  pricing  at  the  burner 
tip,  with  governmental  or  public  control  of  prices and/or  competition, 
or  wl th  TPA.  He  added  that  the  best  way  to  Intervene  depends  on 
historical  and  specific conditions  that  differ  from  country  to country 
and  that  there  Is  no  evidence  that  TPA  would  be  more  effect lve  than 
other  systems. 
On  the  other  hand,  another  delegate  emphasized  that  there  are 
significant  benefits  to  be  realized  from  the  Introduction  of  more 
competition,  Inter-fuel  and  more  particularly  gas  to  gas  competition. 
Customers  of  new  suppliers  stand  to  benefit,  because  new  suppliers 
wou I  d  be  expected  to  lower  prIces  In  order  to  enter  the  market  and 
remain  competitive.  Customers  of existing suppliers  are  also expected 
to  benefit,  as  the  mere  threat  of  competition  would  force  the 
traditional  suppliers  to adjust  their  prices  In  order  to  prevent  their 
customers  from  going  elsewhere.  Increased  gas  to  gas  competition  Is 
expected  to have  two  more  additional  benefits,  namely  the  •de-coupling• 
of  gas  prices  from  oil  prices  and  the  creation of  a  more  Independent 
natural  gas  market,  as  well  as  the  Increased  penetration  of  gas  In 
certain  traditional  and  new  markets,  such  as  the  power.  generation 
market. 
All  delegates agreed  that  Increased gas  penetration,  Independent  of  the 
way  It  were  achieved,  would  have  a  positive  and  beneficial  effect  on 
environmental  objectives. - 9  -
6.0 MODALITIES  OF  IMPLEMEN[ATIQN  OF  TPA 
The  fIrst  de I  egate  made  reference  to  sIgnIfIcant  changes  that  have 
occurred  and  continue  to occur  in  the  natural  gas  market,  such  as  new 
opportunities  In  East  Europe.  The  Introduction of  TPA  would  necessitate 
some  form  of  regu I  at I  on.  However,  It  was  argued  that  neIther  the 
necessity  nor  the  degree  of  TPA  to  be  Introduced  had  been  decided  and 
It  was  therefore  too early  to attempt  to define  the modalities at  this 
point  In  time. 
Another  representative  submitted  that  his  country  did  not  have  any 
exper lence  In  the  area  of  TPA  and  that  discussions  cont lnue  In  an 
effort  to determine  the  course of  action  to be  taken.  With  respect  to 
the overal I  need  for  regulation,  his view  was  that private arrangements 
between  the  part les  concerned  would  be  preferable  to  regulat lon.  He 
pointed  out  the  need  to establish  a  general  framework  for  competition 
and  then  allow  the  market  to operate.  He  suggested  that  the  voluntary 
system  that  may  be  adopted  to  facilitate  transit  may  also  be  suitable 
for  TPA  by  adding  a  conciliatory  body  that  would  be  empowered  to 
resolve disputes. 
Despite  the  presence  of  a  national  monopoly  In  his  country,  and  taking 
into  account  the  actual  situation  In  Europe  today,  he  submitted  that 
three  schemes  were  being  examined  In  parallel  In  order  to  enhance 
competition and  Integration of  the natural  gas markets: 
A scheme  of  cooperation  between  transmission  companies  In  order  to 
enhance  International  transit.  That  would  Include  the  systematic 
use  of  negotiations  of  all  Interested  parties  In  the  form  of  a 
consortium  that  would  Include  all  third  parties  and  possibly 
producers,  the  development  of  exchanges  between  companies  and  a 
common  management  of  networks,  storage and  take or  pay  obligations. 
A scheme  of  competition amongst  transmission companies. 
A scheme  of  competition  that  would  allow  more  competition  amongst 
producers  and  transmission  companies  by  allowing  them  to  supply 
directly to the  Industrial  sector and  distribution companies. 
The  competitive pressure of  the  first  scheme  would  allow  the  companies 
to  stay  In  control  of  their  markets  and,  thanks  to  a  greater 
cooperation,  be  able  to reduce  costs. 
He  argued  that  cost  and  price transparency would  be  essential  for  a  TPA 
system,  but  It  should  respect  the  confidentiality  of  commercial 
Information.  One  should  let  the  market  determine  and  decide  the  need 
to  build  addlt lonal  capacity  and  allow  the  operat lng  companies  to 
continue  providing  services  such  as  back-up,  without  disturbing  the 
equilibrium  that  exists  In  Europe  today.  Transportation  charges  should 
be  determined  on  the  basis of  total  costs and  that  an  overseeing  body, 
or  arbitrator,  would  be  an  acceptable  way  to  resolve  disputes  at 
Commun 1  ty  I  eve I . - 10 -
Another  representative,  drawing  attention  to  the  significant 
d 1  fferences  that  ex 1st  between  member  states,  ment loned  that  In  hIs 
country,  a  regulatory  scheme  to govern  the  development  of  the  national 
gas  gr ld  has  been  Implemented.  Consumer  prIces  are  regulated  In  an 
effort  to  promote  gas  and  make  It  more  attractive  than  diesel  and  fuel 
oil.  In  such  an  environment  the potential  benefits of a  TPA  regime  may 
not  be  passed  to  the  consumer  for  some  time,  In  order  to  allow  the 
recovery  of  the  Initial  large  capital  costs  ..  He  concluded  by  stating 
that  there would  be  need  for  a  dispute resolution mechanism. 
Another  delegate  submitted  that,  taking  Into  account  the  difficulties 
raised  elsewhere  In  this  report,  It  may  be  preferable  to  start  by 
studying  the possibility of  Introducing  an  experimental  phase  of  TPA  to 
a  limited  number  of  customers.  This  category  could  be  the  large users 
using  gas  as  feedstock.  On  the  same  point,  another  delegate  suggested 
the  possibility  of  Introducing,  perhaps  on  an  experimental  basis,  a 
system of  TPA  first  to the  large  Industrial  consumers  and  later  perhaps 
to the  small  consumers.  Taking  Into account  that  It should  be  possible 
to  stop  such  an  experiment,  If  It  proved  unsuccessful,  one  should  not 
create  a  regulatory  authority  at  Community  level  that  could,  with  Its 
inertia,  prevent  turning  back.  During  such  an  experimental  phase,  It 
would  not  be  necessary  to  Institute a  "back-up"  obligation;  the  large 
consumers  who  use  gas  as  feedstock,  he  added,  do  not  appear  to  require 
as much  security of  supply  for  gas  as  they  do  for  other materials. 
The  opening  up  of  the  grid  to  third parties  would  necessitate,  In  his 
view,  to  have  a  regulatory  mechanism  at  Community  level,  but  he  added 
that  this  mechanism  should  be  light  and  flexible.  It  could,  for 
Instance,  be  a  committee  of  the  type  of  committee  of  professionals and 
experts  envisaged  by  the  draft  Gas  Transit  Directive  which  could  deal 
wl th  disagreements  between  a  transporter  and  a  consumer  or  another 
transporter  on  the  conditions  of  gas  transport.  He  finally  suggested 
that  In  a  system of open  networks,  It  appears  necessary  that  the states 
could  control  gas  Imports,  for  reasons  of  security  of  supply.  The 
states should  have  the  means  to avoid  having  a  gas  exporter  acquire  a 
significant position  In  their gas  plan. 
The  next  delegate  argued  that  TPA  Induced  competition  would  require 
some  regulation.  It  suggested  that  only  the  monopoly  aspects  of  the 
natural  gas  business should  be  regulated and  at  this point  It may  still 
be  too  early  to  say  what  degree  of  regulation  Is  needed  and  at  what 
level.  There  are  advantages  In  having  some  regulation at  the  national 
level  and  advantages  as  well  as  disadvantages  of  having  regulation  at 
community  level,  such  as slow  procedures  and  regulatory over-burden. 
With  respect  to  the  form  of  TPA  that  would  be  able  to  achieve  more 
compet 1  t ion  wl thout  onerous  regu I  at ion,  he  drew  at  tent ion  _to  the  UK 
reg I  me  and  found  It  promising.  He  further  added  that  ma.rket  forces 
would  determine  the  need  for  new  pipeline  capacity  and  that  functions 
such  as  ensuring  back  up,  price  transparency  (that  respects  commercial 
confidentiality),  the setting of  transportation and  related charges  and 
dispute  resolution  should  be  part  of  the  responsibilities  of  a 
regulatory authority. - 11  -
The  next  representative  submitted  that,  before  discussing  the 
modalities  of  implementation  of  TPA,  the  nature  of  the  energy  market, 
and  more  specifically of  the  natural  gas  market,  need  to  be  taken  Into 
account.  He  added  that  the principle of subsidiarity  Is of  fundamental 
Importance  and  when  discussing  what  should  be  regulated  at  Community 
level  versus  the  national  level,  Community  Involvement  should  be  kept 
at  a  minimum,  so  as  to  leave  maximum  space  for  member  states  to  move. 
The  Community,  he  suggested,  should  establish  a  set  of  general 
principles aiming  at  achieving  Community  energy  policy,  and  the  member 
states  should  be  left  to  Implement  these  principles  by  choosing  their 
own  modalities.· This  would  be  the  way  to  achieve  maximum  efficiency 
and  do  justice to both  Industrial  and  consumer  needs. 
Another  delegate  submitted  that  a  general  approach  to  Implement  TPA 
should  Include: 
-a minimal  amount  of  regulation,  only where  needed 
-the  Introduction of  a  set  of  principles  that  will  apply  Community-
wide  and  could  Include  the  following: 
establish  the  basis  on  which  TPA  should  be  made  available,  e. 
g.  first come-first  served. 
ensure  that  TPA  should  be  made  available  to parties wishing  to 
use  all  or  any  part  of  the  pipeline  network  on  a  non-
discriminatory  basis,  recognizing  that  member  states  may  wish 
to  nprotect"  certain  categories of  customers  and  I imlt  TPA  to 
customers  above  a  particular  threshold of  consumption. 
ensure  that  plpel ine  operators  should  receive  a  reasonable 
level  of  compensation  for  making  transportation  and  related 
services  available  to  third  part les,  without  penalizing  or 
discriminating against  these customers. 
decide  whether  transporters  should  be  obi iged  to  build 
additional  capacity when  the system  is genuinely  full. 
if  the  existing  system  could  not  be  expanded  to  overcome 
bottlenecks,  member  states  to  be  wl I ling  to  authorize  the 
construction of  new  pipelines. 
ensure  regulation  is  kept  to  a  minimum,  make  arbitration 
available  to  resolve  disputes  and  allow  the  market  to 
determine  and  re~olve  commercial  issues  such  as  terms  of 
contracts,  basis of  tariffs etc. 
allow  flexibility  In  the  system  to evolve  over  time  and  adjust 
to market  needs  as  they  develop. 
leaving  the  Implementation  of  these  principles  to  national 
authorities - 12  -
It  was  the  view  of  the  same  representative  that  the  implementation  of 
TPA  doesn't  necessarily  require  the  creation  of  new  bodies.  National 
departments  of  Energy  could  carry  out  such  a  function  at  the  national 
level· and  existing  Commission  services  at  community  level.  He  added 
that  even  for  the  lmplementat ion  of  the  Gas  Transit  Direct lve,  some 
regulatory principles may  have  to be  established by  the COmmission.  It 
was  finally  his  assessment  that  any  regulatory  function  could  be 
carried  out  on  an  exception  basis,  I.e.,  there  Is  no  need  for 
continuous  Involvement,  unless  a  dispute  arises  that  requires  the 
regulator  to  Intervene  In  order  to  resolve  lt.  With  respect  to  price 
transparency,  he  argued  It  was  one  of  the  fundamental  principles 
necessary  to  ensure  non-discrimination,  however,  he  added,  cost 
transparency  for  the  supply  of  natural  gas  as  a  commodity  <excluding 
transportation  and  re 1  a ted  servIces),  wou I  d  neIther  be  needed  nor 
necessary  in  a  competitive  market.  With  respect  to  transportation 
charges,  he  suggested  that maximum  charges should  be  set, and  that  they 
should  cover  costs.  However,  the  question  still  remained  whether  It 
should  be  marginal  or  average  costs  that  should  provide  the  basis  for 
setting transportation and  related charges. 
7.0 SIJMMARY  AND  FINAL  OBSERVATIONS 
7.1  Areas of agreement 
The  dl"scusslons  did not  put  In  question  the  argument  that  the obJective 
of  the  Internal  Energy  Market: 
- should  have  beneficial  consequences  for  consumers  In  the  Community 
and  for  the competitiveness of  Its  Industry. 
should  also  be  an  important  factor  in  the  Community's  security  of 
energy  supplies; 
During  the  discussions  another  Important  argument  made  was  that  means 
other  than  TPA  were  also  able  to  favour  the  continued  Integration  of 
the  CommunIty  natura I  gas  market.  Among  the  means  mentioned  were, 
first,  the  necessity  to  Increase  at  COmmunity  level  convergence  in 
different  domains  (such  as  fiscal,  environmental,  accounting  policies, 
standardization  etc.)  and  second,  the  elimination  of  trade  obstacles 
incompatible  with  the  Treaty  of  Rome:  In  this  context  some  delegates 
made  reference  to  Import  and  export  monopolies. 
A  third  Important  argument  that  was  made  Implicitly  during  the 
discussions  is  that  long  term  gas  supply  contracts  constitute  an 
important  guarantee for  the security of  natural  gas  supply. 
It  is also fair  to say  that,  In  the context of TPA,  and  oniy  If  It were 
to be  Introduced,  there was  agreement  on  the following  four  aspects: 
first,  It  was  agreed  to  exclude  decisively  any  form  of  •common-
carrier•,  as  It  Implies  a  danger  of  pro  rating existing  contracts 
and  thus a  danger  to the continuity of supply. - 13 -
second,  Its  modalities  of  Implementation  should  be  based,  as  much 
as possible,  on  simple  and  flexible principles: 
as  much  regulation  as  necessary,  but  keep  It  to  a  minimum  to 
avoid  unnecessary  bureaucracy; 
priority to regulation at  national  versus Community  level; 
experimentation and  evaluation; 
third,  special  provisions  would  have  to  be  drawn  concerning 
existing  contracts  and  particularly,  existing  "take  or  pay• 
obi lgatlons  In  order  to  avoid  financial  difficulties  to  those 
utilities  who  have  to  honour  these  obligations  under  existing 
contracts. 
finally,  the  necessity  to  consider  particular  protective  measures 
for  Investments  made  in  order  to  Introduce or  expand  natural  gas  in 
Immature  or  new  markets. 
7.2 Remaining  differences 
In  general  terms,  a  number  of  delegates  kept  repeating  that  the 
traditional  and  even  young  natural  gas  systems  that  exist  In  most 
member  states  have  proven  their  efficiency.  This  was  not  necessarily 
the  case  with  a  system  such  as  the  one  existing  In  the  UK:  as 
interesting as  It  may  be,  this system  was  Influenced  by  the  particular 
circumstances  of  that  country  and  Its  implementation  was  too  recent  to 
allow  drawing  any  Irrefutable  conclusions.  They  kept  reminding  that 
they  saw  no  need  to  replace  a  well  established system  by  a  system  that 
has  yet  to prove  Itself. 
On  the  other  hand,  It  was  poInted  out  by  two  de I  egates  that  the  UK 
system  has  not  I  esu I  ted  In  any  of  the  dIsadvantages,  referred  to  by 
other  delegates,  attr lbuted  to  the  lntroduct lon  of  TPA.  The  UK  did 
provide  a  concrete  example  of  how  such  a  system  worked  In  practIce, 
whether  or  not  such  a  system  proved  an  exactly  suitable  model  for  a 
more  widely  based  Community  system. 
Always  speaking  In  general  terms,  many  delegates  argued  that  the 
Internal  Market  for  natural  gas  (and  the  Introduction of  some  form  of 
TPA)  did  not  necessarily  presuppose  a  modification  In  the  corporate 
structure of  the gas  Industry.  In  other words,  the actual  diversity of 
these  structures  would  not  constitute  In  Itself  an  unsurmountable 
obstacle  In  the achievement  of  the  Internal  Market  for  natural  gas. 
It  Is  clear  that  the  debate  brought  to  light  the  persl~tence  of 
appreciably  divergent  points  of  view  on  a  number  of  other· Issues  and 
more  specifically on  the possible effects of a  TPA  system. 
a)  Possible effects 
These  differences of opinion may  be  summarized  as follows: - 14 -
I)  Concerning  the  Impact  of  a  TPA  system  on  the  explorat lon  and 
production of natural  gas. 
Certain delegates feared  that  a  TPA  system  would  add  additional 
uncerta lnty  and  would  subsequently  have  negat lve  effects  on 
exploration  and  production  activities.  The  need  for  long  term 
agreements  (with  take  or  pay  clauses)  Is  seen  by  them  as  a 
necessary  condition  for  the  development  of  gas  fields. 
Furthermore,  the  absence  of  a  secure  market  would  result  In 
marginal  fields being  left unexplored or  undeveloped. 
The  opposIte  v lew  was  expressed  by  another  de legate  from  a 
member  state  which  has  actual  TPA  experience.  He  Indicated 
that,  wh lie  long  term  contracts  are  stIll  be tng  entered  Into 
after  the  Introduction of  TPA,  the  new  regime  has  also allowed 
both  producers  and  consumers  to  enter  Into  shorter  term 
contracts,  when  It  was  mutually  beneficial  to  do  so.  His  view 
was  that  no  negatIve  effects  have  been  experIenced  so  far, 
concerning  exploration  and  production  of  fields  of  any  size. 
Furthermore,  due  to  the  Increased  range  of  potential  future 
buyers,  It  could  be  argued  that  a  TPA  regime  might  have  a 
positive overall  effect on  gas  exploration and  production. 
II)  Concerning  the  Impact  of  TPA  on  the  transportation of  natural 
gas 
Certain  delegates  argued  that  the  Integrated  character  of  the 
present  system  allows  for  maximum  rationalization of activities 
at  the  lowest  cost.  Furthermore,  the  transportation  function 
Is,  In  their  view,  only  a  part  of  an  Integral  system  of 
operatIons  <Including  services  such  as  back-up,  storage  and 
load  balancing)  which,  by  the  nature  of  Its  Integration, 
results  In  better  quality  of  service  and  higher  security  than 
that  offered  by  a  TPA  reg I  me.  They  added  that  a  fragmented 
demand  for  gas  caused  by  TPA  would  have  a  negative  effect  on 
new  pipeline  Investments. 
On  the other  hand,  It  was  argued  that  a  more  open  market  under 
a  TPA  regime  would  result  In  a  better  allocation of  resources 
and  a  greater  scope  for  efficiency  Improvements  resulting  from 
competitive pressure. 
Ill)  Concerning  the  Impact  of  TPA  on  prices and  co.petltlon 
Certain  delegates expect  that  the  growing  gas  market  will  soon 
change  Into a  sellers' market  which  could  lead  to higher  prices 
In  the  case  of  fragmentatIon  of  demand  under  TPA_,  and  the 
strengthening  of  the  position  of  the  producers.  Another 
argument  that  was  presented  was  that  TPA  would  Introduce 
ser lous  dlscr lmlnat ton  by  ask lng  capt lve  customers,  or 
customers  with  little  negotiating  power,  to  pay  for  the 
benefits that would  be  obtained by  the  large consumers.  On  the 
other  hand  It  was  argued  that,  by  Increasing  exchanges  and  by 
Increasing  the  opportunities offered  to  lower  cost  sources  of 
supply,  TPA  would  allow  the  reduction of  natural  gas  prices. - 15  -
Furthermore,  TPA  would  lead  to  a  closer  relationship of  prices 
wl th  costs,  would  reduce  the  r lsk  of  discr lmlnatory  cross-
subsidies  between  consumer  types  and  would  thus  lead  to  a  more 
rational  price  structure  that  would  be  more  favourable  to 
general  economic  development. 
b)  Modal It lea 
A certain number  of  delegates felt  It  was  premature  to  discuss  the 
modalities of  Introducing  a  TPA  system.  In  this context,  some  felt 
that  one  should  walt  to  see  the  results  of  the  measures  being 
adopted  (Price  Transparency  Directive)  or  proposed  (Gas  Transit 
Directive)  at Community  level. 
However,  concerning  the  possible  modalities  of  Implementing  a  TPA 
scheme,  two  interrelated  Issues,  even  though  only  br lef ly 
discussed,  appeared  to be  the subject of divrglng opinions: 
the  advantages  and  particular IY  the  feaslblll ty  of  unbundling 
the various activities of  the gas  sector  (supply,  transmission, 
distribution). 
cost  transparency. 
7.3 General  observations 
The  CCEMG  fulfilled  Its  mandate  practically  within  the  set  deadline, 
despite  the  fact  that first,  some  delegates felt  they  were  under  fairly 
strong  time  pressure,  and  moreover,  that  the  mandate  of  the  Committee 
should  have  been  expanded  to  Include  a  comparIson  of  the  relat lve 
merits of a  TPA  system with  the more  traditional  systems of  supply. 
The  debate  was  frank  and  was  conducted  In  a  positive  and  open 
atmosphere.  In  this  regard,  It  Is  Important  to  underline  that,  even 
though  they  frequently expressed  themselves more  as experts rather  than 
national  representatives,  the  delegates  accepted  In  this  report  the 
principle  of  anonymity  which  Indicates  that  the  positions  expressed 
were  not  necessar II y  fIxed  and  I  rrevers I  b I  e.  ThIs  agrees  wIth  the 
Intention  of  the  Commission,  when  It  created  the  consultative 
Committees  to deal  with  the  Issue of  TPA. 
As  It  Is  natural,  the  discussions  In  the  frame  of  CCEMG  were  less 
technical  than  those  of  the  professional  COIMIIttees;  on  the  other 
hand,  concerns of energy  policy were  always  at  the forefront  of  various 
Interventions. 
Finally  <and  without  prejudice to what  was  said  In  the second_ paragraph 
of  this  chapter),  It  appeared  that,  In  terms  of  balance  of  opinions, 
the  sceptics of  the  possible  advantages  and  modalities of  Implementing 
TPA  outnumbered  those  who  were  favourable.  However,  a  number  of 
delegates  did  not  wish  to  express  themselves  neither  In  favour  nor 
against  a  TPAsystem  at  this stage. 
Commission  Services,  In  accordance  with  their  task,  remained  neutral  at 
this stage on  all  aspects of  the problem. - 16  -
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APPENDIX  B 
Glossary of  terms 
Right  to  the  use 
transportation  grid 
system. 
of 
In 
the 
a  TPA 
An  intermediary  who  buys  gas 
from  whatever  source  for  its 
subseQuent  resale. 
Theoretical  definition of  common 
carriage  includes  the allocation 
of  capacity  pro  rata  among  a II 
applicants.  This  concept  is 
excluded  in  the  definition  of 
TPA  used  in  this report. 
Process  of  charging  an 
unjustifiably  low  price  to 
customer  groups  and  compensating 
for  this  by  charging  higher 
prices  to other  customer  groups. 
The  transport  of  natural  gas  on 
lower  pressure  local  networks 
for  del Ivery  to final  consumers. 
Gas  operations  relating  to 
transmission within  the European 
communIty,  d i str I  but ion  and 
related  services  as  well  as  gas 
marketing. 
As  merchant  gas  company,  but 
also  performs  the  function  of 
distribution. 
Local  distribution company. - 20  -
Merchant  gas  company 
Region 
Supply 
Take  or  Pay  Obi lgatlons 
Third  Party Access- TPA 
Transmission 
Unbundling 
Upstream 
Gas  company  that  includes  the 
following  functions:  bulk 
purchase  from  producers, 
transmission and  sale of  gas. 
The  geographical  area  served  by 
a  particular grid. 
The  de II very  of  natura I  gas  to 
final  consumers,  Including 
arrangements  for  purchase, 
transmission,  storage  and 
distribution. 
Financial  contractual  obi lgatlon 
of  a  natura I  gas  buyer  to  pay 
for  a  certain  mInimum  Quant I  ty 
of  gas  IrrespectIve  of  whet her 
he  takes delivery of  that  gas. 
A  scheme  providing  for  a 
Qua II fled  ob II gat I  on  on 
companies  operating  natural  gas 
transportation  facilities  to 
offer  terms  for  the use of  their 
system. 
The  transport  of  natural  gas  on 
the  Interconnected  high  pressure 
grid. 
Disaggregation  of  charging, 
accounting  or  management  of 
part I  cuI ar  ope rat Ions,  or  even 
ownership  of  an  Integrated  or 
partly  Integrated gas  company. 
Gas  operations  relating  to 
exploration,  production  and 
purification  of  natural  gas  up 
to  the  delivery  point  to  the 
transmission  grid  In  the 
European  Community. COMMISSION 
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PCCG  Committee  Procedures 
(Note  by  the Chairman) 
In  arranging  these  consultations  It  was  our  aim  In  the  European 
Commission  to  bring  about  a  genuine  discussion  between  the  members  of 
the  Professional  Committee,  rather  than  simply  to  ascertain  their 
Individual  views  or  those of  the  Interests  they  represented.  That  could 
In  any  case  have  been  achieved  by  correspondence or  bilateral  meetings. 
From  the  beginning,  therefore,  It was  clear  that  the Committee's  Report 
shou I  d  both  IdentIfy  the  key  Issues.  as  requIred  by  the  terms  of 
reference,  and  clarify  the  areas  of  agreement  or  disagreement  between 
the participants. 
Against  this background  It was  essential  that  the  text of  the Committee 
Report  should  be  based  on  thorough  discussion  of  all  aspects  of  the 
Third  Party Access  (TPA)  Question.  After  a  first  procedural  meeting  In 
Ma~  1990,  therefore,  the  discussions  were  divided  Into  four  subject 
areas: 
COnsumption,  Prices and  Competition 
Gas  Transport 
Exploration,  Production and  Gas  Purchases 
Modalities and  Regulation. 
For  each  of  these  areas  a  first  discussion  was  held  on  the  basis of  a 
non-exclusive agenda  sent out  In  advance  by  the Commission,  In  Its role 
as Committee  Secretariat.  The  Secretariat  then  prepared and  circulated 
to  Members  a  draft  Chapter  for  the  Committee  Report  dealing  with  that 
subject  . 
ThIs  draft  text  was  then  dIs  cussed  In  a  second  CommIt tee  meet I  ng. 
revised  accordingly,  circulated  for  written  comments  and  revised  for  a 
second  time.  A few  further  changes  were  made  to  these  Chapters  at  a 
later  stage,  to  take  account  of  the  final  phases  of  the  Committee's 
discussions. 
Following  the  discussions  of  the  four  subject  areas,  the  SecretarIat 
prepared  an  ExecutIve  Summary  for  the  over a II  Report.  In  success  1  ve 
versions,  this  text  was  discussed  three  times  In  the  Committee  and 
twice  circulated for  written comments,  with  revisions at each  stage. - i;  -
To  Illustrate  the  extensive  nature  of  these  consultations,  the  effect 
of  TPA  on  consumption,  prices  and  competition,  for  Instance,  was 
discussed  In  both  the  Committee's  June  and  July  1990  meetings.  Written 
comments  on  successive  draft  texts  of  the  Chapter  dealing  with  that 
subject  were  requested  In  September  and  again  In  February  1991.  The 
subject  of  consumption,  prices and  competition  was  returned  to  In  the 
three  Commlt~ee  discussions  of  the  Executive  Summary  In  January, 
February  and  March  1991  and  In  Members'  written  comments  on  that 
Summary  text. 
The  Report  of  the  Professional  Consultative  Committee  on  Gas  Is 
therefore a  synthesis of  views  exchanged  In  the Committee's  discussions 
and/or  expressed  In  written  comments.  As  such,  It  should  not  be  taken 
to reflect  In  detal I  the views  of  any  Individual  Committee  Member. 
Some  Comml ttee  members,  however,  requested  that  the  published  report 
should  be  accompanied  by  position statements setting out  their  views  or 
those  of  their  organ I  sat Ions  on  the  TPA  Issue.  These  statements  are 
annexed  to  the  PCCG  Report,  but  were  not  discussed by  the Committee  and 
should  not  be  taken  as  forming  part of  the Report. 
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EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY 
1.  The  concept  of  Third  Party Access  (TPA)  Is  that  buyers  or  sellers 
of  gas,  or  selected  categories  of  buyers  and  sellers,  would  have 
the  right  to  be  offered  transport  services  by  the  companies  which 
own  the  Community's  gas  pipeline  systems.  In  pr lnclple,  where 
capacity was  available,  this would  make  It  possible  for  consumers 
or  dIstrIbutors  to  buy  gas  through  the  pIpe II ne  system  from  a 
range  of existing or  new  suppliers,  thus  removing  a  key  barrier  to 
competition  within  the  natural  gas  market.  A number  of  Important 
doubts  have  been  raised  however  about  the  effects  of  TPA  on  the 
gas  market,  and  on  whether  competition  would  In  practice  be 
enhanced. 
2.  The  Commission  asked  the  Professional  Consultative  COmmittee  to 
Identify  the  Issues  arising  from  the  concept  of  Third  Party 
Access,  rather  than  to  recommend  whether  or  not  TPA  shou I  d  be 
Introduced  In  the  Community's  gas  market.  The  terms  of  reference 
agreed  by  the Committee  at  Its  first meeting,  therefore,  were  to 
•• IdentIfy  and  present  the  ma 1  n  techn I  ca 1 ,  economIc  and 
administrative  considerations  which  should  be  taken  Into  account 
In  Community  policy  on  whether  and,  If  so,  In  what  form  and  by 
what  means  third-party  access  to  gas  transport  systems  should  be 
provided." 
It  was  agreed  that  both  transmission  and  distribution  systems 
should  be  covered  by  this  remit.  The  Committee  was  not  asked  to 
consider  legal  questions. 
3.  The  results of  this work  are  presented  In  Chapters  2  to 5 of  this 
Report.  But  the  discussions  In  the  Committee  have  shown  that 
there  are  maJor  differences  of  view  about  the  advantages  or 
disadvantages of  the Third Party Access  approach. 
4.  These  differences of  view  centre on  three main  Issues 
would  security  of  supply  be  Jeopardlsed  by  the  Introduction 
of  TPA,  or  would  the  new  market  situation  stll.l  attract  the 
necessary gas  supplies and  preserve security of supply  for  the 
final  consumer  ? 
would  the general  level  of consumer  gas  prices,  and  the prices 
paid by  particular  types of consumers,  be  higher  or  lower  as a 
result of  TPA  ? - 8  -
Would  the  Introduction of  TPA  lead  to  excessive  regulation or 
could  regulation be  kept  within  reasonable  limits? 
5.  These  three domInant  Issues of  secur l.ty  of supp I  y,  consumer  pr Ices 
and  regulation  are  discussed  further  below.  Another  Important 
Issue,  the  Impact  of  TPA  on  existing  and  prospective  Take  or  Pay 
agreements,  Is  discussed  under  both  the  first  and  third  headings. 
Other  quest Ions  such  as  pipeline  capacity  and  transport  charges 
are dealt with  under  the  heading  of  regulation. 
SUPPly  and  Security of SuPply 
6.  At  present  the Community's  gas  requirements  are met  from  a  variety 
of  sources  within  the  Community  (mainly  Netherlands  and  the  UK) 
and  outside  (mainly  Norway,  USSR  and  Algeria).  It  Is  common  ground 
that  gas  demand  Is  likely  to rise substantially  In  the  next  10  to 
20  years,  and  that  to  satIsfy  thIs  demand  add 1  t lona I  gas  wou I  d 
need  to  be  produced  within  the  EC  and  purchased  from  elsewhere. 
The  view  of  the  gas  producer  representatives  and  some  others  on 
the  Conlnlttee  Is  that  the  Introduction  of  TPA  would  create  such 
uncertainty  as  to  jeopardise  gas  exploration  and  development  and 
the  availability  of  supply,  both  within  the  Community  and  In 
regard  to external  suppliers.  They  believe that  long-term security 
of  supply  can  best  be  assured  by  the  present  system  In  which  the 
gas  companies,  with  their  effective  monopoly  of  final  gas  sales, 
can  aggregate  their  consumers'  demand  and  provide  large  offtake 
(take  or  pay)  guarantees.  This  Is  felt  to  be  particularly 
Important  for  major  Investments  In  offshore  and  other  h lgh  cost 
fields,  or  In  long-distance  pipeline  delivery  systems<1>.  There 
would  also  be  Important  consequences  If  a  move  to  TPA  prevented 
compliance  with  existing  take  or  pay  contracts  (see  paragraph  23 
below  >. 
7.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  long-term  take  or  pay  agreements 
constitute  a  highly  effective  means  of  reducing  upstream 
Investment  risks.  The  question  Is  whether  sufficient  gas  supplies 
would  still  come  forward  In  a  TPA  situation.  Some  Committee 
members  believe  that  this would  be  the  case  and  do  not  accept  the 
views  expressed  In  the  preceding  paragraph.  They  argue  that  many 
consumers  or  dlstr I  but lon  companies  could  provide  offtake 
guarantees  (or  take  over  a  part  of  existing  take  or  pay 
(1)  These  views  were  supported  by  the  Norwegian  State  oil  company, 
STATOIL,  In  an  Informal  presentation to COmmittee  Members. - 9  -
agreements)  and  that  some  upstream  companies  with  no  downstream 
gas  Interests might  Increase  their gas  exploration and  development 
efforts  If  they  were  no  longer  restricted  to  selling  to  a  small 
number  of  purchasers.  Such  companies  might  be  Interested  In 
entering a  more  open  and  growing  downstream  market  themselves,  as 
has  happened  In  the  UK.  Producers  with  downstream  Interests would 
no  doubt  remaIn  act I  ve  In  br I  ng I  ng  forward  gas  supp I I  es.  In 
principle,  external  suppliers  could  also  be  expected  to  remain 
strongly  Interested  In  selling  gas  Into  the  large  and  growing 
community  market,  depending  on  prices  and  other  contractual 
conditions. 
8.  The  view  of  the  merchant  gas  company  representatives  and  some 
others  on  the  Committee  Is  that  upstream  purchase  prices  would 
tend  to  be  Increased  by  the  lntroduct I  on  of  a  TPA  reg I  me.  They 
believe that,  at a  time  of growing  demand,  TPA  could shift  market 
power  in  the direction of  the  limited  number  of  external  suppliers 
by  'fragmenting'  demand  so  that  many  more  buyers  would  be  bidding 
for  supplies,  rather  than  just  the  present  small  number  of  major 
gas  companies.  Some  other  Committee  Members,  however,  take  the 
view  that greater competition  In  the  downstream  market  would  exert 
strong  downward  pressure on  upstream  purchase  prices.  Ultimately, 
the  level  of  prices over  time  would  of  course  be  that  necessary 
to  bring  supply  and  demand  Into  line.  Higher  prices would  tend  to 
encourage  upstream  activity  but  reduce  market  penetration  In  the 
face  of  competition  from  oil  and  other  fuels,  whilst  lower  prices 
would  work  In  the other direction  In  both  respects. 
9.  The  Issue  of  supply  security  also· has  a  downstream  aspect.  The 
merchant  gas  companies  stated  that  If  TPA  were  Introduced  they 
could  no  longer  Invest  In  reserve  pipeline  capacity  and  keep 
capacity aval lable  for  dealing with  unexpected  supply difficulties 
and  ensuring continuity of  supply  to  local  distribution companies. 
They  also  argued  that  TPA  and  unbundling  of  specific  downstream 
functIons  would  prevent  the  opt lmal  use  of  the  pipeline  system. 
Lastly  they  argued  that  TPA  customers  would  not  automatically  be 
able  to obtain  back-up  gas  supplies  from  their  local  supplier  If 
their  contracted  source  of  supply  failed.  Some  others  on  the 
Committee,  however,  did not  accept  these views  and  believed that  a 
TPA  situation would  still  bring  forward  reserve  pipeline  capacity 
eg.  through  a  growth  In  Interruptible  sales.  These  Issues  are 
discussed  further  below. 
Consumer  Prices 
10.  The  Committee  Identified  considerable  differences  of  view  about 
the effect of  TPA  on  the general  level  of prices paid by  consumers 
for  gas,  and  on  the  relative  price  levels  for  different  types  of 
consumer. - 10 -
11.  In  the current situation most  gas  consumers,  large  and  small,  pay 
prices  related  to  (or  just  below)  the  cost  of  using  the 
alternative  fuel,  usually  oil.  Where  there  Is  a  real  possibility 
of  consumers  changing  to  another  fuel  In  the  short  term  (fuel 
switching)  or  longer  term  (changes  In  equipment),  It  Is  clearly 
Improbable  that  prIces  could  r lse  to  and  stay  at  higher  levels 
over  any  sustained  period  of  time  without  reducing  market  sales, 
even  If  the  merchant  gas  companies'  expectatIons  about  upstream 
prices  and  higher  system  costs  proved  correct.  Some  participants, 
however,  argued  that  In  the expanding  market  which  Is  foreseen  It 
would  be  open  to  companies  to  serve  only  higher  price  sectors of 
the market. 
12.  Some  Committee  members  believe  that  the  general  level  of  consumer 
gas  prices  might  be  lower  In  a  TPA  situation,  as  an  Inevitable 
consequence  of  TPA  opening  the  way  for  gas-to-gas  competition  and 
for  new  sellers  to  enter  the  market.  They  argue  that  oil-related 
pricing  could  no  longer  be  maintained  In  a  situation  where 
consumers  had  a  choice of  changing  suppliers,  even  If  they  did  not 
exercise  that  choice,  and  that  to  move  away  from  that  system  of 
pricing would  be  desirable  In  terms  of  lower  costs  for  consumers 
and  a  stable  level  of  gas  prices  less  subject  to  the  vagaries  of 
the  International  oil  market.  They  underline  the  favourable 
consequences  this would  have  In  reducing  the Community's  reliance 
on  Imported  oil,  and  stress  also  the  environmental  qual lty 
advantages of  Increased use  of  gas,  for  Instance  In  CHP  schemes. 
13.  The  merchant  gas  company  and  producer  representatIves,  on  the 
other  hand,  believe that  there would  not  be  much  scope  for  gas-to-
gas  competition  or  for  new  sellers  entering  the  market  because. 
Inter  a I I  a.  of  I lm 1  tat Ions  on  the  product I  on  and  de II verab 1 I 1  ty 
of  new  gas  supplies.  They  argue  therefore  that  TPA  would  not  have 
any  downwards  Impact  on  consumer  prices.  They  also say  that many 
consumers  would  want  to  cont lnue  to  pay  oil-related  prIces  to 
ensure  that  their  energy  costs  are  kept  In  line  with  competitors 
elsewhere.  Lastly,  they  argue  that  this  method  of  pricing 
ensures  a  high  market  penetration  for  natural  gas  by  guaranteeing 
that  the  prIces  of  the  a I  ternat l  ve  o II  products  In  the  var lous 
market  sectors are always  undercut .  .... 
14.  Some  participants  believe  that  the  relative  prices  for  different 
classes  of  consumer  would  not  change  much  unless  TPA  competition 
did  have  an  effect  on  overall  consumer  price  levels.  The  merchant 
gas  companies  and  others do  not  believe  that  this  Is  likely.  They 
argue  that  any  price- reductions  would  mainly  benefit  larger 
consumers  eligible  for  TPA,  and  that  smaller  consumers  might  even 
pay  more  because  of  an  Increased  risk  of  cross-subsldlsatlon  and - 11  -
higher  costs -likely,  In  their  view,  to  arise  from  TPA.  Others  In 
the  Committee  contend  that  all  consumers  might  well  benefit 
because  of  a  reduction  In  the  general  level  of  gas  prices,  and 
that  regulatory  authorities would,  as  Is  already  the  case  In  some 
countries,  guard  against  cross-subsldlsatlon  risks.  They  also 
point  out  that  local  distribution .companies  could,  with  TPA, 
compete  for  lower  price gas  supplies and  pass on  benefits to their 
smaller  consumers.  This  last  point  was  however  contested  by  other 
participants,  who  asserted  that  LDC's  would  not  be  In  a  position 
to compete  for  lower  priced gas  supplies. 
15.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  If  TPA  competition  were  effective 
the  prIces  paid  by  TPA  consumers  would  tend  to  bear  a  closer 
relation  to  supply  costs  than  Is  at  present  the  case.  This  would 
mitigate  against  any  attempts  to  establish  pricing  patterns  for 
these  consumers  In  accordance  with  regional  or  Industrial  policy 
alms.  It  could  also  lead  to  a  greater  'reglonallsatlon'  of 
reliance  on  particular  gas  sources,  although  this  could  reduce 
over a I I costs. 
Regulation 
16.  Although  TPA  could  have  consequences  for  all  sectors  of  the  gas 
market,  the extent  of  direct  TPA  activity would  depend  In  part  on 
how  many  and  which  types  of  consumer  <or  distributor)  were 
eligible  to  enter  Into  such  arrangements.  It  Is  Inherent  In  the 
concept  that  those  who  became  eligible  for  TPA  should  no  longer 
need  to  be  covered  by  price  controls or  supply  obligations  where 
those exist  today. 
There  cou I  d  be  three  categorIes  of  e I I  g I  b I I I  ty  for  consumers  or 
distributors: 
those declared eligible for  TPA; 
those  who  could  choose  to be  eligible but  who  would  otherwise 
remain  covered  by  their existing  regulatory arrangements; 
those  declared  Ineligible. 
The  Committee  felt  tht~,  at  least  Initially,  many  smaller 
consumers  would  wish  to  continue  to  benefit  from  p_rlce  controls 
and  supply obligations,  and  would  therefore be  unlfkely  to opt  for 
TPA  even  If  they  were  Included  In  the  second  category.  Some 
Committee  members  felt  that  household  consumers  should  definitely 
be  excluded  on  grounds  of  supply  security,  taking  account  of 
safety  r lsks,  and  to  ree:.;.ce  regulatory  complex tty.  Another  view 
was  that  such  consumers  should  not  be  permanently  excluded;  they 
might  be  excluded  Initially with  the  possibility of  being  brought 
wl thIn  TPA  later  In  the  light  of  exper lence  of  the  new  market 
situation. - 12  -
17.  Although  the  Introduction  of  TPA  would,  as  noted  In  the  previous 
paragraph,  reduce  the  need  for  some  types  of  regulation  for 
certain  categor les  of  consumers,  there  are  a  number  of  problems 
Inherent  In  the  TPA  concept  which  would  require  new  regulatory 
Intervention.  These  mainly  concern  transport,  In  particular  the 
availability and  allocation of  transport  capacitY  and  the question 
of  transPort  charges.  But  there would  also  be  some  related  Issues 
Including  arrangements  for  dealing  with  supply  Interruptions  and, 
possibly,  access  to  gas  storage  or  blending  facilities.  It  would 
be  Important  to  ensure  that  the  Introduction of  TPA  did  not  lead 
onto  regulation at  the  level  of  gas  production,  which  could  have 
adverse  consequences  for  upstream activity. 
18.  There  was  general  agreement  that  regulation  should  be  kept  to  a 
minimum,  although  many  Committee  members  felt  that  this would  not 
be  feasible  and  that  regulation  would  tend  to  Increase  over  time. 
One  approach  discussed  In  the Committee  was  to  limit  the  need  for 
case-by-case  lntervent ion  by  laying  down  clearly  in  advance  the 
main  principles of  a  TPA  regime  In  the  form  of  a  legally  binding 
Community  Instrument.  Regulatory  Interventions would  then  need  to 
deal  only  with  disputes  about  the  correct  Implementation  of  the 
principles,  always  provided  that  the  principles were  sufficiently 
comprehensIve.  It  mIght  a I  so  he I  p  to  provIde  for  some  form  of 
Independent  arbitration  of  certain  types  of  dispute  before 
recourse  to  the  regulator.  Doubts  were,  however,  raised  on 
whether  this approach  could  deal  satisfactorily with  the problems 
which  could  arise  In  a  TPA  situation.  In  particular,  It  was 
argued  that  each  case  woul.d  Involve  different  details which  could 
not  be  anticipated  In  advance. 
19.  As  an  alternative  to  the  approach  outlined  In  the  previous 
paragraph,  the  possibility was  raised of  TPA  legislation based  on 
the  prevention  of  abuse  by  undertakings  dominating  the  market. 
Such  abuse  regulation  would  be,  from  the  viewpoint  of  both 
procedures  and  principles,  an  element  of  cartel  law.  It  would 
leave  the conclusion and  contents of  transmission contracts to the 
parties  Involved,  thus providing scope  for  varying solutions.  Only 
In  I  nd I  vI dua I  cases  of  refusa I  to  grant  access  on  reasonab I  e 
terms,  would  the  relevant  authorities  Investigate  and  take 
correct lve  act ion.  They  would  do  so  on  the  basis  of  general 
predetermined  criteria  indicating  what  situations  should  be 
cons I  de red  as  abuses  of  domInant  posIt I  on.  The  C~.l  t tee  d 1  d  not 
discuss  In  any  detail  the  arguments  for  and  against  such  an 
approach,  or  its  legal  Implications. 
20.  The  Committee  did  not  attempt  to  define  the  details  of  the 
regulation which  would  need  to accompany  TPA.  But  some  of  the  key 
parameters  for  dealing  with  the  issues  mentioned  In  paragraph  17 
above  were  discussed,  and  are outlined  In  more  detail  In  Chapter  5 
of  this report. - 13  -
21.  On  transoort  caoaclty  there would  clearly  have  to  be  an  equitable 
system  for  Identifying  and  allocating  spare  pipeline  capacity, 
where  this  was  Insufficient  to  deal  with  new  transmission  needs, 
and  for  ensur lng  that  capacIty  could  stIll  be  made  available  to 
deal  with  emergency  situations.  There  might  also need  to be  some 
means  of  ensur lng  that  the  development  of  gas  pipe I ine  systems 
over  time  took  account  of  TPA  as well  as of  the merchant  company's 
own  sales.  It  was  however  contested  whether  these  alms  could  be 
achieved  satisfactorily  In  a  complex  and  highly  Interconnected 
pipeline network. 
Transport  charges  should,  according  to some  Committee  members,  be 
based  on  a  clear  published  scale  of  charges  derived  from 
separately  accounted  (unbundled)  transmission  costs.  The  merchant 
companies  felt  however  that  this would  not  be  feasible,  and  raised 
the  possibility of  allocating  capacity  by  market  value  through  a 
bidding  process.  They  also  asserted  that  cost  allocation  for  the 
purposes  of  setting  transport  charges  would  be  complex,  arbitrary 
and  likely  to  cause  market  distortions.  In  addition  they  argued 
that  published  and  transparent  charges  would  damage  the 
marketability of natural  gas. 
There  was  also  discussion  of  whether  It  should  be  an  obligation, 
where  gas  and  pipeline  capacity  was  available,  for  merchant  gas 
companies  to provide  back-up  supplies to TPA  customers where  their 
contracted source of supply  failed and,  If so,  on  what  terms. 
22.  There  was  agreement  In  the  Committee  that  In  a  TPA  situation 
regulation  should  be  carried  out  at  both  Community  and  national 
levels.  It would  be  more  effective and  appropriate,  and  consistent 
with  the  principle of  subsidiarity  for  the Codes  of  Principles  to 
be  drawn  up  and  Implemented  by  Member  States'  authorities,  on  the 
basis  of  Community  principles.  A Community  role  would  however  be 
necessary  to  deal  with  any  international  problems  arising  from 
cross-front ler  TPA  transact Ions,  and  to  ensure  that  the 
harmonisation of national  rules was  effective. 
Other  Issues 
23.  The  problem  of  implementing  and  regulating  a  TPA.  regime  would 
certainly be  eased  by  providing  for  transitional  arrangements  or  a 
phased  introduction  of  TPA.  It  would  probably  take  some  time 
before  the  number  of  TPA  transactions grew  to significant  levels, 
but  the  market's  reactions  to  that  possibility  might  have  an 
important  Indirect  effect  at  an  earlier stage.  The  Committee  did 
not  discuss  possible  types  of  transitional  arrangements,  but 
Identified  some  of  the  Issues  on  which  such  arrangements  might  be 
necessary. - 14  -
One  sensitive  area  for  the  transition  would  clearly  be  the 
secur lty  of  Investments  already  made  and  the  Impact  on  related 
contractual  obligations.  Within  that  heading,  as  discussed  In 
paragraph  6,  there would  be  the particular  problem  of  Take  or  Pay 
Agreements,  both  from  the point of  view  of  the sellers and  of  the 
merchant  gas  companies  who  might  become  liable  for  large 
compensation  payments  If  TPA  competition prevented  them  fulfilling 
their  offtake  commitments.  This  problem  might  therefore  require 
specific transitional  arrangements  to the extent  that  the  relevant 
Agreements,  often of  very  long  duration,  could  not  be  renegotiated 
or  transferred  to  other  buyers.  The  current  and  future  market 
growth  and  possibility  of  direct  sales  by  producers  could  help 
w  1  th  th 1  s  s 1  tuat I  on.  It  Is  however  the  posIt I  on  of  the  merchant 
companies  and  the  producers  that  Take  or  Pay  agreements  would 
remain  essential  for  future  gas  supply.  They  do  not  believe  that 
transitional  arrangements  could  solve  the Take  or  Pay  problem. 
There  would  no  doubt  also  be  claims  for  consideration  under 
transitional  arrangements  In  relation  to  recent  Infrastructure 
Investment,  the  viability  of  which  might  be  affected  by  a  TPA 
regime,  either  In  Member  States  where  there  had  not  previously 
been  a  natural  gas  Industry or  for  extensions  to already developed 
systems. 
24.  Although  not  directly  within  the  Committee's  remit,  It  was  noted 
at  a  number  of  points  In  the  discussions  that  there  could  be  a 
case,  particularly  If  a  TPA  regime  were  Introduced,  for  removing 
other  relevant  barriers  to  trade  and  comPetition,  Including 
restrictions on  the  right  to  Import  or  export  natural  gas  (within 
the  Community  and  externally)  and  any  limitations on  who  could  In 
principle construct  gas  pipelines or  purchase  gas  from  producers. 
The  Industry  has  also  pointed  out  consistently  that  there  are 
other  differences  In  national  law  or  fiscal  arrangements  which 
would  significantly  distort  competition  In  the  gas  and  energy 
markets,  and  argued  that  these  should  be  removed  before  any 
Introduction  of  TPA.  The  other  view  was  that  such  differences 
could  be  'driven out'  by  the effects of  TPA  competition,  although 
the Commission  would  need  to consider  the case  for  remedial  action 
at Community  level  If  that  proved  not  to be  the case.  The  Industry 
also expressed strong concern  about  the possible effects,  In  a  TPA 
sItuatIon,  on  competItIon  In  genera_l,  and  on  competItIon  between 
gas  companies,  of  the  differing  Industry  structures  In  different 
Member  States. 
25.  It  Is also  Important  to note  that  the Committee's  discussions were 
limited  to  the  Issue  of  access  to  Inland  gas  transport  systems. 
Questions  were  however  raised  on  whether  It  would  be - 15 -
necessary  or  Justified  to  provide  access  also  to  associated 
faclllt  les  such  as  offshore  gas  pipelines,  treatment  terminals, 
liquefied  natural  gas  (LNG)  Installations  and  gas  storage  or 
b I end I ng  f ac I I I t I es •  Each  of  these  cases  r a I ses  spec I f I c  and 
complex  arguments  which  the  Committee  was  not  asked  to  address  In 
this  Report. 
26.  F Ina II  y;  It  Is  Important  to  recognIse  that  the  success  of  any 
lntroduct lon  of  TPA  In  the  Community  would  depend  both  on  the 
practicability  of  the  system  adopted  and  on  the  efforts  of  all 
concerned  to make  the  new  system  work. 
• • • • • * - 16  -
CHAPTER  1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.  In  September  1989  the  Commission  sent  a  Communi cat lon  to  the 
Council  ·on  the  subject of  the  Internal  market  for  natural  gas<1>. 
This  Included  a  proposal  for  a  council  Directive  on  gas  transit 
which,  with  certain  amendments,  has  now  been  the  subject  of  a 
favourable  common  position  in  the Council  of Minlsters<2>. 
2.  The  Gas  Transit  Directive  would  apply  only  to  transactions  which 
Involved  cross-frontier  trade within  the Community,  and  which  were 
conducted  by  the  companies  owning  the  Conununlty's  high  pressure 
transmission  grids.  It  would  not  therefore  assure  third  party 
access  for  others  such  as  gas  producers  or  other  suppliers,  non-
integrated gas  companies  or  particular  types of consumer. 
3.  In  its  September  1989  Communication  the  Commission  announced  Its 
Intention  to  hold  a  dialogue  with  Interested  parties  before 
deciding  whether  or  not  to  make  further  proposals  on  third  party 
access.  This  would  be  achieved  by  creating  two  Consultative 
Committees,  one  composed  of Member  States'  representatives and  the 
other  of  representatIves  of  producers,  gas  companIes  and 
consumers. 
4.  The  second  of  these  Committees,  the  Professional  COnsultative 
Committee  for  Gas  (PCCG),  met  for  the  first  time  on  18  May  1990 
and  has  been  responsible for  the preparation of  this Report. 
The  full  membership  of  PCCG  Is set out on  page( .. ),  together  with 
a  note on  the procedures  followed  In  preparing  the  report. 
5.  The  terms  of  reference  agreed  by  the  CommIttee  at  Its  fIrst 
meeting  were: 
'To  Identify  and  present  the  main  technical,  economic  and 
administrative  considerations  which  should  be  taken  Into  account 
In  Community  policy  on  whether  and,  If  so,  In  what  form  and  by 
what  means  third  party  access  to  gas  transport  systems  should  be 
prov lded. • 
The  comm 1  t tee  was  not  asked  by  the  CommIssIon  to  make  spec I  f I  c 
recommendations  on  whether  or  not  Third  Party  Access  should  be 
(1)  COM(89)334  final  of 6  September  1989 
(2)  In  adopting  that  position  the  Council  noted  that  strong 
opposition  existed  within  It  to  adopting  the  so-called  'common 
carrier•  rule. - 17  -
Introduced  In  the  Community's  gas  transport  system.  This  will  be 
a  matter on  which  the Commission  will  make  Its proposals  following 
this  Report  and  other  consultations.  Nor  was  the  Committee  asked 
to take a  position on  legal  Issues. 
6.  The  following  chapters of  this Report- describe  the  considerations 
which  PCCG  has  identified  In  accordance  with  these  terms  of 
reference.  On  some  key  Issues  there  were  dIsagreements  between 
members  of  the Committee.  which  are  recorded  In  the Report. 
7.  In  Its  fIrst  meetIng  the  CommIt tee  under II ned  the  dIfference 
between  a  common  carrier  and  a  third  partY  access  regime.  The 
former  concept  would  Include  the  allocation of  transport  capacity 
pro-rata amongst  all  users at  any  given  time.  with  no  distinction 
between  existing  and  new  clients.  This  would  obviously  undermine. 
ab  Initio.  the  security  of  supply  of  existing  customers  and 
existing  contracts.  The  common  carrier  approach  Is  not  therefore 
considered  further  In  this Report. 
8.  It  was  a I  so  recognIsed  that  a  number  of  tYpes  of  thIrd  partY 
access  regime  were  possible.  depending  on  which  categor les  of 
consumers  or  other  buyers. · and  whIch  categor 1  es  of  supp llers  or 
producers.  were  assured  access  rights.  Rather  than  limit  their 
scope.  however.  the  consultations did  not  rule  out  any  particular 
type of  TPA  client at  this stage.  The  considerations  Identified  In 
the  Report  would  then  assist  the  Commission  to  take  a  view  on  the 
merits of  assuring  access  for  particular  types  of  client.  as well 
as on  the  overall  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the  third party 
access concept. 
9.  Similarly.  to avoid  limiting  the  discussion.  the COmmittee  was  not 
Invited  to analyse  future  gas  supply  and  demand  prospects.  or  to 
assume  that  any  particular  energy  policy  objectives  would  apply. 
The  1995  Community  energy  objectives  were  under  review.  Some 
members  fe It  that  It  was  unsatIsfactory  to  d 1  scuss  the 
Implications of  TPA  In  the  absence  of  a  defined  context  or  stated 
goals.  In  any  case  It  was  agreed  that  the Committee's  discussions 
of  the  Impact  of  TPA  should  take account  of different  possible gas 
supply/demand  scenar los.  and  consider  the  effect  of  TPA  on  the 
Community's  future pattern of energy  use. 
10.  Last I  y.  It  was  agreed  at  the  begInnIng  of  the  Comm 1  t tee's  work 
that  It  would  be  necessary  to evaluate  the effects of  Introducing 
third party access  to both  gas  transmission and  local  distribution 
systems.  Offshore  pipelines  were  excluded  from  the  .. scope  of  the 
Committee's  discussions. 
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Chapter  2 
EFFECTS  ON  CONSlAIPTION,  PRICING  AND  COMPETITION 
SecuritY of SUpply(1) 
1.  The  security of  supply  Impact  on  consumers  who  take  advantage  of 
Third  Party  Access  (TPA)  rights  will  depend  on  whether  their  new 
supplier  has  a  diversified slate of gas  sources or  access  to back-
up  deliveries.  In  fact  TPA  would  enable  a  risk/reward calculation 
by  the  consumer- either  Individually  or  as  part  of  a  group.  The 
potential  risks- principally security of supply,  would  have  to be 
balanced  against  the  potential  rewards  - principally  a  wider 
opportunity  to  seek  lower  cost  gas  supplies.  This  approach  would 
give  consumers  with  TPA  rights greater  choice  than  they  presently 
enjoy  and  clarify the  costs for  them  of  different options. 
2.  A TPA  regime  might  grant  access  rights to all  consumers  or  only  to 
certain  types  of  consumer.  But  In  any  case  It  would  not  oblige 
eligible purchasers  to  take  advantage  of  those  rights.  Even  given 
the  ability  to  engage  In  direct  purchase,  large  numbers  of 
consumers  might  choose  to  retain  their  present  level  of  security 
rather  than  participate  In  such  arrangements.  But  their  potential 
recourse  to  TPA  should  still  result  in  a  more  competitive 
env I  ronment . 
3.  The  degree  of  secur lty  enjoyed  by  an  Individual  consumer  will 
depend  on  the  flexibility  provided  by  his  gas  supplier,  on  his 
ability  (If any)  to switch  to an  alternative  fuel;  and,  In  a  TPA 
sltuat lon,  on  his  ability  to  switch  to  an  alternat lve  source  of 
gas  supp I  y.  The  fact  that  European  supp I  y  Is  dependent  on  a 
limited  number  of  sources would  constrain flexibility on  the  last 
point. 
4.  The  group  best  equipped  to  engage  In  direct  purchase  are  on  the 
one  hand  electricity companies  and  on  the  other  hand  Industrial 
consumers  with  Interruptible  capability  (I.e.  ability  to  switch 
to  an  alternative  fuel  at  short  notice  and  for  an  Indefinite 
period  of  time)  or,  more  rarely,  with  on-site  storage  capacity. 
Such  customers  using  transportation  services  would  have  few 
security  of  supply  concerns.  To  the  extent  that  the  Introduction 
of  TPA  encouraged  ex 1st lng  gas  consumers  (or  thIrd  part les)  to 
Install  additional  dual-fired  facilities  and  storage,  this  could 
Improve  the  total  security  of  supply  situation.  The  scope  for 
(1)  This  section of  the  report  deals only  with  security of  supply  at 
the  level  of  the  Individual  consumer.  The  possible  effects  on 
TPA  on  overall  COmmunity  gas  supply  are discussed  In  chapter  4. - 19 -
customers  switching  to  Interruptible  supply  would  depend  on 
ex 1st lng  gas  supply  contracts  and  Infrastructure.  Those  opt lng 
for  Interruptible supply  would,  of  course,  have  to be  prepared  to 
Interrupt  when  required,  rather  than  rely  on  political  pressures 
In  their  favour  In  a  crisis situation. 
5.  Firm  Industrial  consumers  (with  more  limited  fuel  switching 
opt Ions  ·or  using  gas  as  feedstock)  engaging  In  direct  purchase 
would  be  exposed  to  a  degree  of  risk  that  their,  possibly  less 
diversified,  TPA  supplier  might  be  unable  to  meet  their  peak 
supp I  y  requIrements,  and  that  In  a  worst  case  sItuatIon  theIr 
source  of  supply  might  be  curtailed  or  cut  off  completely.  In 
such  cases,  these  consumers  would  need  to  seek  gas  elsewhere, 
probably  from  their  'local' or  traditional  suppliers.  There  Is  a 
major  1  ssue  of  d 1  ssent  as  to  whether,  under  TPA,  trad It lona I 
suppliers  should  have  any  obligation  to supply  gas  In  such  cases. 
Replacement  supply  may  not  always  be  possible  If  there  are 
lim 1  tat Ions  on  gas  supp 1  y  or  de II very  capacIty  at  the  tIme  the 
supply  Is  needed,  particularly  since  the  merchant  suppliers  will 
give first priority to their  own  customers.  A distinction should 
therefore  be  made  between  providing  a  replacement  supply  If  the 
necessary  gas  and  pipeline capacity  are available  <Back-up)  and  a 
guarantee of  replacement  supply  (Stand-by).  Replacement  supplies, 
when  necessary,  would  probably  need  to  be  the  subject  of  a 
separate contract  with  the  traditional  supplier  as  an  'unbundled' 
service.  A.  stand-by  contract  guaranteeing  supply  would  need  to 
take  account  of  the  costs of  the  necessary  reserve  gas  production 
(or  storage)  and  transport  capacIty.  These  quest Ions  of 
replacement  supply  would  probably  have  to  be  covered  by  the 
regulation accompanying  a  TPA  regime  (chapter  5). 
6.  There  Is  also the  Issue of whether  a  customer  who  decided  to bring 
to  an  end  a  TPA.  contract  would  be  able  to  revert  to  his 
traditional  supplier.  To  the extent  that  the  latter  remained  In  a 
dominant  position  In  the  gas  market,  It  might  be  necessary  to 
app 1  y  a  'non-d 1  scr lm I  nat I  on'  ru I  e  to  ensure  that  the  return  1  ng 
customer  was  treated  no  differently  than  an  altogether  new 
customer  (see chapter  5). 
7.  consumers  without  fuel-switching  options  particularly 
residential  and  commercial  customers  -are  In  a  more  vulnerable 
security of  supply  position.  While  small  consumers.  will  probably 
be  less  likely  to  experience direct benefits from  a  system of  TPA 
than  large  Industrial  users,  there  Is  no  reason  to  automatically 
conclude  that  there  will  be  no  benefits  for  small  consumers. 
Possible  developments  could  Include  groups  of  consumers  engaging 
In  direct  purchase,  or  LDC's  doing  so  on  behalf  of  all  their 
customers  (see  below).  Some  Committee  members  agreed  however  that 
smaller  consumers  might  be  worse  off under  a  TPA  regime. - 20  -
a.  The  fact  that  security of  supply  Issues  are most  acute  for  small 
(principally  residential  and  commercial)  consumers,  for  whom  the 
risk  of  Interruption  Is  most  significant,  raises  an  Important 
Issue.  It  might  be  Judged  that  allowing  household  consumers  or 
groups  of  such  customers  to  engage  .In  TPA  would  expose  them  to 
unacceptable  security  of  supply  risks,  unless  they  have  an 
alternative  fuel  supply,  and  possibly  also  to  safety  risks  at 
t lmes  of  supply  Interrupt lon.  Such  a  decision  would  create  at 
least  two  groups  of  consumers:  those eligible to engage  In  TPA  and 
those  which  were  not,  with  the  latter  presumably  retaining  their 
regulatory  protection  In  terms  of  pricing  and  supply  security. 
This  type  of  approach  would,  however,  carry  with  It  a  risk  of 
discrimination,  denying  freedom  of  choice  and  direct  or  Indirect 
TPA  benefits  to  a  whole  category  of  consumers.  One  possibility 
would  be  to  Increase  the  number  of  categories of  consumer  eligible 
for  TPA  over  time,  as  the market  situation developed. 
9.  As  a  system  of  TPA  evolved,  LDCs  might  themselves  opt  to 
participate  In  direct  purchase,  even  If  this meant  that  they  had 
to enter  Into some  degree  of offtake commitments.  This  development 
could  present  advantages  In  terms  of  the  purchasing  power  LDCs 
could exert on  behalf of  their  customers  by  having  the possibility 
of  buying  gas  from  a  range  of  gas  companies  and  producers,  but  It 
could  also  present  problems  In  that  LDCs  tend  to  serve  customers 
who  could  not  accept  significant  reductions  In  security of  supply 
and  who  might,  as  discussed  above,  benefit  from  supply 
obligations.  LDCs  buying  from  other  sources  might  have  less 
flexibility  than  the  gas  companies  In  terms  of  gas  portfolios and 
purchase  contract  durat lon,  and  thus  not  be  In  a  posIt I  on  to 
provide  the  same  level  of  security.  LDCs  exploiting  TPA  rights 
might  however  be  able  to balance  these risks by  diversifying their 
range  of  supply  contracts,  Including  longer-term  contracts,  by 
Investing  In  storage  capacity  or  other  contingency  measures,  and 
by  se 1  I I  ng  more  Interrupt I  b 1  e  gas.  Reg I  ona I  LDCs  (or  consort I  a 
LDCs)  would  clearly  be  better  placed  to  do  this  than  local  or 
municipal  LDCs  operating mainly  In  the  residential  market. 
10.  Because  of  the  relatively  secure  position  of  larger  Industrial 
customers  with  dual-firing  facilities,  a  TPA  regime  could  have  an 
Incentive  effect  on  Interruptible  gas  sales.  The  extent  to  which 
addlt lonal  gas  could  be  made  available  on  this  basis  In  the 
shorter  term  would  depend  on  the flexibility  remal~lng  In  existing 
production  capacity,  gas  purchase  contracts  and  pipeline  delivery 
capacity.  The  merchant  gas  Industry's  view  Is  that  this 
flexibility  Is  at  present  limited  although  this  could  Improve  as 
the  new  market  situation  evolved.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the 
gas  Industry,  Interruptible  contracts  are  at  present  designed  to 
allow  gas  companies  to use  gas  released  by  such  customers  to meet 
peak  demand,  mainly  In  the residential  market. - 21  -
11.  overall,  It  Is  evident  that  a  TPA  regime  would  lead  to  Important 
changes  In  the  security  of  supply  situation  for  natural  gas,  but 
It  Is  less  clear  whether  those  changes  would  be  beneficial  or 
undesirable.  The  current  assumptions  on  security  of  supply  needs 
would  not  necessar lly  survive.  In  .the  view  of  some  Conunl ttee 
Members  TPA  could create a  market  for  security of  supply  where  Its 
value  would  be  determined  by  market  forces.  New  and  more  flexible 
approaches  could evolve  from  the greater  role consumers  would  have 
In  determining  their  own  security of  supply  arrangements.  In  some 
cases  very  large  consumers  might  even  be  able  to  provide  their 
suppliers  with  greater  overall  flexibility,  particularly  If  they 
could  'onsell'  surplus  gas  to others.  Some  customers  might  also 
Invest  In  their  own  security arrangements  on  the  basis of  savings 
In  gas  costs.  Storage  facilities  would  probably  be  too  expensive 
for  most  companies  to  contemplate,  although  Third  Parties  might 
offer  these  or  other  back-up  facilities.  Dual-firing  would 
probably  Increase.  Finally,  according  to  this  view,  a  more 
competitive market  should  bring more  suppliers  Into  the market  and 
give  greater  scope  for  the  price  mechanism  to  bring  supply  Into 
line with  demand  when  tight market  situations develop. 
12~  The  counter-argument  Is  that  the  present  Integrated  system  should 
produce  greater  rationalisation of  security  arrangements  at  lower 
costs.  By  aggregating  the demand  of  a  greater  number  of  customers, 
Including  LDCs,  the  gas  companies  should  be  In  a  better  position 
to  purchase  diversified  supplies,  to  take  advantage  of  scale 
economies  In  Investing  In  storage  and  reserve  pipeline  capacity, 
and  to provide  their  customers with  a  high  level  of security. 
oualltx of service 
13.  It  Is  Important  to  note  that  customers  using  the  low  calorific 
value  (L)  gas  networks,  supplied  maIn I  y  from  the  Gron 1  ngen  gas 
field,  could be  limited  In  their ability to exploit  TPA  rights.  In 
certain  countr les  and  regions  L  gas  accounts  for  a  sign if I  cant 
percentage  of  total  demand.  SOme  existing  L  gas  consumers  might 
however  consider  switching  to  high  calor If lc  value  (H)  gas  by 
modifying  their  combustion  equipment,  although  this would  Involve 
costs  and  would  only  be  possible  If  the  customer  could  be 
connected  to a  pipeline carrying the higher  quality. 
14.  TPA  may  affect  the  quality  of  services  which  gas  companies 
presently  provide  to  dlstr lbutors  or  to  their  own  customers  in 
terms  of  their  ability  to  ensure  gas  quality,  balance  loads  and 
offer  short  term  contracts  wl th  zero  or  lim I  ted  offtake 
obligations,  whilst  themselves  purchasing  long  term  bulk  supplies 
under  take-or-pay  comml tments  (transformatIon  of  terms). - 22  -
However,  some  consumers  consider  that  the  potential  for  Increased 
choice  Is  a  more  Important  determinant. 
Prlclna 
15.  The  first major  element  under  this heading  Is  the  likely effect of 
TPA  on·  producer  prices,  whether  purchases  are  made  by  gas 
companies  or  directly  by  consumers.  Prevailing  market  conditions 
will  be  an  extremely  Important  factor.  To  the  extent  that  the 
market  Is  tight,  the  negotiating position of  buyers  will  be  weaker 
and  this  could  Increase  the  arguments  for  balancing  the  market 
power  of  producers  against  the  Integrated  gas  companies,  rather 
than  a  potentially  fragmented  collection  of  consumers,  always 
provided  that  the  benefits  are  passed  on.  Even  In  a  seller's 
market,  higher  upstream  prices would  presumably  lead  to  some  loss 
of  market  sales  through  competition  with  alternative  fuels. 
Conversely  If  the  market  Is  In  surplus,  the  position of  consumers 
vls-i-vls  producers  will  be  stronger.  And  at  any  time  there  may 
be  surplus gas  available at  the  margin  for  direct  sale.  All  this 
will  depend  on  upstream  considerations  and  the  likely  effect  of 
.TPA  on  exploration  and  product ion,  which  Is  discussed  later  In 
this report. 
16.  Many  of  the  downstream  actors  In  European  gas  Industries  -
specifically  gas  companies  and  local  distribution  companies  -
enjoy  a  considerable  degree  of  monopoly  power  or  a  'dominant 
position'  within their national  and  regional  systems,  subject only 
to  competition  from  other  fuels.  TPA  may  Introduce  a  change  In 
the  division of  the  profits  from  gas  sales as  between  the margins 
earned  by  the producer,  gas  company  and  (where  relevant)  LDC,  and 
the  prices  for  gas  <and  other  services)  paid  by  the  different 
groups  of  consumers.  The  exper lence  of  open  access  In  the  UK 
suggests  It  Is  possible  for  consumers  to  pay  higher  prices  to 
producers  than  the  gas  company  and  still  profit  from  direct 
purchase.  But  It  Is  too  early  to  draw  conclusions  about  the 
medium  to  long  term  prIce  consequences  for  UK  consumers.  The 
Impact  of  TPA  would  evolve  over  time.  As  the  market  adjusted  the 
opportunity  for  consumers  to  explore  alternative  purchasing 
options,  whether  or  not  they  actually  took  up  such  options,  would 
exert  downward  pressure  on  prIces.  This  could  be  part lcular ly 
Important  for  Industries  committed  without  alternative  to  using 
gas  as a  raw  material.  A high  degree  of  price  tra~sparency would 
be  essential. 
17.  TPA  would  change  the  basis  of  the  entire  gas  market.  All 
consumers  would  be  automatically  affected  by  this  change  whether 
or  not  they  chose  to  part lclpate  act lvely  In  TPA.  There  are 
conflicting  views  about  the  Impact  on  particular  types  of 
consumer.  some  argue  that  prices might  rise  and  that  In  any  case - 23  -
large  consumers  would  gain  at  the  expense  of  small  consumers 
because  of  their  greater  market  leverage.  Others  believe  that, 
the  overall  changes  In  price  levels  would  be  such  that  no 
consumers  would  be  worse  off  than  before,  although  some  might  gain 
more  than others from  the  Introduction of  the  new  system. 
18.  There  were  also  differences  of  opinion  about  the  risks  of  cross-
subsldlsatlon  between  consumer  groups.  One  view  was  that  the 
I  nt roduct I  on  of  TPA  wou I  d  he I  p  to  expose  any  exIstIng  cross-
subsidies  because,  under  TPA,  consumers  would  tend  to  pay  for 
'unbundled'  services,  with  'transparency'  of  pricing  of  those 
services.  The  other  view  was  that  TPA  would  Increase  the  risk  of 
cross-subsldlsat ion.  It  would  be  Important  to  ensure  that  those 
who  cou I  d  not  engage  In  TPA  dId  not  fInd  themse I  ves  payIng  a 
disproportionate  part  of  the  fixed  costs  of,  particularly,  the 
dlstr I  but ion  systems.  (These  are  issues  to  be  discussed  further 
under  the  heading of  regulation  In  chapter  5.) 
19.  Under  TPA  prIces  could  also  be  more  affected  by  location.  One 
effect  of  TPA  competition  could  be  to  disadvantage  TPA  customers 
who  were  more  distant  from  a  source  of  gas  supply.  It  Is 
difficult  to  predict  whether  this  relative  disadvantage  would  be 
offset  by  an  overall  reduction  In  price  levels,  but  If  It were  not 
gas  penetration  In  such  areas  could  be  reduced.  Conversely,  TPA 
customers  close to gas  sources would  presumably  benefit. 
20.  Different methods  of pricing gas  to consumers  have  been  adopted  at 
different  times  In  different  countries.  At  present,  a  widely 
adopted  practice  In  Europe  Is  to price gas  against  (or  just below) 
competItIve  fue Is,  usua II y  o I I .  The  advocates  of  thIs  method 
suggest  that  It  gives  the  highest  possible market  penetration  for 
gas;  Is  the most  equitable for  consumers;  and  Is  a  flexible system 
able  to  cope  with  shifts  In  the  prices of  competing  fuels.  This 
view  was  not,  however,  shared  by  some  other Committee  Members. 
21.  However,  under  a  TPA  system  where  consumers  had  greater  liberty 
to  make  Individual  deals,  other  pricing  systems  would  emerge  In 
negotiation,  driven  by  gas-to-gas  competition.  Individual 
consumers  could  be  expected  to seek  different  pricing arrangements 
at  different  times  and  a  variety  of  contractual  arrangements 
could  evolve.  It  Is  difficult  to  generalise  abol:lt.  the  types  of 
price  mechanism  which  might  be  favoured  by  consumers  under  TPA, 
but  such  competition  would  tend  to  bring  final  consumer  prices 
closer  to  cost-related  levels.  Consumers  would  also  have  the 
advantage  of  no  longer  being  faced  with  the  risk  of  substantial 
short-term  Increases  In  gas  prices  when  oil  prices  rose  because 
of difficulties  In  the  International oil  market. - 24  -
EnergY  and  Enylronment  PolleY 
22.  The  community's  energy  objectives,  adopted  In  1986,  call  for  the 
market  share  of  natural  gas  to  be  at  least  maintained.  These 
objectives  are  about  to  be  reviewed  and  It  Is  clear  that  the 
relative environmental  advantages  of  gas  are  likely  to  favour  Its 
expanded  use.  The  Energy  Council  has  agreed  In  principle  to  the 
Commlslon's  proposal  that  the  1975  Directive  limiting  the  use  of 
gas  In  power  stations should  be  revoked. 
23.  Whether  a  TPA  regime  would  accelerate  the  use  of  natural  gas  In 
the  Community,  which  Is  already  growing,  will  depend  on  whether 
the advocates of  TPA  are right  In  believing  that  prices would  fal I 
In  the  more  competitive  environment.  Certainly gas  penetration  Is 
much  greater  In  the  United  States  where  competition  Is  well 
established,  although  market  conditions  and  Industry  structure 
differ  In  the  two  regions  and  TPA  is  clearly  not  the  only  factor 
at  work.  The  extent  to  which  addlt lonal  supplies  of  gas  could 
come  forward  would  depend  on  whether  TPA  had  a  positive or  adverse 
Impact  upstream  (chapter  4). 
24.  Lower  gas  prices could,  of  course,  act  as a  disincentive to energy 
efficiency,  but  It  Is  not  a  sustainable  argument  that  efficiency 
alms  should  be  pursued  by  transferring  economic  rent  from 
consumers  to  producers  or  suppliers.  One  other  effect  of  TPA  In 
this  context  could  be  to  Improve  the  economics  of  co-generation 
Investments,  which  will  also  depend  to  an  extent  on  developments 
In  Internal  market  policy  In  the electricity sector. 
* * * * * * - 25  -
Chapter  3 
EFFECTS  ON  NATURAL  GAS  TRANSPORTATION  AND  RELATED  SERVICES 
1.  Because  of  the  degree  of  Integration  of  transmission  and 
distribution  systems  In  most  EC  countries,  this  section  of  the 
report  deals  with  gas  transportation overall,  Including  both  the 
transmission and  distribution functions.  Reference  Is also made  to 
some  of  the  transportation-related  services  Including:  load 
balancing,  back-up,  storage,  Quality management. 
2.  It  Is  Important  to  distinguish  between  the  transportation  and 
merchant  functions  performed  by  many  EC  gas  companies.  While  there 
Is  certainly  scope  for  competition  In  the  merchant  function,  this 
Is  less  clear  In  the  case  of  transportation.  In  practIce  gas 
transmission  can  be  considered  to  be  a  near  monopoly  because  of 
the  financial,  legal  and  Institutional  barriers  to  new  pipeline 
construction.  This  can  be  even  more  true  of  local  distribution, 
part lcular ly  In  high  population  areas.  The  following  paragraphs 
deal  with  transportation  and  related  services,  referring  on 
occasion to  Issues arising from  the  Integration of  those  functions 
and  the merchant  function. 
3.  It  Is  however  lmpor tant  to  note  that  Eurogas  and  the  Integrated 
Community  gas  companies  believe  that  there  are  strong  Inherent 
advantages  In  the  lntegrat I  on  of  transportat lon  and  gas  sales, 
from  the  point of  view  of  both  security of  supply  and  the overall 
efficiency  of  the  gas  supply  system.  Others,  Including  some 
consumers  and  LDC' s  argued,  however,  that  the  loss  of  any  such 
advantages  would  be  outweighed  by  the  Inherent  benefits  of 
Increased competition as a  conseQuence  of TPA. 
4.  'A  Common  Carr I  age'  (pro  rata  transportation  allocation)  regime 
has  the  disadvantage  that  It  would  place  at  risk  continuity  of 
supp I  y  for  exIstIng  gas  users  on  the  system.  It  Is  therefore 
assumed  In  what  follows  that  any  new  access  regime  would  adopt  the 
concept  of making  spare capacity available,  In  principle,  to third 
party  users  on  some  defined  basis  (see  below).  Th_ls  Is  variously 
called  'open  access'  or  'third  party  access'.  Since  the  former 
term  would  Imply  no  dlst lnct ion  between  the  different  types  of 
consumer  which  might  be  granted  access  rights  (see  preceding 
chapter),  the  term  'third  party  access'  <or  TPA)  Is  used  In  the 
remainder  of  this  report  without  prejudging  whether  any 
particular  types  of  consumers  might  or  might  not  be  granted  such 
rights. - 26-
5.  The  key  Issues  In  the  fields of  transportation arising  from  a  TPA 
regime  would  particularly  be  the  availability and  use  of  pipeline 
capacity  (Including  Investment  in  new  capacity)  and  the  charges 
for  transportation and  other  services. 
AvailabilitY and  Allocation of CaPacitY  and  Related Serylces 
6.  Capacity  Is  a  complex  concept  which  needs  to  be  considered  on  a 
day-to-day,  and  1  n  some  cases  an  hour-to-hour,  bas Is.  CapacIty 
cannot  simply  be  considered  In  terms  of  space  In  a  pipeline.  Also, 
It  may  sometimes  be  necessary  to  consider  the  availability  of 
related services such  as gas  storage and  blending facilities. 
7.  One  bas I  c  way  of  organIsIng  capacIty  allocatIon  wou I  d  be  on  a 
first  come,  fIrst  served  system,  a I  though  a  number  of 
modifications  to  this  might  be  necessary  to  avoid  operational 
difficulties or  new  obstacles to competition.  For  Instance,  If  It 
was  Judged  that  an  obllgat ion  to  supply  should  be  preserved  for 
particular  customers,  such  as  the  domestic  and  other  small 
consumers  who  account  for  a  major  part of  many  EC  markets,  then  a 
tranche  of  pipeline  capacity  would  need  to  be  set  aside  by  the 
pipeline companies,  or  contracted by  local  distribution companies, 
to  assure  their  security  of  supply.  In  that  case,  a  TPA  regime 
would  only  apply  to  part  of  the  total  capacity  of  the  transport 
system.  However,  any  contingency  reserve  or  seasonal  element  In 
that  'set-aside'  capacity  could  presumably  be  used  for 
Interruptible TPA  sales,  thus  Improving  overall  uti I lsatlon of  the 
system. 
8.  There  Is  also the Question of contract duration.  Capacity  could  be 
contracted  on  a  long  or  a  short  term  basis.  CUstomers  giving  a 
high  priority  to  security  of  supply  would  probably  seek  to  enter 
Into  long-term  contracts,  those  with  greater  flexibility  might 
seek  a  less  rigid  contractual  framework.  Rules  might  need  to  be 
laid  down  on  the  relative  priority  to  be  given  to  such  reQuests, 
as  well  as  on  other  matters  such  as  distance  and  lnterruptlblllty 
(see be low). 
9.  To  avoid  unnecessary  or  deliberate  reservation of  unused  pipeline 
capacity,  It might  be  necessary  to adopt  the concept.of  'use  It or 
lose  It'.  This  Implies  that  In  a  first  come  first  served  system, 
capacity which  remained  unused  over  a  defined period of  time  could 
be  offered  to  the  next  customer  walt lng  for  serv lee  from  the 
transportation company,  either on  a  temporary  or  permanent  basis. - 27-
10.  Alternatively or  additionally,  TPA  transmission contracts could  be 
organised  similarly  to  a  property  right  which  could- for  a 
def 1  ned  per lod  of  tIme  - be  acquIred  and  transferred  to  other 
part les,  provided  that  there  were  reasonably  standard  contract 
conditions  (pressure,  gas  quality,  contract  duration  ,  load 
factor).  This  could  also  have  advantages  for  companies  who  might 
otherwise  face  an  unacceptable  risk  In  contracting capacity before 
they  had  finalised a  gas  purchase  agreement.  However,  the  location 
of  the  alternative  customer  relative  to  the  original  contractual 
commitment  would  be  Important,  as  well  as  various  other 
operational  factors.  Gas  companies  could  not  be  expected  to 
transfer  automatically  a  capacity  commitment  to serve  alternative 
customers  In  entirely  different  locations,  and  It  might  not  even 
be  possible  to  do  so  In  some  cases.  Local  distribution  companies 
should  In  most  cases  be  able  to provide  some  flexibility  for  the 
transport  stage  between  the  high  pressure  system  and  the 
alternative customer. 
11.  Other  issues would  arise under  the  heading  of capacity allocation, 
for  instance  the  risk  that  a  TPA  commitment  to  carry  gas  over  a 
relatively  short  distance  within  a  pipeline  system  could  block 
longer  transmission  paths.  Issues of  this  type  would  also  need  to 
be  allowed  for  In  the  framework  for  a  TPA  regime. 
12.  Lastly,  under  the  heading  of  capacity allocation,  It  Is  Important 
to  keep  In  mind  that  firm  transportat lon  commitments,  whether 
arising  from  supply  obligations  or  longer  term  TPA  contracts, 
might  still  leave  room  for  Interruptible TPA  contracts at  times  of 
lower  demand  (see  also  paragraph  7  above).  Part  of  the  gas 
Industry  believes  however  that  this  option  might  at  present  be 
limited  by  a  lack  of  spare  gas  production  and  delivery  capacity, 
as  well  as  the  need  to  use  the  summer  period  for  maintenance  and 
refilling  gas  storage.  In  the  longer  term  the  new  market 
opportunities  under  a  TPA  regime  might  lead  Investors  In  gas 
production  and  delivery  systems  to  provide  for  a  larger  capacity 
margin.  This  view  Is  not  however  shared  by  the  merchant  gas 
companies. 
13.  In  deciding whether  to offer  transportation services a  gas  company 
would  clearly  have  to  assess  whether  such  an  arrangement  would 
lnfr lnge  on  the  margin  of  spare  capacity  required. to  deal  with 
emergency  situations,  as  well  as  to  cater  for  variations  In  the 
needs  of  Its own  contractual  customers,  or  other  pre-existing  TPA 
contracts.  It  Is  however  Inevitable that disputes would  arise when 
requests  for  TPA  were  refused  on  capac 1  ty  grounds,  part 1  cu 1  ar 1  y 
perhaps  when  the  transmission  network  was  owned  by  an  Integrated 
merchant  company  competing  to supply  the  same  market,  rather  than 
by  a  gas  transportation  company  concerned  to  maximise  the  use  of 
Its  capacity.  Such  disputes  would  need  to  be  submitted  to - 28-
arbitration  ·by  a  regulatory  authority  or  Independent  expert 
a 1  though.  g 1  ven  the  complexIty  of  the  subject.  the  judgements 
would  not  be  easy  and  there  would  be  difficulty  In  matching  the 
expertise of  the system  owner.  Decisions  taken  In  this way,  would 
need  to  have  regard  to  existing  contractual  or  legal  supply 
obligations.  This  problem  Is  considered  further  In  chapter  5. 
14.  Another·and  more  controversial  option  for  a  TPA  regime  would  be  to 
Impose  an  obllgat ion  on  the  company  owning  the  transportation 
network  to  ensure,  given  enough  notice,  that  sufficient  pipeline 
capacity  was  available  to meet  any  TPA  requests,  by  Investing  In 
new  pipelines  or  by  providing  for  more  capacity  In  pipelines 
already  planned.  (This  would  always  be  subject  to  the  necessary 
construction and  wayleave  consents  being obtained.)  For  Investment 
security  It  would  be  essential  that  firm  long-term  commitments 
should  be  made  by  the  TPA  customers,  and  that  the  Investment  costs 
could  be  recovered  from  transportation  charges  with  a  reasonable 
rate  of  return,  taking  account  of  business  risks.  Nevertheless, 
even  under  these  conditions,  the  merchant  gas  companies  would 
regard  any  such  measure  as unacceptable. 
15~  It  would  In  any  case  be  consistent  with  the  Introduction  of  more 
competition  Into  the gas  sector  that  any  national  rules preventing 
the  construction  of  pipelines  by  new  entrants  should  be  removed. 
But,  given  the advantages of  rational Ising  the overall  system,  and 
the  fact  that  the  present  dominant  position  In  transport  of  the 
ex 1st lng  Integrated  gas  companies  would  certainly  cont lnue  for 
some  tIme,  thIs  II bera II sat I  on  wou I  d  probab I  y  not  elimInate  any 
need  to require  the existing companies  to construct  new  capacity. 
16.  In  a  wider  sense,  there  Is  concern  on  the  part  of  the  Integrated 
gas  companies  that  a  TPA  regime  would  undermine  Investment 
confidence,  both  In  the  case  of  large-scale  pipeline  projects 
bringing gas  Into  the  COmmunity,  and  In  the case of  new  pipelines 
within  the  COmmunity.  Theoretically  If  charges  were  set at  a  fair 
level,  TPA  contracts  should  not  reduce  revenues  earned  by  a 
pipeline  Investment  and  might  even  Increase  them.  But  financing  Is 
at  present  often  based  on  assessing  revenues  from  both  transport 
and  sale.  In  some  circumstances,  therefore,  particularly  where 
Investments  had  not  yet  been  amortised,  TPA  could  cause  problems 
for  pipeline  owners  unless  there  were  suitable  safeguards. 
Otherwise,  In  facilities  where  volumes  were  still  building  to 
plateau  level,  owners  would  run  the  risk  that  part  of  the 
1  n 1  t 1  a II y  unused  capacIty  cou I  d  be  preempted  by  others,  thereby 
preventing  related  contractual  gas  supply  commitments  from  being 
fulfilled.  These  problems  would  exist  In  the  case  of  both  the 
'Immature'  gas  transportation  systems  under  construction  In  some 
COmmunity  countries,  and  for  maJor  new  Investments  In  existing gas 
systems.  The  use  of  transportation  capacity  by  third  parties - 29  -
might  also  prevent  the  gas  company  from  fulfilling  take  or  pay 
commitments  upstream,  or  from  supplying  contracted  future 
customers  downstream.  The  merchant  gas  companies  are  concerned 
that  these  TPA-Induced  problems  of  fulfilling  'take  or  pay' 
commitments  could cause  them  significant  financial  hardship or,  at 
the extreme,  bankruptcy.  This potential  problem  would  also need  to 
be  addressed  In  any  future  TPA  regime. 
Charges  for Transportation and  Other  Serylces 
17.  Charges  for  pipeline  transportation  could  be  negotiated 
Individually  by  the parties or  determined on  a  cost-related basis. 
Since  transportation would  In  most  cases  remain  largely a  monopoly 
service,  the  latter  approach  would  seem  more  justifiable and  less 
likely  to  give  rise  to  economic  distortions.  However,  the 
Integrated  gas  companies  and  some  other  Committee  members  believe 
that  a  cost-related  system  would  probably  be  less  satisfactory. 
Another  approach  might  be  negotiation  between  the  parties  on  the 
basis  of  cost  guidelines  laid  down  In  advance,  If  necessary 
followed  by  a  conclllat lon  procedure.  In  general,  dlscr lmlnat lon 
between  customers should be  avoided.  A related question  Is whether 
any  dlst lnct ion  should  be  made  between  charges  for  the  use  of 
existing  capacity  and  those  for  new  lines,  which  would  lead  to  a 
form  of  'vintage pricing'  (see also paragraph  19). 
18.  In  economIc  terms,  marg Ina I  cost  pr 1  c I  ng  mIght  be  cons I  de red  to 
send  more  accurate  price  signals  to  consumers.  However  this 
carries the risk of generating excessive profits or  losses  for  the 
gas  company  depending  on  the  relationship  of  the  charges  arising 
with  the  average  system  cost.  For  this  reason,  the use  of  average 
cost  as  the guiding concept  seems  to be  more  generally acceptable, 
although  this would  be  a  fairly  complex  process.  The  size of  the 
pipeline,  load  factor,  location  of  the  consumer  within  the 
network,  transport  distance,  contract  duration  and  the  Impact  on 
the  overall  system  are  all  factors  which  should  be  taken  Into 
consideration. 
19.  With  respect  to  the  accounting  basis  for  the  derivation  of 
charges,  historic  costs  reflect  the  original  capital  Investment 
required  for  the  construction  of  the  facilities,  while  current 
(replacement)  costs  reflect  the  present  value  of  t~e system.  The 
choice  between  these options will  be  Important  both  for  transport 
costs and  for  new  Investments. 
20.  In  order  to  ensure  that  charges  are  fair,  greater  cost 
transparency will  be  needed.  Equitable allocation of  the unbundled 
costs  of  transportatIon  as  we II  as  other  servIces  (load - 30  -
balancing,  storage  and  other  Induced  costs),  plus  some  allowance 
for  risk,  Is  a  complex  process.  Integrated  companies  tend  to  feel 
that  any  such  calculations would  be  misleading,  whereas  potential 
TPA  users  fee I  that  unbund I I  ng  of  costs  wou I  d  be  an  essent I  a I 
requirement  for  such  a  regime.  There  could  therefore  be 
difficulties  In  persuading  different  parties  to  accept  the 
derivation  of  costs  which  were  Intended  to  reflect  the  value  of 
the  services  which  they  provided  or  received.  Some  of  these 
services  could  be  attributed  to  the merchant  function  rather  than 
the  transportation function.  This  complexity  Is  Increased  because 
of  different  depreciation  and  taxation  regimes  In  different 
countries.  One  way  to reduce  the  scale of  this problem  would  be  to 
set  upper  and  lower  limits  on  transportation  and  related  charges 
within which  negotiations could  take  place. 
21.  It  Is  possible  that  transportation unit  costs  could  Increase  as  a 
result  of  loss  of  economies  of  scale  enjoyed  by  more  Integrated 
gas  compan les.  Converse I  y,  such  Increases  m  lght  be  offset  by 
higher  uti I lsatlon of  the  Inland  gas  transport  system. 
22.  To  the  extent  that  part les  were  unable  to  reach  agreement  by 
negot I  at lon,  there  would  be  a  role  for  regulatory  oversight  and 
arbitration  In  the  allocation  of  capacity,  Investments,  and 
formulating  and  overseeing  transportation  charges,  Including 
appropriate  rates  of  return.  Although  these  Issues  are  further 
discussed  In  chapter  5,  It  Is  worth-noting  here  that  the extent  to 
which  transportation services are unbundled  and  separately charged 
would  be  an  Important  determinant  of  the complexity of  regulation. 
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Chapter  4 
EXPLORATION,  PRODUCT ION  AND  PURCHASE 
The  Effect of TPA  on  Exploration and  tho Qeyelopmont  of Now  Fields 
1.  Companies  Involved  In  exploration  and  production  In  the  Community 
poInt  out  substantIa I  dIfferences  In  market  f I  ex I  bIll ty  between 
natura I  gas  and  o II,  to  the  dIsadvantage  of  natura I  gas  and, 
particularly  for  offshore  fields,  differences  In  transport  costs, 
the  need  In  some  cases  for  a  ded I  cat  ed  transport  system,  I  ead 
times,  and  requirement  to  corrunlt  large  'front-end'  Investments. 
For  these  reasons  producers,  and  the  financial  Institutions which 
provide  their  backing,  seek  long  term  contracts with  a  high  degree 
of  offtake  guarantee  through  take  or  pay  commitment.  Producers 
believe that  the  Introduction of  TPA  would  Impact  adversely on  the 
ability  to obtain such  contracts,  and,  therefore,  that  they  would 
be  unable  to  develop  major  new  fields  requiring  very  large 
Investments.  For  similar  reasons  many  producers  also  argue  that 
the  Incentive  to explore  for  new  gas  would  be  reduced. 
2.  The  majority  of  producers  believe,  therefore,  that  their 
requirements  are  best  served  by  sales  to  companies  which  can 
provide  long  term  financial  and  offtake  corrunltments,  and  handle 
variations  In  production.  By  aggregating  sales  to  a  multiplicity 
of  customers  across  different  market  sectors  the  major  gas 
companies  fulfill  this role.  Producers  fear  that  the  fragmentation 
of  the  customer  base  of  the  gas  companies  resulting  from  a  TPA 
regime  could  undermine  the  latter's  ability  to  sign  long  term 
contracts,  and  that  the  alternative of  seeking  long  term  take  or 
pay  contracts  directly  with  consumers  would  not  be  feasible. 
Individual  customers  might  not  be  willing  or  able  to  give  such 
long-term  guarantees  of  offtake,  and  In  any  case  many  such 
contracts  would  be  necessary  to  reach  a  satisfactory  volume. 
There  would  also  be  some  degree  of  risk  arising  from  the 
possibility of  customers  going  out  of  business  during  the  period 
of  the contract  . 
3.  The  question  Is whether  the current  relatively exclusive producer-
gas  company  relationships,  Involving  long-term offtake commitments 
and  netback  prices  maximised  to  a  level  determined  by  the 
competing  fuel,  are  the only  viable  way  of  operating  European  gas 
markets.  Some  large gas users have  shown  themselves  to be  willing 
and  able  to sign  long  term  contracts with  take  or  pay  commitments 
or offer other ways  of  risk sharing.  COnsortia  of  purchasers might - 32  -
develop  similar  abll ltles.  A TPA  regime  might  also enable a  buyer 
to  'onsell'  gas  that  he  had  committed  himself  to  take  but  no 
longer  needed  for  his own  plant,  thus  making  It easier  for  buyers 
to provide offtake guarantees. 
4.  Producers  would  still  be  free  under  a  TPA  regime  to  sell  to  the 
existing gas  companies,  which  would  certainly  remain  major  actors 
In  the  market.  Both  they  and  local  distribution  companies  should 
presumably  be  able  to  provide  some  level  and  duration  of  offtake 
guarantees,  particularly  In  an  expanding  market.  In  addition,  If 
they  had  to assume  more  market  risks,  producers  would  at  the  same 
time  have  the  advantage  of  being  able  to sell  their gas  In  a  much 
wider  and  growing  (perhaps  faster  growing)  market  and  to a  variety 
of  buyers,  rather  than  Just  to  the  existing  gas  transmission 
companies 
5.  This  last  argument  underlies  the  view  that  a  TPA  regime,  and  the 
consequent  ability  to sell  to  a  wider  range  of  buyers  (Including 
new  market  entrants) or  direct  to consumers,  could  have  a  positive 
effect  on  the  level  of  gas  exploration  and  production  In  the 
Community.  This  was  one  of  the  arguments  made  In  favour  of 
llberallsatlon  of  the  UK  gas  regime.  But,  although  exploration 
activity  In  gas  areas  of  the  UK  North  Sea  has  Increased  In  recent 
years,  producers  argue  that  this  has  been  due  to  other  factors, 
and  that  there  Is  no  evidence  that  the  changes  In  the  UK  regime 
had  a  positive or  negative effect on  North  Sea  gas exploration and 
development.  Gas  producers  In  the  UK  have  not  In  any  case  been 
able  to sell  to markets outside that  country. 
6.  Uncertainty  about  the effect of  TPA  on  Investment  Is  particularly 
(although  not  only)  relevant  In  the  case  of  the  development  of 
very  large  offshore  or  remote  fields,  which  can  have  an  annual 
plateau  production  as  high  as  20  billion cubic  metres  (2  billion 
cubic  feet  per  day),  with  capital  costs  of  S5-10bn.  The  current 
planning  Is  that  developments  of  this  type  will  be  needed  to meet 
future  EC  gas demand.  Clearly producers  Involved  In  large projects 
value  highly  the  financial  secur lty  which  Is  contained  In  the 
commitment  of  the  gas  companies.  They  are  not  convinced  that  the 
same  degree of security for  such  developments  could  be  provided  by 
a  situation  where  there  might  be  wider  opportunities  for  direct 
sales,  but  less  scope  for  the  gas  companies  to  guarantee  their 
offtake  levels. 
7.  There  were  differences  of  opinion  on  whether  a  TPA  regime  might 
help  or  hinder  the  development  of  smaller  gas  fields.  But  In  any 
case  It  seems  unlikely  that  changes  In  the  pattern  of  gasfleld 
development  Induced  by  a  TPA  regime  would  bring  forward  enough 
lower  cost  gas  to  cater  for  future  Community  demand  without  the 
need  for  significant  Investments  In  maJor  fields.  It  remains  a 
key  question,  therefore,  whether  the  Industry  Is  right  In 
believing  that  Investments  In  such  fields  would  be  deterred  by  a - 33 -
TPA  regime,  or  whether  they  would  still  take  place,  perhaps  with  a 
different  phasing  or  different  contractual  arrangements,  in 
response  to growing  demand  and  a  wider  but  less  guaranteed market 
potent I  a I.  Much  wou I  d  depend  on  the  reI at I  ve  competItIveness  of 
these fields  in  terms  of unit  production and  del Ivery  costs. 
Tho  Effect of TPA  00  Existing Gal  Production 
8.  The  producers  and  merchant  gas  companies  on  the  Committee  pointed 
out  that  TPA  could  reduce  the  ability  of  buyers  to  honour  their 
contractual  commitments  In  respect  of  existing  gas  production. 
But,  If  Introduced,  TPA  could  possibly  be  applied  to  additional 
production  from  existing  fields.  For  Instance,  spare  capacity  in 
production  and  delivery  systems  could  be  utilised  to  sell  gas  in 
excess  of  contractual  commitments,  although  the  Industry  believes 
that  this  option  would  be  constrained  by  limits  on  field  and 
pipeline  capacity,  which  usually  reflect  supply  contracts. 
Certainly the scope  would  vary  seasonally,  but  Interruptible sales 
should  often  be  feasible.  There  might  also  be  cases  where 
delivery  capacity  could  be  upgraded  without  incurring  prohibitive 
costs.  For  fields  not  sold  on  full-life  depletion  contracts  It 
would  also  be  less  difficult  to  Introduce  TPA  once  the  Initial 
term  of  the  contract  had  expired  and  different  contractual  terms 
could  be  negotiated. 
Commercial  Situation of ProdUcers  yls-6-yls Buxers 
9.  It  Is uncertain,  whether,  In  Itself,  TPA  would  make  any  difference 
to  the  commercial  balance  of  advantage  between  producers  and 
existing or  new  purchasers.  As  Important  will  be  Judgements  as  to 
whether  market  (supply/demand)  conditions  favour  buyers  or 
sellers;  the  costs  associated  with  gas  development  In  new 
producing  regions;  and  the  degree  and  diversity  of  excess  gas 
dellverablllty.  As  far  as  the direct  effect of  TPA  Is  concerned, 
there  are  differences  of  opinion  as  to whether  gas  prices  would 
be  driven  down  by  the  Introduction of  gas  to  gas  competition,  or 
bid  up  because  of  the  fragmentation  of  buyers  In  the  face  of  a 
powerful  group  of  producers  and  exporters,  although  In  the  latter 
case  prices  would  presumably  still  be  limited  In  the  longer  term 
by  the risk of  losing  sales to alternative fuels  In  the different 
market  sectors. 
10.  Nor  Is  there  agreement  as  to  how  TPA  might  change  trends  In  gas 
demand.  One  view  was  that,  unless oil  prices fell  considerably,  a 
decoupllng of gas prices from  oil  Induced  by  TPA  competition would 
allow  gas  to  capture  a  greater  market  share  and  Increase - 34  -
volume  sales.  This  would  in  turn  be  a  constraint  on  future  oil 
price  escalation.  Decoupllng  might  also  Improve  flexibility  and 
security  by  encouraging  the  installation  of  more  dual  firing 
equipment.  An  alternative  view  however  was  that  TPA  would  not 
lead  to  greater  substitution  of  oil  by  gas  because  lower  prices 
would  not  be  sufficient  to bring  forward  new  gas  from  large,  high 
cost  grass-roots proJects. 
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Chapter  5 
REGULATION  AND  MODALITIES 
1.  There  Is  consensus  that,  If  some  form  of  TPA  regime  were  to  be 
Introduced,  care  should  be  taken  to  ensure  that  the  associated 
regulatory  procedures  should  not  be  (or  become)  too  lengthy, 
complex  and  costly,  Involving  the  creation  of  large  regulatory 
authorities.  In  addition,  It  would  be  necessary  to  guard  against 
procedures  designed  to  regulate  a  relatively  limited  part  of  the 
Industry  'creeping'  Into  other  areas,  thus  expanding  regulatory 
Jurisdiction.  However,  some  Committee  members  felt  that  It  would 
not  be  feasible  to  limit  the  amount  of  regulation  In  a  TPA 
situation and  that  regulation would  tend  to  increase over  time 
2.  As  well  as  the  control  over  the gas market  and  over  the use of gas 
transmission  networks  exercised  by  the  Industry  Itself,  there  Is 
already  a  degree  of  regulation  of  the  gas  Industry  by  national 
authorities,  at  armslength  or  through  State  ownership.  The 
sl tuat I  on  var les  from  one  Member  State  to  another  but  the  most 
widespread  regulatory activities which  are relevant  to this report 
concern  consumer  prices and  obligations to supply. 
3.  For  consumers  who  did  not  enter  Into  a  TPA  regime,  existing 
regulations  of  this  type  would  probably  continue.  But  for  TPA 
customers  both  gas  prices and  the  degree  of  supply  security could 
be  left  to  negotiation  between  buyer  and  seller.  Regulatory 
authorities would  however  need  to  look  at  the  allocation of  costs 
over  the  whole  system  (as  Is  already  the  practice  In  some 
countries)  to ensure  that  there was  no  cross-subsldlsatlon between 
different  classes  of  consumer.  The  Introduction  of  TPA  would  be 
likely  to  focus  more  attention on  this  Issue,  particularly  since 
It  would  tend  to  discourage  the  practice  of  pricing  gas  In 
relation  to other  fuels  (see  chapter  2).  The  allocation of  costs 
to  dIfferent  c I  asses  of  consumer  wou I  d  be  a  comp I  ex  area  of 
regulatory activity,  although  this should  be  helped  by  the greater 
transparency  likely  to  be  brought  about  by  TPA  competition.  In 
t lme,  the  lntroduct ion  of  TPA  would  probably  also  change  the 
present  structure of  gas  purchase  contracts,  where  price  formulae 
tend  to  be  based  on  a  weighted  average  of  the  pilces  obtainable 
from  different  types of  consumer. - 36-
Gas  TransQQrt 
4.  A TPA  regime  would  create  a  need  for  new  types  of  regulation  In 
the  field  of  gas  transport  (transmission  and  distribution)  to 
ensure  that  the obJective of opening  the market  to competition was 
achieved.  Although  It  would  be  a  logical  counterpart  of  such  a 
system  to  remove  any  remaining  barriers  to  pipeline  construction 
by  other  companies,  gas  transportation would  tend  to remain  a  near 
monopoly  activity- at  least  for  some  years ahead. 
5.  The  aim  therefore  would  be  to  devise  a  practical,  effective  and 
reasonably  simple  approach  to satisfying this need  for  regulation. 
One  way  of  minimising  detailed  case-by-case  regulat ton  could  be 
for  the  key  pr lnclples  to  be  laid  down  In  a  legally  binding 
Community  Instrument  as a  basis for  the  Introduction  of  TPA.  This 
would  probably  have  to cover: 
which  classes  of  consumers,  distributors  and  other  suppliers 
(e.g.  brokers)  would  be  eligible  for  access  to  transportation 
and  related  services.  There  could  be  three  categories  of 
eligibility 
-those declared  to be  eligible for  TPA; 
- those  who  could  choose  to  be  eligible  but  who  would 
otherwise  remain  covered  by  existing  regulatory 
arrangements; 
-those declared  Ineligible,  at  least  Initially. 
gas qual lty and  quality of service standards, 
pr Inc I  pIes  for  a I locatIng  capacIty  In  the  event  of  demands 
for  transport exceeding  the spare capacity available.  These 
could  be  based  on  'first come  first served'  and  'use or  lose 
It'  rules,  but  might  need  to  take  account  of  other  factors 
e.g.  contract duration,  distance or  lnterruptlblllty. 
non-discrimination  rules,  for  Instance  between  returning  and 
new  customers. 
transparency  of  Information  on  present  and  future  transport 
capacity; 
possibly,  an  obligation on  the owners  of  transport  systems  to 
maintain  a  sufficient  level  of  capacity over  time  to  provide 
for  their  own  customers,  TPA  contracts  and  a  defined 
contingency  reserve; 
principles  for  determining  charges  for  transport  and  for  any 
related  services  covered  by  the  TPA  system,  Including  cost 
transparency and  allocation; - 37  -
a  reQuirement  to  publish  and  keep  up-to-date  a  scale  of 
charges  for  transportation and  related services; 
arrangements  for  back-up  supply  In  emergencies; 
commercial  confidentiality; 
any  ·non-contractual  procedures  for  settling  disputes  before 
recourse  to the  regulator. 
The  legal  instrument  might  also  usefully  Include  statements  of 
principle  on  the  treatment  of  non-TPA  consumers  In  terms  of 
securIty  of  supp I  y  ( supp I  y  obI I  gat Ions)  and  avo I  dance  of  cross-
subsldlsatlon. 
6.  These  Community  principles  should  clearly  be  drawn  up  after 
consultations between  the  regulatory authorities,  the gas  Industry 
and  gas  consumers.  Once  the  pr Inc i pIes  were  estab II shed,  the 
regulatory  authorities  would  not  be  cal led  upon  to  Intervene 
unless  the  commercial  parties concerned  could  not  reach  agreement 
within  the  principles,  or  one  or  both  parties  felt  that  the 
principles were  not  being  followed. 
7.  The  extent  to  which  this  approach  would  be  successful  In 
minimising  day-to-day  regulat lon  and  avoiding  recourse  to  the 
courts  If  a  TPA  regime  was  Introduced,  would  depend  on  whether 
all  sides  felt  that  the  basic  principles  were  practical, 
comprehensive  and  fair,  and  on  the wl lllngness of  the  Industry  to 
make  any  such  regime  work.  There  would  Inevitably be  some  disputes 
Initially,  but  these  should  become  progressively  less  common  as 
the basic principles were  tested and  upheld. 
8.  The  scope  for  disputes  could  possibly  be  reduced  by  a  degree  of 
Industry  self-regulation,  or  arbitration  by  Joint  groups  of 
Industry  and  consumers  as  already  exists  In  some  cases.  These 
options,  which  would  still  leave  open  the  possibility of  recourse 
to  the  regu 1  a tor  1  f  sel f-regu I  at I  on  did  not  succeed,  shou I  d  be 
taken  Into  account  In  deciding  on  the  type  of  regulation 
necessary. 
9.  1  t  Is  Important  to  record  that  the  merchant  gas  compan les  and 
others on  the Committee  did not  believe that  the approach  outlined 
In  paragraphs  5  to  8  above  would  be  fair,  practicable  or 
successful  In  reducing  the need  for  detailed regulation. - 38  -
10.  A regulatory  system  for  TPA  should  be  concerned  with  safeguarding 
the  position  of  all  those  Involved  In  the  transport  system, 
Including  the  gas  companies  themselves.  Account  would  need  to  be 
taken  of  contractual  commitments,  particularly  take  or  pay 
contracts,  which  could,  If  not  fulfilled  In  consequence  of  a  TPA 
regime  lead  to maJor  claims  for  compensation  against  merchant  gas 
companies  unless  acceptable  solutIons  were  found.  Transit tonal 
arrangem~nts might  be  needed  to deal  with  this type of  problem. 
11.  On  transPort  capacitY  there would  have  to  be  an  equitable system, 
capable  of  dealing  wl th  the  complex  EC  p lpe line  network,  for 
Identifying  and  allocating spare  pipeline capacity where  this was 
Insufficient  to  deal  with  all  new  transmission  needs,  and  for 
ensuring  that  capacity  could still  be  made  available  to  deal  with 
emergency  situations.  There  might  also  be  a  need  to  ensure  that 
the  development  of  gas  pipeline  networks  over  time  took  account 
of  TPA  as well  as of  the merchant  companies'  own  sales. 
12.  The  principles for  setting transPort  charges  and  charges  for  other 
services  would  be  particularly  Important  as  a  key  factor  In 
establishing  competition  and  In  the  gas  companies'  financial 
viability.  The  principles  would  need  to  provide  for  reasonable 
rates  of  return  on  capital  Investment.  COst  transparency  and 
separate accounting  for  transport would  be  essential,  for  Instance 
to  ensure  that  there  was  no  discrimination  between  transport 
charges  for  TPA  users  and  that  element  In  the  prices  paid  by  the 
gas  companies'  own  customers.  Transparency  would  also,  by 
providing  comparat lve  data,  help  to  I  dent lfy  'gold  plat lng'  or 
other  cases  where  unnecessarily  high  costs  had  been  Incurred  In 
new  Investments. 
13.  For  a  'user-friendly'  TPA  system  It would  probably  be  necessary  to 
require system owners  to publish a  standardised scale of  transport 
charges,  based  on  a  few  variables  such  as  distance,  throughout, 
maximum  capacity,  lnterruptlblllty and  possibly contract  duration. 
An  element  of  negotiating  flexibility  could  be  preserved  by 
quoting  the scale of  charges  In  terms  of  maxima  or  ranges.  Given 
the  d 1  ff 1  cuI ty  of  precIse  cost  allocatIon  In  a  comp I  ex  system, 
this  approach  would  clearly  Involve  approximations.  But,  If  the 
basic  principles  were  satisfactory,  It  should  not  lead  to  any 
unacceptable market  distortions or  financial  risks. 
14  The  merchant  gas companies  and  others argued  however  that  the  type 
of  cost-related  approach  out lined  In  paragraph  12  would  not  be 
feasible,  and  that  a  simplified scale of  transport  charges  would 
be  arbitrary and  likely to  lead  to market  distortions. - 39  -
15.  The  most  practical  method  of  applying  the  type  of  regulatory 
mechanism  described above  might  be  to vest  the  necessary  powers  In 
national  authorities.  But  a  degree of Community-level  Involvement, 
either  through  the  commission  or  a  new  body,  would  certainly  be 
necessary  to ensure  that national  regimes  operated on  the basis of 
harmonlsed  principles,  and  to  deal  with  disputes  arising  from 
cross-frontier  TPA  activity. 
16.  The  poss I  b I 1 I  ty  of  1  eg lsi at I  on  based  on  the  prevent I  on  of  abuse 
was  also  suggested  and  Is  mentioned  In  paragraph  19  of  the 
Executive  Summary. 
17.  Under  a  Community-wide  TPA  regime  competition  could  be  distorted 
by  differences  In  national  conditions,  for  Instance  In  taxation 
levels,  depreciation  rates  or  environment/safety  standards.  Some 
of  these  differences might  be  'driven out'  by  the  consequences  of 
market  competition,  but  In  other  cases  Community-level 
negotiations  to agree on  common  rules might  be  necessary. 
18.  There  are  differences  of  opinion  as  to  whether  other  services 
associated with  gas  transport  should  be  subject  to TPA,  and  hence 
to  regulation.  The  most  Important  Issue  here  Is  storage  but 
blending  and  control  of  gas  quality  are  also  relevant.  In  some 
countries,  storage  facilities  are  extremely  difficult  to  build 
(because  of  a  lack  of  available  underground  structures,  safety 
rules,  or  difficulty  In  obtaining  permission  for  sites);  In 
others,  the  posIt I  on  Is  I  ess  d Iff I  cuI t  and  storage  may  not  be 
considered  as  a  hurdle  to  market  entry.  In  some  countries 
Individual  customers  own  storage  facilities;  In  others,  all 
storage  Is  owned  by  the  gas  company.  In  a  TPA  system,  there could 
be  a  separate  market  In  storage  capacity,  as  well  as  a  market  In 
pipeline capacity. 
19.  Lastly,  although  not  strictly  under  the  heading  of  TPA,  there 
could  be  a  case,  particularly  If  TPA  were  Introduced,  for  lifting 
other  barr lers  to  competItIon  and  market  entry  such  as 
Import/export  restrictions,  or  statutory  purchase  or  sales 
monopolies,  as  well  as  liberalising  the  construction  of  gas 
pipelines and  storage facilities. 
• • • • • • Access  rights 
Back-up 
Broker/Trader 
Common  carriage 
Cross  subsldlsatlon 
Distribution 
Downstream 
Integrated gas  company 
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- 40  -
GlossarY  of  terms 
Right  to  the  use  of  the  transportation  grid 
In  a  TPA  system. 
To  supply  a  TPA  user  If  gas  and  pipeline 
capacity  are  available,  when  the  user's 
normal  source  of  supply  Is  temporarily 
Interrupted. 
An  Intermediary  who  buys  gas  from  whatever 
source  for  Its subsequent  resale. 
Theoretical  definition  of  common  carriage 
Includes  the allocation of capacity pro  rata 
among  a I I  app I i cants.  ThIs  concept  Is 
excluded  In  the  defInition  of  TPA  used  In 
this report. 
Process  of  charging  an  unJustifiably  low 
pr lee  to  customer  groups  and  compensat lng 
for  this  by  charging  higher  prices  to other 
customer  groups. 
The  transport 
pressure  local 
final  consumers. 
of  natural  gas  on  lower 
networks  for  delivery  to 
Gas  operations  relating  to  transmission 
within  the  European  Community,  distri-
bution  and  related  services  as  well  as  gas 
marketing. 
As  merchant  gas  company,  but  also 
performs  the  function of distribution. 
Local  distribution company. 
Gas  company  that  Includes  the  following 
functions:  bulk  purchase  from  producers 
and  wholesalers,  transmission  and  sale  of 
gas. Region 
Stand-by 
Supply 
Take  or  Pay  Obligations 
Third  Party Access  - TPA 
Transmission 
Transport/transportation 
Unbundling 
Upstream 
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The  geographical  area  served  by  a 
particular grid. 
To  guarantee  In  advance  supply  to  a  TPA 
user  at  any  time  his  usual  source  of 
supply  Is  Interrupted. 
The  delivery  of  natural  gas  to  final 
consumers  Including  necessary arrangements 
for  purchase,  transport,  storage,  and 
other  related activities. 
Financial  contractual  obligation  of  a 
natural  gas  buyer  to  pay  for  a  certain 
minimum  quantity  of  gas  Irrespective  of 
whether  he  takes del Ivery  of  that gas. 
A  scheme  providing  for  a  qualified 
obligation  on  companies  operating  natural 
gas  transportation  facilities  to  offer 
terms  for  the use of  their  system. 
The  transport  of  natural  gas  on  the 
Interconnected  high  pressure grid. 
Includes  both  the  transmission  and 
distribution functions. 
Disaggregation  of  charging,  accounting  or 
management  of  part I  cuI ar  ope rat Ions,  or 
even  ownership  of  an  Integrated or  partly 
Integrated gas  company. 
Gas  operations  relating  to  exploration, 
production and  purification of  natural  gas 
up  to  the  delivery  point  to  the 
transmission  grid  In  the  European 
Community. 1 • 
2. 
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CONSEIL EUROPEEN 
DES FEDERATIONS 
DE L'INDUSTRIE CHIMIQUE 
Annex  1 
:  •.  '!:.I I 
·-=  [I!P~~~  ~::·JP GENERAL 
Dear Mr.  jones, 
Mr. Clive Jones 
Deputy Director-General 
Directorate General XVII 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES 
Rue de Ia Loi, 200 
1049 BRUXELLES 
Brwcelles,  1'2 April 1991 
ANNEX TO THE FINAL REPORT OF THE PCCG (PROFESSIONAL CONSULT  ATJVE 
COMMit I EE - GAS) 
In  the last PCCG Meeting on March 26,  1991, you announced that the EC Commission 
had agreed to the fact that individual Members of the Consultative Committee could 
express their own view on the effect of TPA in a separate Annex to be attached to the 
Final Report. 
CEFIC  - as  an  invited  Member  of the PCCG - is  keen  to take advantage  of this 
opportunity to make its view known to the Commission. 
The CEFIC Gas Spokesman and Suppleant have drafted the attached Position Statement 
- together with Members of the CEFIC Gas Working Party- which puts forward in a 
concise fonn the view of the gas consumers. 
Naturally,  as  we  have  had  to  state  before,  not  all  CEFIC  Member  Companies  -
particularly the upstream oil  and gas producers - are in agreement with the majority 
CEFIC position of support by the chemical industry gas consumers for open access to 
gas. 
Yours sincerely, 
Attr.  Directeur  gl  adjoil'\t  to  .-
lnf.  Oi·~c~.:::..r  ge:"f.r:al 
Otr:: .... :'!  -t". f. _  e,  +  -----CEFIC  ENERGY  COMMITTEE 
POSITION  PAPER 
ON 
PROFESSIONAL  CONSULTATIVE  COMMITTEE  ON  GAS 
PREFACE 
The  initial terms  of reference  proposed  by the  commission  and 
adopted  by  the  Delegates  of  the  PCCG,  required  the  Committee 
to  assist  the  Commission  in  identifying  and  presenting  the 
main  technical,  economic  and  administrative  considerations  to 
be  taken  into  account  in  the  Community  policy  with  regard  to 
TPA. 
CEFIC  contributed to  PCCG  debates  in the belief that the  end 
result  would  be  a  Committee  Report  based  on  the  consensus 
achieved  and  recording the major points of disagreement. 
CEFIC  believes  that  the  Committee  Report  is  reasonably  fair 
and  CEFIC  would  have  been  content to see it published  alone. 
The  decision  of  certain  members  of  the  Committee  to  publish 
their  views  in  full  as  an  Annex  Report  has  caused  CEFIC  to 
reluctantly replicate this action  in order that the  consumers 
view  is fairly represented. 
INTRODUCTION 
The  structure  of  the  European  gas  market,  in  which  supply  is 
controlled  by  obligopolies  and  distribution  in  most  cases  by 
countrywide  monopolies,  has  produced  good  results  during  the 
early years  of  the  gas  market  development,  but  has  failed  to 
adapt  to  the  differentiated  consumers  needs  of  today•s 
increasingly competitive global market. 
A  small  number  of  major  companies  have  shareholding  interests 
in  gas  production,  gas  transmission  and  gas  distribution 
companies  throughout Europe. 
The  situation  is further  complicated  by  such political  issues 
as  the desire to protect the  indigenous  coal  industry  in  many 
countries  and  taxati6n  on  gas  production as  a  major  source  of 
state revenue. 
-1-Given  this  structure  it  is  not  surpr1s1ng  that  some  gas 
production  and  distribution  companies  are  slow  to  respond  to 
the  challenge  presented  by  the  introduction  of  competition: 
indeed  it  could  be  asked  when  has  a  monopoly  welcomed  the 
breaking up  of its control  on  the market.  Nevertheless the  UK 
experience  has  shown  that  a  TPA  regime  can  operate 
successfully given a  positive approach by market participants. 
The  result  of  the  current  market  structure  has  been  a  slow 
growth  in  Europe  of gas  consumption;  in fact the share  of  the 
primary  energy  sector  which  gas  held  in  West  Europe  in  1989 
was  only  15.8%.  whilst  in USA  was  24.5%.  Another example,taken 
from  the  BP  Review of World  Gas  August  90  issue,  shows that the 
consumption  in  the  EEC  has  grown  from  199.7  BCM  in  1979  to 
214.8  BCM  in  1989,  an  average  growth  rate  of  only  1.5%  per 
annum.  Greater  penetration  of  gas  in  the  energy  market 
would  have  occurred with gas to gas competition,  encouraged by 
gas  prices  below  oil  parity,  in  this  period  when  oil  prices 
were at times  over 30$/bbl. 
The  consumers  today  are  faced  with  the  simple  prospect  of  DQ 
supply  alternative.  Producers  who  have  gas,  but  no 
shareholding  in the  transmission  companies,  have  no  practical 
means  in the  absence  of TPA  of getting gas to the market,  and 
they  have  no  other  choice  than  to  fit  in  with  the  current 
structure  of  selling  gas  to  transmission  and  distribution 
companies. 
So  from  a  structural  and  commercial  point  of  view  the 
European  gas  market  has  massive  potential  but  is  stifled  by 
ist very monopolistic nature. 
THIRD  PARTY  ACCESS  CTPAl 
To  change  the  gas  market  in  Europe  requires  moves  to  break 
its  monopolistic  structure  and  encourage  gas  to  gas 
competition.  The  introduction  of  a  Community  Directive 
allowing  third  party  access  is  the  first  necessary  step 
toward  an  integrated  European  energy market.  It will  allow  to 
buyers  and  sellers  of  gas  the  right  to  be  offered  transport 
services  - on  a  first come  first served basis  - where  capacity 
is available.  As  a  result any  company  having  gas  to sell will 
be  free to do  so to consumers with  an  interest in  pu~chasing. 
-2-EFFECTS  OF  TPA 
We  will examine  the effects of TPA  on the main  issues of: 
- pricing,  consumption  and  competition 
- security of supply 
- transportation 
- exploration and  production 
- regulation 
1.  Pricing.  Consumption  and  Competition 
The  introduction  of  TPA  will  have  important  economic 
implication;  in  fact  by  enabling  gas  to  gas  competition 
it will eventually result in a  reduction of gas prices to 
all consumers. 
The driving force  for price reduction will  come  from  more 
efficient utilisation of the  gas grid  and  clear evidence 
is provided  by  the comparison  between  Europe  and  USA.  In 
the  latter,  the  utilisation  rate  for  the  24  largest  us 
pipelines  was  over  90%  as  compared  with  less  than  50% 
for the national transmission systems  in Europe  (R.  Hopper 
Report,  pp  9  and  10).  The  small  and  large  consumers  will 
have  a  choice  of  supply  and  the  ability  to  negotiate 
terms  according  to their needs.  Today•s  pricing  the  gas 
at  the  alternate  fuel  price  level  ensures  the  consumer 
pays  the  maximum,  discouraging  gas  consumption 
and  reducing market penetration. 
The  alternative fuel  philosophy in many  cases discourages 
efficient  use  of  gas.  Why  should  a  consumer  who  has 
invested  in  gas  turbine  combined  heat  and  power 
facilities  and  therefore  is  only  able  to  use  gas  oil 
(light  fuel  oil)  as  an  alternative  fuel  be  required  to 
pay  more  for  his  gas  then  a  consumer  who  uses  gas  less 
efficiently  in  a  steam  boiler  1  steam  turbine  facility 
but  can  use  cheaper  heavy  fuel  oil  as  an  alternative 
fuel?  CEFIC  believes  such  anomalies  can  only  be  finally 
removed  in a  competitive market. 
Large  industrial  gas  consumers  will  of  course  invest  in 
dual  fuelling  and  gas  storage  to  be  able  to  negotiate 
interruptible contracts at lower prices. 
The  consumers  will  have  to  balance  security  of  supply 
with  price  and  may  choose  sometime  to  maximise  the 
reliability at the expense of economic  advantages. 
-3-The  market  developments  of  the  last  few  years  in  the  UK 
and  USA  indicates that it is the small to medium  consumer 
who  has benefited most,  not the large industrial user.  In 
the  USA  the household  gas  price  index  fell  more  than  the 
same  index  for industrial consumer in the years  from  1986 
to  1989.  In  the  UK  competitors  to  British  Gas  have 
targeted  small  to  medium  firm  gas  users  and  some  argue 
that  the  25.000  therms  per  year  limit  - below  which 
British  Gas  have  monopoly  rights  of  supply  - should  be 
reduced. 
2.  Security of Supply 
The  issue of security of supply  can potentially apply to 
upstream  and  downstream  segments  of  the 
production-transmission-distribution chain. 
We  refer  to  security  of  supply  for  upstream  gas 
production  investments  and  to  reliability  of  supply  for 
downstream gas transmission and distribution investments. 
The  security  of  supply  is  dependent  from  the  number  of 
development  projects  being  pursued  by  the  exploration  1 
production companies. 
The  growth  in  exploration in the  UK  overall  and  Southern 
Basin  in  particular  since  liberalisation  of  the  gas 
market  shows  how  TPA  can  encourage  new  supplies.  The 
"secure"  volume  guarantees  which  the  transmission 
companies  supposedly  provide  today,  are  based  on  pricing 
the  gas  as  high  as  possible  and  this  hardly  gives  the 
production  companies  optimism  to  explore  and  secure  new 
gas  fields. 
Existing  contracts  will  not  be  necessarily  affected  by 
the  TPA  and  those  contracts  that  do  expire  would  leave 
the  producers  happier  in  the  security  of  higher  demand 
and  broad customer base securing their gas sale. 
It is  recognised  however  that  transitional  arrangements 
may  be  necessary  in  the  introduction  of  TPA  to  take 
account  of commitments  already made  by gas  companies. 
TPA  will  broaden  the  market  to  include  large  independent 
consumers  or new  aggregators of demand  other than the gas 
companies. 
-4-In  fact,  today's  dominant  position  of  the  2  or  3  large 
gas  distribution  companies  affects  the  producers  to  the 
extent  that  they  need  to  secure  long  term  supply 
contracts. 
In  the  UK,  the  multitude  of  deals  between  producers  and 
direct  consumers  and  the  commitment  of  producers  like 
Statoil  and  BP  to the  newly  created  free market  show  the 
benefit of TPA  on the security of supply. 
As  far  as  the  downstream  sector  is  concerned,  the 
introduction of TPA  will not have  an  adverse effect on  the 
reliability of  supply;  indeed  it can  be  argued  that  the 
end  result  will  lead  to  improved  reliability  of  the 
system as  a  whole. 
In  a  TPA  regime  certain  customers  with  a  low  need  of 
reliability  of  supply  will  negotiate  interruptible 
contracts  and  effectively  enhance  the  safety  margin 
currently  inherent to the  system,  for  the benefit of  the 
remaining  customers  opting  for  more  traditional  secure 
supply contracts. 
It  is  not  envisaged  that  TPA  would  be  anything  but 
voluntary  for  participating  players  and  so  it is  clear 
that purchasers would not be obliged to take advantage  of 
such  rights.  Whilst  the  small  commercial  and  residential 
consumers  are  in  a  less flexible  position through  having 
no  realistic dual  fuelling alternative,  their security of 
supply  will  not  be  threatened.  The  local  distribution 
companies  (LDC)  will  take  on  a  negotiating role  on  their 
behalf using  their stronger bargaining position  in  a  TPA 
environment. 
A  TPA  regime  will  provide  consumers  with  the  opportunity 
to  negotiate  for  the  reliability  of  supply  they  need, 
thus  ensuring  that  resources  such  as  gas  storage 
facilities and  reserve pipeline capacity are allocated to 
those  consumers  who  need  a  high  level  of  supply  security 
and  are  prepared  to  pay  the  cost.  Such  a  regime  also 
provides clear market  signals  for  new  investment  in  such 
facilities  and  encourages  use  of  lower  cost alternatives 
such as dual  fuel  flexibility when  appropriate. 
-5-3.  Transportation 
In  practice  gas  transmission  can  be  considered  to  be  a 
near  monopoly  today  because  of  the  financial  and 
institutional  barriers  existing  to  new  pipeline 
construction.  TPA  in  itself  does  not  affect this  status 
gyQ,  since  it  only  advocates  open  access  to  any  grid 
where  capacity is available  on  a  first come  first  served 
basis:  a  mechanism  which  protects  existing  captive 
customers.  It  is  however  highly  desirable  in  a  future 
free  European  gas  market  that  anybody  with  substantial 
need  and  capital  should  be  allowed  to  build  pipelines 
across  Europe.  In  a  TPA  regime  on  the  other  hand  the 
unbundling  of  service  of  transportation  from  that  of 
merchandising gas will  tend to drive  the business  of  gas 
transportation  toward  a  more  efficient  use  of  the 
transportation  assets  employed.  It  will  thus  become  in 
the  transportation  business  interest  to  make  available 
all spare capacity that does or can be made  to exist with 
relatively  inexpensive  debottlenecking,  for  either  firm 
or interruptible gas transportation. 
It  will  of  course  be  necessary  to  have  a  transoarent 
market  in  order  to  verify  the  availability  of  spa:e 
capacity  of  transportation  and  to  allow  mediation  1n 
disputes where  capacity has  been declared unavailable.  If 
a  transmission  company  has  in  fact  no  available  spare 
capacity,  it  will  have  the  interest  to  declare  the 
capital  cost  needed  for  incremental  debottlenecking  of 
the  system.  If  capacity  increases  were  already  planned, 
then  these  should  become  of  public  knowledge  so  that 
interested parties  can elect to subscribe  to  even  larger 
capacity increases. 
Interruptible transportation contracts will enable better 
capacity  utilisation  of  the  pipeline  system  while 
ensuring capacity is available when  necessary to meet the 
needs  of  those  consumers  who  require  a  secure  source  of 
supply. 
TPA  leads  to  more  efficient  use  and  operation  of  the 
existing transportation systems.  As  the European pipeline 
system  moves  to  capacity  so  market  forces  will  bring  in 
new  investment  in  pipeline  and  distribution.  The 
announcement  of the construction of the MIDAL  Pipeline by 
Wintershall  proves  that  TPA  is  supportive  of  these  new 
initiatives.  Finally the requirement of liberalisation of 
the  European  energy market  - a  goal  of  EEC  for  1992  - is 
that  national  monopolies  on  the  purchase  1  sale  of  gas 
from  national  fields  should  be  eliminated.  Privatisation 
of the  local  distribution companies  should  be  encouraged 
and  at  the  very  least  their  performance  separately 
identified and  monitored. 
-6-4.  Exploration,  production and  purchase 
The situation of today with the maximum  or1c1ng  system  for 
gas  (coupled to oil price)  discourages the use  and  hence the 
exploration and production of new  gas.  In  a  TPA  regime the 
market  share of gas will  increase vis a  vis other energy 
sources  and  integrated or non  - integrated energy companies 
will step in and provide the increase in production.  The 
experience of the UK  clearly shows that existing E  & P 
companies will continue to explore for  and sell gas  and  the 
existing transmission companies  continue to buy the majority 
of gas  on  a  long term committed basis.  It also demonstrates 
that producers are prepared to market gas themselves 
directly to consumers  and  even to buy gas to support these 
market activities  (Mobil  purchase of Scott field gas). 
A comparison of exploration in the decade of the 1980's in 
the North  Sea  Basin,  UK  Continental Shelf and  US 
demonstrates the higher level of activity in USA  and  UK  c 
Shelf where  TPA  was  introduced.  Reseryes  of gas  convergent 
on the  EEC  are  immense  and will be developed  when  the need 
will be there.  The  cost of development will be least under  a 
competitive environment.  Flexible gas pricing brought about 
by  gas to gas  competition will ensure that large 
developments will be utilised at full rate  from  day  one  and 
hence  improve  the overall payback of the  investments. 
5.  Regulation  and Modalities 
In comparing the  new  resources required for TPA  regulation 
it will be  recognised that already today there is a  great 
deal  of regulatory.  monitoring  and  supervisory activity 
carried out by  governments. 
Upon  introducing TPA  regulation will be  needed to guide the 
industry through areas of dispute/conflict.  As  TPA  matures 
and players  in the market  accept self discipline then  such 
regulations can be gradually withdrawn  so that in the end 
the objective would  be  a  self governing  systems with  a 
minimum  of  regulatory oversight. 
The  transmission and distribution systems are usually 
regarded as  near monopolies  and  as  such require strong 
regulation.  In order to avoid  a  regulatory organisation 
stifling the gas market  development,  the regulation will 
have to be  based  on clear principles for  the market  players 
to  implement  and  an  effective  means  for  settling  any 
disputes,  rather than  a  set of rules trying to foresee  and 
regulate every possible event. 
-7-Under  a  competitive environment  in which  TPA  exists and  some 
national  regulation like the one  provided  by  OFGAS  in the  UK 
is introduced,  the existing need  for regulation of the 
monopoly  supplier will be  reduced.  In fact the experience of 
the UK  shows  that a  hand-off reactive approach with  a 
minimum  of  regulatory oversight  (2  man  year)  is working.  The 
comparison often drawn with the larger staff of the  FERC  is 
misleading in that the majority of the staff is employed  in 
activities related to deregulation. 
The  establishment of  a  European Arbitration  Body will  enable 
consumers,  producers  and transportation companies to have  a 
forum  where  recourse will be possible in the event of 
disputes  on application of the general  regulatory 
principles,  which  have  not been settled at the national 
level or involve transportation across national borders. 
BENEFITS  OF  INTRODUCING  TPA 
The benefits of bringing gas  competition to EEC  are  far reaching; 
we  would  like to examine  in detail the: 
- increased competitiveness of European  industry 
- overall  economic benefits to the Community 
- benefits on  the environment 
1.  Competitiveness of the European  Industry 
The  objective in the creation of the EEC  was  to provide  a 
larger  market  place  with  consequent  lower  prices  for 
consumers  and/or  improved quality of service.  The  improved 
competitiveness  of  the  European  chemical  and  other 
industrial  Companies  would  lead  to  greater  economic 
activity,  prosperity  and  employment.  For  companies  to  be 
competitive  an  obvious  essential  requirement  is that  the 
procurement of essential services and  raw materials  like gas 
and  energy is effected at globally competitive levels. 
For  energy  intensive  industries  (like the  chemical  industry) 
the energy cost structure of today has  a  critical negative 
effect on their ability to compete  long term with  foreign 
companies  either  based  in  USA  or  in  the  Middle  East. 
Eventually  this  will  inevitably  lead  to  a  relocation  of 
these  industries to countries with  lower  energy costs with  a 
loss  of  jobs  and  prosperity  for  the  Community.  The 
introduction of TPA  will  improve substantially this situation 
introducing  important energy cost savings  which will  render 
these European  companies  competitive again. 
-8-2.  overall  Economic  Benefits 
A  study  by  R.  Hopper,  commissioned  by  CEFIC,  to examine  the 
potential economic benefits of TPA  has  concluded that the 
margin  above gas acquisition cost being extracted today  from 
European  consumers  is  7.8  billions  ECUS/year  higher  than 
that in USA.  The  breakdown of this figure between household 
users  and  industry  is  respectively  6.2  and  1.6  billions 
ECUSjyear,  indicating  that  contrary  to  widely  held 
perceptions,  the household sector has more potential to gain 
from  TPA  than the industrial sector. 
The  adoption of TPA  will result in a  greater utilization of 
the  internal  and  possibly  external  European  gas 
transportation  system,  and  an  abandonment  of  rigid  oil 
related  pricing  with  consequent  lowering  of  the  general 
{i.e.  for all customers)  gas price level.  The  lower price of 
gas will  be  financed  by the higher utilisation of the gas 
transportation/distribution system. 
3.  Environment  Benefits 
One  of the most  important global  issues today is pollution 
and  the  effect  industrial  emissions  have  on  the 
environment.  The  constraint the monopolies  have  exercised 
on  increasing the gas share of the primary energy use  has 
prevented  Europe's  exploitation  of  gas'  environmental 
advantages  over other fuels.  The  new  technology of  Combined 
Heat  and  Power  (CHP)  .schemes  using  gas  as  energy  source 
brings significant efficiency advantages  over other fuels. 
Coal  Fired 
New  Coal  Fired 
Gas  Combined  Cycle 
Gas  Combined  Heat  & Power 
Efficiency 
34% 
37% 
47% 
80% 
(from  R.A.  Evans  ETSU  for  DOE  1990  - Environmental  and 
Economic  implications of small scale  CHP) 
Although  some  CHP  schemes  may  be attractive even at gas 
pricing at oil parity,  many  schemes  need,  however,  lower  gas 
prices to be  encouraged  and  a  more  flexible approach to gas 
price escalation  (e.g.  linked to electricity rather than oil 
prices). 
The  above  report suggests it may  be  feasible to generate  up 
to  50%  of total electricity demand  with  CHP  schemes  and  that 
10%  is realistic. 
-9-The  UK  market  has  shown  that  a  competitive  gas  market 
enables  more  efficient  ways  of  power  production.  Post 
TPA  there  are  27  projects  at  engineering,  approval  or 
feasibility  stage  using  gas  in  CHP  schemes  which  could 
displace some  25  million tonnes per annum  of coal use. 
The  energy  for  a  New  Century  document  published  in  May 
1990  by  the  Directorate  General  for  Energy  of  EEC 
assesses  consumption  in year  2010  to  reach  1376  millions 
tons  of  oil  equivalents.  If  gas  were  to  penetrate 
primary  energy  up  to  25%  and  coal  and  oil  giving  up 
market  share  on  a  2/3,  1/3  basis,  the  savings  in 
pollutants would be  a  staggering: 
72.000.000 tonnesjy of  CO 
490.000  tonnesjy of SOX 
300.000  tonnesjy of NOX 
In  terms  of  LCP  directive  (Large  Combustion  Plant 
directive  aimed  at  power  stations)  the  savings  detailed 
above,  if  coupled  with  energy  efficiency  savings 
brought  about  by  more  CHP  projects,  would  contribute  .s 
15%  savings  on  SOX  and  80%  on  NOX  EEC  target levels. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The  1992  single  market  objective  is  a  major  driving  force  to 
introduce  competition  to  the  European  gas  market  and  indeed 
the  Internal  Market  will  not  be  complete  until  energy  (gas  + 
electricity)  are  opened  up  to  competition.  The  significant 
environmental  benefits,  the  increase  in  competitiveness  of 
the  European  industry  and  the  overall  huge  economic  benefits 
to  the  Community  as  a  whole  arising  from  the  introduction  of 
competition  to  the  gas  markets  should  be  a  major  factor  in 
the  judgement  of  the  Commission  with  respect  to  the 
introduction of third party assess. 
-10-Annex  ~ 
COHITE  CONSULTATIF  GAZ 
* Position des  consommateurs  sur le TPA  * 
La  Commission  des  Communautes  Europeennes  ayant 
affirme  que  le  marche  de  l'energie  etant  un  secteur  comme 
les  autres,  les  entraves  aux  6chan~es  devaient  ~tre 
supprimees.  Dans  cet  te  optique,  elle  s' interroge  sur  le 
fait  de  savoir si  le  transport  pour  compte  de  tiers  (TPA) 
serait favorable  pour  les consommateurs. 
Les  partisans  de  cette  these  posent  le  postulat 
suivant:  le  TPA  devrait  etre  favorable  pour  les 
consommateurs,  tous  consommateurs  confondus,  sauf  peut-
etre  pour  les  consommateurs  domestiques.  Pour  ceux-ci,  on 
est pret a admettre  une  reglementation specifique. 
Les  gros  consommateurs  veulent  le  marche  "libre" 
pour pouvoir faire  jouer la concurrence et obtenir des  prix 
d'achat  de  gaz  inferieurs  pour  leurs  activites.  Les  petits 
consommateurs  qui  ne  veulent  pas  (ou  ne  peuvent  pas) 
prendre  ce  risque  et  qui  preferent  avoir  la  securite 
d'approvisionnement devront  en payer  le prix!  Le  surcout de 
cette  securite  est explicitement  prevu  par  les  supporters 
du  TPA,  le consommateur  domestique est done  prevenu. 
Heme  lors<JUC  .lc  (:onsommut.cur  dispose  de  lu  bi-
~nergie,  par  exemple  ~LanL  amen6  a  changer  la  chaudi~re de 
son  chauffage  central  il  opte  pour  une  chaudiere  a  gaz  et 
conserve  son  ancienne  chaudiere  au  fioul,  ce  qui  regle  son 
probleme  de  securite d'approvisionnement,  mais  meme  dans  ce 
cas  le  consommateur  n'a pas  la  possibilite  de  choisir  son 
distributeur  de  gaz,  les  imperatifs  lies  a  !'installation 
d'un  reseau  feront  que  toujours  il aura a  faire  face  a  un 
monopole  de  fait.  En  aucun  cas,  le consommateur  domestique 
n'  a  le  choix  de  son  distributeur,  il est  prisonnier  d'  un 
monopole  et qu'importe alors  la taille de celui-ci,  il est 
alors  simplement. souhaitable pour  lui  que  ce  monopole  soit 
le  plus  performant  possible  au  niveau  des  coiits  et  des 
tarifs!  • 
Les  travaux  du  CC  Gaz  ont  bien  demontre  ainsi  la 
necessite  de  !'existence  d'un  marche  reserve  pour  les 
menages  avec  obligation  de  pourvoir  a  leur  securite 
d'approvisionnement.  Celle-ci engendrera obligatoirement un 
surcout qui  sera supporte par  les consommateurs,  de  plus  la lut.. t.e  sur  lcs  prix  pour  arracher  le  marc  he  des  gros 
consommaleurs  risque  de  se  repercut..er  sur  les  prix 
pratiques 
clientele 
frais  de 
pour  les  menages  qui  sont  bel 
captive,  1a.  encore  ils  risquent 
cette bataille commerciale. 
• 
Le  "TPA"  ne  peut  done 
gu'~tre  ~reJudiciable  au 
petit  consommateur,  et 
c' est  lui  qui  supporters 
la  plus  grande  partie  du 
surcout qui  en resultera. 
et  bien  une 
de  fa  ire  les 
Nous  tenons  a  rappeler,  par  ailleurs,  que  les 
consommateurs  domestiques  de  gaz  representent  plus  de  45  % 
de  la  consommation  de  cette  energie,  et qu'en  pratique  ce 
sont  eux  les plus gros  consommateurs:  Il faudrait peut-etre 
en tenir compte! 
De  plus  certains  producteurs  estiment  que  le  prix 
du  gaz  devrait  augmenter  a- l'avenir  en raison  des qualites 
propres  a  cette  energie,  en  particulier parce  qu'elle est 
respectueuse  de  l'environnement.  Les  consommateurs  sont 
tres  sensibles  a  la  sauvegarde  de  leur  cadre  de  vie,  mais 
ils  soulignent  la  contradiction  qui  existe  entre  cette 
affirmation  et  celle  qui  affirme  que  le  TPA  devrait 
permettre  un  abaissement des  prix! 
En  conclusion:  les  travaux  du  Comite  ont  mis  en 
evidence  qu'il  y  avait  beaucoup  d'inter~ts contradictoires 
en  jeu,  mais  ce  qui  semble  certain,  c'est  que  le 
consommateur  domestique  n'a  pas  un  pouvoir  de  decision 
correspondant  a  son  poids  economique  reel.  Le  "common 
carrier"  et  m~me  "l'open  access"  se  traduiront  par  un 
"surcout"  du  transport  qui  sera  supporte  par  l'usager  qui 
aura  opte  pour  la securite,  c'est  a  dire  la  fourniture  de 
gaz  365  jours par an 
Inutile de  preciser que  tres peu 
de clients domestiques  auront  une 
veritable liberte de  choix:  pour 
eux  ce sera  : 
"Tais-toi et paye!" 
PAUL  EMAER 
Vice-President 
Conseil Consullatif des  Consommateurs 
A Bruxelles,  le 26  Avril  1991 E&P Forum 
The Oil Industry International Exploration & Production Forum 
25/28 Old Burlington Street London WlX 1  LB 
Telephone: 71-437 6291· Telex: 919707 ·Fax: 71-434 3721 
Our  Reference  GT/GR/6.3.18/2345 
Mr.  C.L.  Jones 
Directorate General  for  Energy 
Commission  of  the European  Communities 
Rue  de  la Loi  200 
B-1049  Brussels 
Belgium 
Dear  Mr.  Jones, 
PROFESSIONAL  CONSULTATIVE  COMMITTEE  ON  GAS  (PCCG) 
9th April  1991 
I'\  I  Ill~"  .., 
The  E & P Forum  has  received copies  of the minutes  of the tenth meeting  of 
the  PCCG  held  on  26th  March  from  the  producers'  representatives  on  the 
Committee  and  has  the following  comments. 
We  appreciate  your  efforts  to reflect  producers'  views  in  the final  PCCG 
report  and  assume  you  will  take  into  account  the  points  raised  by  our 
members  on  26th  March.  Attached is  a  copy  of  the E  & P Forum's  position 
paper  on  the effects of  a  regulated system of third party  access  (TPA)  on 
the European  natural  gas industry.  We  understand that this position paper 
will be  annexed  to the Commission's  final PCCG  report.  We  will provide the 
requested French and  German  translations to you  in the next  several  days. 
We  wish  to reiterate  our  concern,  as  expressed  by  our  members  at  various 
PCCG meetings and  in writing, that the Commission has adopted a consultative 
process which  appears  to address  TPA  as  if a  decision to go  forward  with a 
proposal to initiate a  regulated TPA  system has already been taken,  and  the 
PCCG  is  simply  legitimizing  the  decision  and  attempting  to  minimize  the 
risks associated  with its  implementation.  The  work  of  the Committee  was 
strictly defined by  the Commission  to look only at TPA  and  did not allow the 
PCCG  to  examine  the  overall  objectives  that  the  Commission  is  trying  to 
achieve.  The  constrained  scope  and  inadequate  timetable  effectively 
frustrated any  attempt by  the Committee  to provide a  thorough analysis  of 
TPA,  and  we  request  that  our  concerns  regarding  sc~pe  and  timing  be 
documented  in the final  report. 
Although one  of our members  (Marathon)  remains supportive of the  concept of 
TPA,  that  member  shares  our  concerns  with  respect  to  the  imposition  of 
extensive regulation. 
Executive Secretary Geoffrey Thorp 
A Company Limited by Guarantee 
Registered in England 1\:o. 1832064 E&PForum 
Our  members  look forward  to continuing the  dialogue with the Commission  on 
this  important  issue. 
Yours  sincerely, 
Geoffrey Thorp 
Executive Secretary 
Enclosure as  above 
c.c.  PCCG  Members/Alternates 
Mr.  C.S.  Maniatopoulos 
Mr.  J.  Stern 
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The Oil Industry International Exploration & Production Forum 
25/28 Old Burlington Street London W1X 1LB 
Telephone: 71-437 6291 ·Telex: 919707 ·Fax: 71-434 3721 
E  AND  P  FORUM  POSITION  PAPER 
EFFECTS  OF  A REGULATED  SYSTEM  OF  THIRD  PARTY  ACCESS 
ON  THE  EUROPEAN  NATURAL  GAS  INDUSTRY 
The  E & P Forum  is an  international oil and  gas  industry association that 
deals  with  international  issues  with  some  fifty  members  from  seventeen 
countries.  Many  of the members  are represented in  the European  Community 
and  have  significant upstream operations  in most  of  the Community  States. 
The  E  &  P  Forum  represents  the  oil  and  gas  industry's  interests  with 
international regulatory bodies. 
POSITION  SUMMARY 
The European Community Commission  is considering a  regulated system of third 
party access  to  the European  natural  gas  transportation system. 
The  E & P  Forum  has  studied the possible effects  of  regulated third party 
access on  the European  gas industry and  has  concluded that there are likely 
to  be  serious  long-term  adverse  consequences  for  the  Community.  The 
establishment of a  regulated  system of third party access would: 
1.  reduce  the  availability of  long-term,  secure  gas 
supplies  to the European  Community, 
2.  inhibit future expansion of the European gas grid, 
3.  limit  increased substitution  of  gas  as  a  primary 
fuel and  the consequential environmental  benefits, 
and 
4.  shift  away  from  free  market  forces  toward 
unnecessary regulation. 
The  stated  objective  of  regulated  third  party  access  is  to  ensure  that 
competition and  free market  forces  are operating in the gas  market  place. 
The  European  gas  industry,  which  has  developed  through  commercial 
negotiations, provides a competitively priced supply of gas to consumers and 
has  demonstrated  its ability  to  respond  to  significant. demand  and  price 
fluctuations.  The  E & P Forum fully supports  the concept of a  competitive 
gas  market  in which  market  forces  play the dominant  role.  However,  a  new 
imposed  regulatory  system  is  not  warranted.  Instead,  the  removal  of 
existing obstacles to free trade should be considered,  specifically (a) the 
elimination  of  import  and  export  barriers,  (b)  the  relaxation  of 
restrictions on  new  pipeline construction, and  (c) the improved application 
and  effectiveness of existing Community  law.  These  actions would  harmonise 
conditions in Member  States and  thereby further facilitate the movement  of 
natural gas  on  the basis of market  forces. 
Executive Secretary Geoffrey Thorp 
A Company Limited by Guarantee 
Registered in England No. 1832064 E&PForum 
Due  to  the  environmental,  energy  diversification  and  supply  security 
benefits of natural gas  over  other hydrocarbon fuels,  gas  usage  should be 
promoted and  the development of Community gas resources encouraged.  Neither 
objective will be  achieved  through  the  introduction of  a  regulated system 
of third  party access,  which  is  likely to  be  restrictive,  cumbersome  and 
costly. 
1 •  REDUCE  THE  AVAILABILITY  OF  LONG-TERM.  SECURE  GAS  SUPPLIES  TO 
THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
Large  increases in European  gas  demand  are forecast  well  into 
the  next  century,  far  in  excess  of  existing  production  and 
delivery  capabilities.  Because  of  geological  limitations, 
Community  gas production is expected to remain at about current 
levels,  but  only  through  the  development  of  smaller  and 
substantially  more  expensive  fields  to  replace  currently 
producing  fields  as  they  are  depleted.  Member  States on  the 
continent are already dependent on  the Soviet Union and  Algeria 
for approximately one-third of their gas  needs,  and  increasing 
dependence  on  major  new  import  projects is inevitable. 
The  economics  of  gas  field  developments  typically  compare 
unfavourably with  those  of oil  fields  due  to  less  attractive 
production  profiles,  lower  prices  per  energy  unit,  higher 
transportation  costs  and  reduced  marketing  flexibility. 
Producer  investment  decisions  are  based  on  extensive  risk 
versus reward analysis,  involving large upfront investments and 
long  lead  times  that,  particularly  for  major  gas  import 
projects,  are  often  much  greater  than  those  in  the  oil 
business.  For  that  reason,  gas  producers  and  their  lenders 
look for offtake assurances,  typically through long-term sales 
contracts with minimum  payment  ("take or pay")  provisions. 
Gas  producers  depend  upon  market  intermediaries  who,  in 
aggregating  the diverse needs  of many  gas  consumers,  not  only 
create an  adequate demand  base for major  projects but are also 
able to offer long-term,  guaranteed gas  contracts.  Regulated 
third party access will cause gas companies and  other potential 
major  gas  buyers  to  be  less  certain  of  their  future  gas 
requirements  and  will  adversely  affect  their  willingness  or 
ability  to  undertake  new  long-term  purchase  and  investment 
commitments.  This  in turn will reduce  producers'  ability and 
incentive  to  explore  for  and  develop  the  new  gas  supplies 
required by the European market.  During a Statoil presentation 
to  the  Professional  Consultative  Committee  on  Gas,  the 
Norwegian  government  confirmed  that  long-term  take  or  pay 
contracts are essential to demonstrate the commercial viability 
of  developments  and  will  continue  to  be  prerequisites  for 
project approvals. 
In addition to the threat to new  developments,  regulated third 
party  access  could  erode  gas  companies'  demand  bases  to  the 
extent that their sales would fall below  their minimum  offtake 
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levels  under  current  purchase  contracts.  This  was  a  major 
problem  in  the United  States  as  a  result  of heavy  government 
regulation.  Producers  are  not  satisfied  that  suggested 
"transitional arrangements" have been considered fully nor that 
they will protect intermediaries from  the adverse  consequences 
of  regulated third party access. 
2.  INHIBIT  FUTURE  EXPANSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  GAS  GRID 
Producers  have  an  inherent  interest  in  expansion  of  the  gas 
market  and  the  increased market  penetration which  will  result 
from  the  connection of  new  regions  to  the  European  gas  grid. 
Provided that producers'  and  transporters'  investments  can be 
economically justified, this expansion is expected to continue. 
Regulated third party access would  make  it increasingly risky 
and  difficult  to  justify  pipeline  projects,  as  the  gas 
companies'  demand  bases  are  fragmented  and  project  financing 
becomes  more  difficult to obtain.  As  a result,  infrastructure 
investments would  tend to lag rather  than anticipate increases 
in demand. 
The  use  of  "transitional  arrangements"  has  been  suggested  to 
provide  investment  security  for  new  major  infrastructure 
projects by means  of exemption from proposed third party access 
regulation.  Without  full consideration and  definition  of  the 
nature,  duration,  and  application of  such  arrangements,  it is 
impossible  to  judge whether  they would  be  either practical or 
effective. 
3.  LIMIT  INCREASED  SUBSTITUTION  OF  GAS  AS  A PRIMARY  FUEL  AND  THE 
CONSEQUENTIAL  ENVIRONMENTAL  BENEFITS 
The  increased substitution of gas for  alternative fossil  fuels 
is a  key objective of  the Commission,  in large part due  to  the 
environmental benefits of a  reduction in harmful  emissions.  A 
threat  to  the  future  availability  of  gas  production  and 
transportation capacity due  to  regulated third party access  is 
a  threat  to  the  potential  benefit  for  the  environment  that 
increased gas  use would  produce. 
4.  SHIFT  AWAY  FROM  FREE  MARKET  FORCES  TOWARD  UNNECESSARY 
REGULATION 
There  is  fierce  competition from  a  wide variety  of  alternate 
fuels at all phases of the gas chain.  In addition,  gas-to-gas 
competition at  the  wholesale  level  already exists  as  various 
suppliers from  inside and outside the Community compete for new 
sales.  Furthermore,  the  fact  that  30%  of  the  European 
Community  gas  supplies currently transits at least  one  Member 
State,  and  50%  is subject to  international  trade demonstrates 
that additional  regulation is not  required.  This  movement  of 
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gas  has  so  far  occurred  as  a  result  of  sound  commercial 
arrangements  rather  than legislation. 
In preference  to regulated third party access,  the Commission 
should  give  priority- -to  harmonizing  national  laws  and  to 
enforcing and  rationalizing existing Community  regulations  to 
ease  their  application  and  improve  their  effectiveness.  A 
system of  regulated third party access will add an  unnecessary 
layer of control and will contribute additional administrative 
costs  and  burdens.  It  seems  odd  for  the  Commission  to  be 
considering new  regulations just as policy makers  elsewhere are 
trying to dismantle  their regulatory bureaucracies. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In summary,  the members  of the E &  P  Forum  fully support the  concept  of a 
competitive  gas  market  in  which  market  forces  play  the  dominant  role. 
However,  a  new  imposed  regulatory  system  is  not  warranted.  The 
establishment  of  a  regulated  system  of third  party  access  conflicts  with 
established Community  energy objectives and  will  hamper  the  environmental 
objective of  increased  gas utilization.  The  members  of  E & P Forum  look 
forward  to continuing the open  dialogue  on  this  important  issue. 
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Re:  PCCG 
We  set out herewith EURELECTRIC's  position raqarding the 
PCCG  final  report. 
EURELECTRIC  is the  European  Committee of Electricity 
Companies,  its members  beinq amongst the largest consumers 
of natural gas  in the CMM. 
In  many  countries the price of gas is an essential item in 
the cost of electricity production. 
EURELECTRIC  is,  like you,  quite in favour of  a  mora  open 
and competitive European qas market. 
However,  EURELECTRIC  is firmly convinced that the TPA  is 
not the most  appropriate means  of chanqinq the 
characteristics of the natural gas market. 
A  more  in depth discussion on tha TPA  would enable the more 
essential aspects to be tackled. 
EURELECTRIC  regrets that the timetable and  procedure for 
PCCG  meetinqs  has  not enabled •uch an  exchanqe of views to 
occur. 
In actual fact,  the PCCG  report appear• as a  general 
statement of the positions expressed without however 
showinq the weight of each of ita sections.  For this 
reason,  it i• doubtful that it could suffice as a  basis for 
astablishinq a  policy at the biqheat l•val. 
This  is. why  - also bearinq in mind  BDRELECTRIC'•  comment• 
at the PCCE  - EURELECTRIC  can neither adhere to the concept 
of tha TPA  as it appears  in the report,  nor let it be 
thought that they share the responsibility for it. 
EURELECTRIC  considers that it is their re•ponsibility to 
clearly warn against the undesirable effects of the 
introduction of  TPA  aa envisaged in this report. 
The safety of obtaining supplies from  a  basic source of 
energy and  the interests of the users - large consumers of 
courae,  but also the domestic cuatomer - requires a  more 
cautious  approach. 
Ga1er.e  Ravenstein 4. Bte 6 BE  · 1000 BRUXELLES 
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COMITE EUFIOPEEN DES ENTREPRISES D'ELECTRICIT~ 
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If the Committee  so wishes,  EURELECTRIC  is at its disposal 
to examine  the ways  and means  of  improving the operation of 
gas market or the consequences of the TPA. 
Gatene Aavenstem 4. Bte 6 BE  • 1000 BRUXELLES 
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EUROGAS  VIEWS  ON THIRD PARTY ACCF$ 
Addendum to PCCG Report 
Original version : ENGLISH  Brussels, April 1991 I  EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY 
Eurogas,  the  European  Union  of the  Natural  Gas  Industry,  is  the  assoc1at1on  of 
natural  gas  merchant  and  distribution companies  in  Europe,  and  it  represents  the 
natural gas industry's interests with international official bodies. 
This report gives the views of Eurogas  on the impiications of a regulated regime of 
mandatory third party access (TPA) to the facilities of the gas companies in the EEC. 
It is intended to be an addendum to the European  Commission's PCCG Report on this 
issue, and it consists of this Summary, an  Introduction, and a detailed section on TPA 
and Community Energy  Policy. 
The European  Natural Gas Industry 
Natural  gas  is produced from  wells,  often  in  combination  with  oil,  usually  by oil 
companies and consortia of investor firms involved in the exploration and production 
of oil and gas. 
The  produced gas  is  purchased  by gas  merchant  companies  which  sell  it  to  their 
customers. 
In executing this business the gas companies operate pipeline networks and distribution 
facilities including attendant activities for gas storage, quality conditioning (e.g.  mixing 
and treating different gas types coming from  diverse sources),  delivery pressure, etc  ... 
The gas industry aggregates and evens out the highly variable demand from individual 
gas  consumers,  thus  enabling  producers to  deliver on  a  long-term  and production 
oriented cost-efficient basis, and offers supply security to its customers on the basis of 
its diversified supply portfolio, its sales mix and its technical facilities. 
Nearly half the  natural gas  consumption  in  the  EC  is imported from  three outside 
sources~  The aggregating merchant function of the gas in-dustry is essential in securing 
- long term imports at best conditions for the users as well as for the EC  tra.de balance. 
Eurogas  principally wishes to address the potential impact on the achievement of the 
Community energy goals and on Community well being of the introduction of a TPA 
system. 
The stated Community energy  policy  objectives are·-'iinproving security  of supply, 
reducing costs, and improving economic competitiveness' which should be seen in the 
context of the  Community's desire to  reduce dependence on  oil,  to  increase  energy 
efficiency, and to  improve the environment.  The importance of natural gas  is self 
evident.  The achievement of these policy objectives would be materially jeopardised 
by the introduction of TPA. 
Page 2 of 13 The main inter-related consequences of TPA will be adverse to the objectives of sound 
energy policy, entailing: 
•  Loss  of security of supply.· 
•  Default on take-or-pay commitments. 
· -•  ·The greater likelihood of increased consumer gas prices.  ·· ··  ·- - -
•  The undermining of the time-proven market related system, replaced by creeping 
regulation and loss of efficiency, because of the desintegration (unbundling) or lack 
of aggregation of gas industry operations. 
As  a  result,  TPA  will  cause  lower  market  penetration  of  gas  which  will  have  an 
unfavourable impact on environmental protection and improvement policies. 
In  short,  it is  the view of Eurogas  that TPA is likely to create significant potential 
disadvantages  for  the  Community  in  terms  of  reduced supply security,  potentially 
increased cost of supply and conflicting economic signals. 
Against these problems, there is no persuasive evidence either that so-called 'gas-to-gas 
competition' will occur beyond the level which currently exists at the European  border 
as a result of the purchasing power of the gas companies (which TPA would diminish), 
or  that  such  competition,  if  it  did  occur,  would  be  in  the  long  run  interest  of 
consumers. 
Loss of Security of Supply 
The introduction of TPA will  risk  both  impairing future  supply and leading to  an 
increase  of  border  prices  which  will  not  increase  the  gas  availability  because  of 
increased risk on the producers' side. 
At  present,  additional gas  supplies  can  be  purchased  from  three  non-Community 
producers,  and 'gas-to-gas competition' exists at the  European  border, through the 
purchasing power of the gas companies who are able to underwrite new major projects. 
This helps to  ensure security of supply for  European  consumers,  who  in  this  way 
receive  the gas  they require from  a  well diversified portfolio at the  best conditions 
which can be negotiated.  This would be endangered by a TPA regime which would not 
anymore allow gas companies to offer the same high take-or-pay commitments as at 
present. This would make it very much more difficult, if not impossible, fo.r  the gas 
companies to continue to assist the development of major new supply sources. 
Europe  will increasingly depend on non-European  sources but because new supplies 
will  involve more remote and high cost  reserves,  the· iimited capacity of most non-
Community  suppliers to  bear  the  economic  and  commercial  risk  inherent  in  such 
projects means that a shift of market risk from  buyers to sellers which will occur in 
a TPA regime is likely materially to reduce investment incentives, and could make new 
investment difficult, if not impossible, thus further jeopardising security of supply.  On 
one side, long term off-take guarantees would not be offered to producers, on the other 
side, supply in line with variable demand from consumers, including Local Distribution 
Companies,  would be  impaired. 
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A TPA regime will  not encourage additional gas producers to enter the market.  TPA 
will  not  reduce field  development or delivery costs,  nor is  any evidence produced to 
support the suggestion that TPA would enable fields to  be  developed more  promptly 
than is possible under the present arrangements.  We question the suggestion that TPA 
will entice new producers to bring supplies to the European  market; the difficulty for 
such  suppliers would stem  from  neither  the level  of reserves  nor  markets,  but the 
ability to  manage financial  and commercial risks.  This would call into question  the 
future levels of investment upon which the growth of Community supply is dependent. 
Take-or-Pay Contracts 
Exploration  and development of gas production facilities,  and the installation of gas 
transportation  systems,  demand increasingly huge  investments  with  the  increasing 
geographical distances and more costly new sources required to supply the growing gas 
demand in  the EC. 
In  order to  secure  the  funding of such  projects,  gas  producers and gas  purchasers 
conclude long  term  take-or-pay contracts  which  oblige  the  purchaser  to  pay the 
producer for an agreed regular volume offtake over an agreed period of time,  whether 
or not the purchaser actually takes off the entitled volume in the contract period.  Such 
contracts guarantee regular income and best possible project financing conditions to the 
producer, and they afford best possible gas price conditions to  the purchaser. 
The purchaser gas company takes the  volume risk,  which it will limit by aggregating 
as  much  as  possible  the  diverse,  often  short  term  demand  from  individual gas 
consumers.  The supplying gas producer, against his guaranteed sales,  takes the price 
risk, as his selling price will be related to the prices of competing alternative energies, 
in such  a way that  the gas merchant companies are  able to  market the gas  they are 
committed to take. 
Default on Take-or-Pay Obligations 
The existing long term take-or-pay obligations of  ·gas companies were incurred on the 
basis of a known balance of risks. If this balance were disturbed by TPA it could bring 
companies in a position where they would no more be able to take off the contracted 
volumes  and  thus  default  on  these  take  obligations.  As  a  consequence,  financial 
difficulties could arise, the nature and severity of which depending on the particular 
situation. Unless government intervenes a series of probtems would arise, among which 
higher cost and lower penetration of gas. Such financial difficulties would have a lasting 
negative  impact  on  the  gas  companies'  ability  to  enter  into  new  take-or-pay 
commitments in order to ensure long term security of supply. 
Either  way, these developments would be at the expense of the consumers notably the 
small consumers, or the European  taxpayer. 
Page 4 of 13 Increased Consumer Gas Prices 
TPA is unlikely to lead to lower. burner-tip prices.  Recovery of capital and operating 
costs associated with serving consumers by  the gas merchant companies represents a 
small component of burner tip  prices.  The assumption that TPA could reduce such 
costs  is  not  plausible.  Increased  inefficiency  caused  by  forced  unbundling  and 
regulation would increase costs instead (see  below). Lower energy market penetration 
of gas would add to  the unit costs. 
The  argument  that  TPA  will  enable  consumers  to  explore  alternative  purchasing 
options, and thus exert downward pressure on  prices, is most unlikely in a situation of 
tight supplies in which the gas companies have the better purchasing power.  Increased 
competition between gas buyers will then cause a bidding up of purchase prices, which 
would serve to compensate for the higher financial risks of producers, and as such not 
provide real incentive to invest (see above). 
Creeping Regulation 
The  effect  of  a  regulatory  regime  on  the  capability  of  companies  to  undertake 
investment  is  a  matter for  concern.  Given  the  diversity in  accounting  procedures, 
depreciation provisions, tax conditions, inflation, and related matters in the Community, 
and the wide range of activities which could ultimately become subject to  dispute, a 
legally  binding Community  instrument  would  nQt  prove  viable.  Increasingly  heavy 
bureaucratic  regulation  would impede investment,  hinder growth,  increase costs  and 
divert resources away from meeting the needs of consumers. 
There would be a large number of problem areas, such as  determination of available 
capacity,  capacity  allocation,  cost  allocation,  gas  quality,  customer  priority.  The 
complexities would be considerable. 
An obligation to invest in additional capacities, sometimes proposed towards a solution 
to the aforementioned problems, wo-uld imply an even deeper regulatory intervention 
and would require careful legal review. Such an obligation on terms judged 'reasonable' 
by a regulatory agency would also raise major issues of Community policy, which are 
not addressedhere, and which would have a most.doubtfullegal basis. 
Moreover,  the  regulation  could  militate  against  the  very  policy  it  is  intended to 
accelerate.  By  fragmenting  demand during an  extended period. of  potentially tight 
supply, TPA would shift market power towards non-Community suppliers.  It would 
- promote  regionalisation  resulting  in  regional  dependence  on  individual  producers~ 
contrary to the stated objectives of the internal market policy and reduce diversification 
of gas  supply.  The potential cost of this to  the Community, in  both economic and 
political terms, and hence to consumers and taxpayers is immense. 
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Concluding Remarks 
While the completion of the European  single market will change many aspects of the 
Community, and Eurogas  is facing the challenge of the future, TPA will not serve the 
long term inter·~sts of Europe's  gas consumers or citizens. These interests will be better 
served by rerr  .ring existing barriers to  EEC  market integration such as differences 
of  taxation  a.  i  environmental  protection  requirements,  and  by  strengthening  the 
existing market-related framework. In addition, the existing possibilities for prevention 
of abuse of market power are enshrined in the EC  Treaty, and their observance should 
ensure enhanced efficient market-related structures and performance. 
In view of the need to enhance efforts to increase gas penetration and to contribute to· 
environmental protection, to  invest in  the infrastructure required and to develop the 
integration  with  countries  in  central  and  eastern  Europe,  the  gas  industry  needs 
continuity of the legal framework, including the minimum of bureaucracy, which will 
enable it to  pursue the necessary huge investments. 
The introduction of a TPA regime would be a high  risk experiment. No TPA system 
exists today in a region  presenting significant differences in fiscal and organisational 
aspects of the industry, in which there is increasing dependence on suppliers not subject 
to  the  same  legal  and  political  regime,  and  in  which  TPA  has  proven  to  function 
properly, in  particular in a tightening market environment, without entailing creeping 
regulation  . 
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1.  Eurogas  has prepared this report on TPA. because adoption of a TPA regime would 
have important repercussions on all aspects of the gas industry, and the consumers. 
In  considering whether such measures are desirable, it will be  essential that: 
A careful review is made of the contribution that the European  gas industry 
has  made  to  the  achievement  of  Community  energy  policies,  in  order to 
identify any areas in  which  progress may  be  required.  TPA  would then be 
evaluated against  clearly identified defects in  the  present operations of the 
European  gas  industry. 
A structured analysis of  major Community energy  priorities is  made in the 
context of the expected environment in  which  the gas  industry is  likely to 
operate over the next decades, to determine whether the potential advantages 
of TP  A were greater or less than the potential disadvantages. 
2.  Eurogas  wishes briefly to recall the contribution which the European  gas industry 
has  made to the development of the Community, against which  background and 
experience, Eurogas  advises on the TPA issue.  In  1965 natural gas provided 2 per 
cent of Community primary energy demand: last year, gas' share was 18 per cent, 
representing a twelve-fold increase in consumption.  In consequence, Community 
oil  dependency has  been significantly reduced. The gas  industry has  been able to 
secure supplies from costly sources in the North Sea, Siberia, North Africa as well 
as  from  important  domestic resources.  This growth  in  supply has  come  about 
because the gas companies have been able and willing to support the many billions 
of  ECUs  of investment  required  to  realise  these  projects.  Moreover,  these 
investments  have  been  undertaken  in  a  period of  unprecedented energy  price 
volatility and  fierce  inter-fuel competition.  During these  turbulent times,  the 
security of consumers' supply has  been  maintained without curtailment, and the 
industry has respected its commitments.  International trade in gas has increased, 
prices have been very competitive against alternative fuels, and huge investments 
have been made both inside and outside the Community. 
Major transmission pipelines in Europe  are already operating at a very high load 
factor - usually higher than most of the major US interstate pipelines, for instance. 
The success of the European  gas industry in adapting to changing circumstances 
is  due,  in  no  small  measure,  to  its  basic  structure,  which  has  permitted it to 
mobilise the necessary resources, and which will enable it to further evolve in the 
face  of  market  development  needs,  and  to  address  the  challenges  of  future 
investment requirements. 
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III  TPA AND COMMUNITY ENERGY  POLICY 
'Improving Security of Supply' · 
1.  A central issue for the future of the European  gas industry is the Community's 
rapidly increasing dependence on non-Community suppliers, principally the Soviet 
Union,  Norway and Algeria.  These countries today supply some 40 .per cent of 
Community  gas,  and  it  is  inevitable,  in  our view,  that,  if as  the  Commission 
expects, gas demand continues to increase rapidly, so will Community dependence 
on these countries, since few,  if any, new major suppliers are expected to appear 
in  the near future. 
2.  This judgement reflects what we believe to be a widely held view that the in-place 
gas reserves of the Community are, at credible depletion rates, unlikely to do more 
than sustain Community production at current levels.  It  follows from this that, 
under present circumstances, the Community will be virtually totally dependent on 
a few  major non-Community suppliers for futu-re  incremental supply. 
3.  One response to this prognosis would be concern that adequate incentives exist to 
encourage further efforts to  increase  and diversify Community gas supply. The 
Eurogas  view of the arguments is  set out in  the following. 
4.  In  the analysis, two other important issues must be raised, namely: 
Would TPA diminish or enhance the capacity of the Community to manage its 
growing dependence on external supplies? 
Would TPA encourage or discourage a diversification of non -Community gas 
supply, as a means of discouraging dependence on a few proximate suppliers? 
We  believe  that,  on  balance,  TPA  is  very likely to  reduce the capacity  of the 
Community to manage its growing dependence on non-Community suppliers and 
thus reduce security of supply: 
As a result of fragmentation of purchasing power, the imbalance between the 
negotiating strength of buyers and sellers is likely to shift in favour, in the 
anticipated tight supply situation, of non-Community sellers. 
In a time of tight supply, 'shopping around' could lead to producers perceiving 
an even tighter supply situation than was  in_  fact the case (since they could 
receive multiple enquiries in  response  of the-.eame  needs) and thus provide 
incentives for unnecessarily large price increases (bidding-up). 
A  reduced  capacity  to  provide  offtake  assurance  will  jeopardise  the 
commercial development of some new supply sources. 
Natural gas consumers on the periphery of Europe  could become 'captive' to 
non -Community producers as  a result of TPA. 
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simply the perceived future supply/demand balance, but also the ability of buyers 
to balance the potential market power of a few sellers.  Even  the largest individual 
consumers or Local  Distribution Companies will  be  unable to match the buying 
power of the gas companies who are, we  believe, in the best position to do so.  In 
a demand-driven market, TPA seems likely not to result in competition between 
producers for markets, but rather competition between consumers for access to gas 
supplies.  The 'bidding-up' process  would lead to  the  possibility that the market 
would not grow, because gas would be priced out of certain low-value outlets, with 
the consequent loss of penetration and of potential environmental improvement. 
6.  In the past, the purchasing power of the gas companies, coupled with their ability 
to support the huge investments needed to bring large new supplies to market , has 
enabled  them  to  offer  the  offtake  commitments  required  to  support  the 
development of major new supply sources. 
7.  We  judge that TPA would, by  eroding the capacity of the gas companies to share 
the  risk  of new  high -cost projects,  reduce the capability of the European  gas 
industry to diversify its supply by  bringing new sources of gas to the market.  Gas 
companies would, under a TPA regime,  be  unable to offer the same level of long 
term  'take-or-pay' offtake commitment  that they  have  in  the  past.  Producers 
recognise  this,  and  have  expressed  concern  at  the  consequence  of  this  on  the 
development of new sources of supply. 
As a case in point, we believe that prospects for the successful development of· the 
Nigerian  LNG  project (which  would  provide access  to  a  resource  base  broadly 
equivalent in size to Algeria's), and of the Russian Barentsz Sea project in future, 
would  be  made significantly more  difficult if potential  purchasers felt  (as  they 
would) unable to  offer the level of take-or-pay obligation which has historically 
been  available.  We  believe that,  given  the high  level  of borrowing required to 
support the project, lenders would take little comfort from the theoretical market 
need for new gas supply, and need to retain the type of arrangement which has, 
in  the past,  proved satisfactory to them. 
As the costs of developing gas reserves have increased, because of their increased 
remoteness and technical difficulty even the gas companies have been obliged to 
join forces to support the huge financial obligations required: we doubt that even 
the largest industrial users would be  willing to make the same commitments. 
8.  In  addition,  to  the  extent  TPA  were  to  be  based  on  distance  - related 
transmission/distribution costs, it will inevitably make it more expensive, and thus 
unattractive, for suppliers either to serve markets--in-the centre of the Community 
or, more importantly, to diversify their sales across the Community. 
Thus,  non -Community suppliers could face  the opportunity to 'capture' outlets 
close  to  their delivery systems and even  to  come  to  a  de  facto  market sharing 
agreement on  a  regional  basis.  This could seriously  jeopardise physical  supply 
security by impairing the Community's ability to develop a diversified portfolio of 
supplies. 
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provide 'back-up'. However, to the extent that such back-up is not guaranteed, it 
is of small value. In  the alternative, if at all  possible, the necessary  back-up will 
require substantial investments. 
10  Sometimes, it is argued that under a TPA system consumers would be able to reach 
an informed judgement as to the trade-off between cost and security of supply. In 
practice, it is unlikely that such an  assessment could be reached with a high level 
of confidence. 
The reason  for this conclusion is,  that we  believe  it  is  unlikely that consumers 
negotiating to  purchase gas  directly from  producers under a  TPA system would 
easily find alternative offers sufficiently comparable for them to be able to weigh 
up relative advantages and disadvantages. Independent storage,  load balance and 
other service  operators are  likely  to  face  significant  cost  penalties,  which  will 
further  complicate  the  'cost/security  trade-off'.  TPA  is  further  likely,  by 
segmenting  risk  which  is  currently  diversified across  gas  companies,  either  to 
decrease security of supply or increase the cost of supply security. 
'Reducing Costs' 
11.  TPA proponents suggest that competition would lead to lower gas prices, and that 
it creates the opportunity for consumers to explore alternative purchasing options. 
They also  claim that a  decoupling of gas  prices from  competing energies prices 
would exert downward pressure on  gas prices. 
It  is  extremely doubtful, in our view,  that a  decoupling of gas from competing 
energies  would  ultimately  prove  beneficial  to  consumers.  We  judge  that  the 
immediate, short term result would be  a decline in development of domestic gas 
resources. In the longer term, decou piing would, as US experience has shown, lead 
to potentially huge shifts in demand. During periods of high oil prices, gas demand 
would tend to increase to levels potentially unsustainable at long run cost levels ; 
during periods of low oil.prices consumers would seek to switch back to oil, leading 
to greater difficulty for gas companies in meeting their contractual commitments. 
If such distortions are to be discouraged, the price of gas must track the prices of 
the energy sources with which gas competes. In short, if supply is  to be stable, 
prices must reflect the value of energy on world markets; if they do not, supply 
and  demand will  inevitably  (as  in  the  US)  show  dramatic  fluctuations  with  a 
consequent reduction in consumer security and increased investment risk. 
12.  TPA  proponents  believe that TPA  in  itself  will· net substantially influence the 
commercial  balance  of  risks  and  opportunities  between  gas  producers and  gas 
purchasers.  As  important  will  be  judgements whether  market  (supply/demand) 
conditions favour buyers or sellers. 
As it is uncertain and, in the view of Eurogas,  highly unlikely, that these market 
conditions in this decade and thereafter would favour buyers, any downward effect 
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level of well-head or border prices. 
In  a genuine market for transportation services, if any, it would appear logical to 
allow capacity to be allocated via the market price mechanisms, rather than on the 
basis of costs, because then capacity will be attributed in accordance with the use 
value for the consumer. Furthermore, allocation on a cost basis will not give the 
adequate incentives  for  efficient conduct of the  gas  companies'  business  (gold 
plating). 
\Ve  remain unconvinced that a cost-based approach will be viable without costly 
and  burdensome regulation,  which  is  likely  to  lead to  'arbitrary' cost  allocation 
procedures leading, inevitably, to dissent and conflict. A system which, directly or 
indirectly, allows  commercial  decisions to  be  'second guessed'  by  organisations 
without financial accountability is  likely to create a new and damaging element in 
investment appraisal. 
The argument  that  effective,  lower transportation  charges arising  from  a  TPA 
regime would lead to lower consumer prices, in our view, is not valid. 
We  think that the cost of servicing customers would increase because of the loss 
of efficiency caused by the desintegration (unbundling) or lack of aggregation of 
gas  supply operations,  and  because  of  the  resulting  lower market  penetration. 
Moreover,  recovery  of  capital  and  operating  costs  associated  with  serving 
consumers by the gas merchant companies represents a small component of burner 
tip prices.  Even  assuming that TPA had the effect of reducing such costs,  the 
resulting reduction in price, if any, for most .customers would be extremely small. 
13.  Should, however improbably, the cost of servicing decrease, then such economy 
would  not  likely  benefit  the  consumer,  but  would  be  translated into  increased 
border prices benefiting the gas producer. Non -Community suppliers would take 
this opportunity to increase border prices by an equivalent and offsetting amount. 
They would regard this as compensation for the reduction in offtake security which 
TPA would bring. 
As such, higher prices reflecting incr-eased producer investment risk would not lead 
to greater supply. 
It is unlikely that a way could be found to prevent non -Community suppliers from 
pursuing their commercial incentive to set wellhead prices on the basis of the cost 
of  alternative  energy  sources  less  internal  (European)  gas  tr-ansmission  and 
distribution costs.  The Community cannot meet current domestic requirements; in 
the future it is unlikely to avoid seeking to satisfy-virtually all growth in demand 
from non -Community suppliers.  In  this situation, a more transparent and lower 
internal cost structure would simply be an invitation for non-Community producers 
to  increase  border  prices.  As  an  example,  a  reduction  in  internal  cost  of 
$0.1 /MMBtu would represent, in  current terms,  a  negative  balance of payment 
impact of some ECU  270  million p.a. (a sum which could easily double by 2000) 
if this were translated into higher prices at the European  border. 
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14.  There is a  potentially serious inconsistency in the signals being sent to producers 
and consumers, alike,  by  the passage of legislation intended (whatever the likely 
effect)  to  reduce short-run gas  prices at a  time when  the Community  needs to 
encourage new suppliers, whom, we  judge, will typically be high -cost producers, 
to enter the market. 
The  potentially  damaging  effect  of  such  economic  signals  can  be  seen  from 
experience  both  in  the  US  (where  regulation  ultimately  created  both  the  gas 
scarcity of the 1970s and the gas glut of the 1980s) and in the UK, which in the 
late  1970s  was  forced  carefully  to  consider the  appropriateness  of  prevailing 
consumer price levels in the light of perceived long run marginal cost.  After due 
consideration, the  UK  Government,  in  1979,  instructed British  Gas to increase 
tariff prices by  10  per cent p.a.  in  real terms, over a  three year period, in order 
to signal to consumers the rising long run cost of accessing future resources.  We 
believe that Europe  now faces a similar situation to that perceived in the UK  in 
the late 1970s, of increasing long-run marginal cost, and that TPA would provide 
fundamentally misleading economic signals. 
Clearly, in providing appropriate consumer price signals, the Community does not 
wish needlessly to increase the balance of payment burden of gas imports; equally, 
however,  it  will  not  wish  to  send  to  consumers signals which are  diametrically 
opposed to those which are required to support the future growth of the market. 
15.  Other  economies  which  provide  appropriate  signals  to  both  producers  and 
consumers will create an  economic system which is  more closely attuned to  the 
realities of resource depletion and is,  thus, intrinsically more competitive, in the 
sense that it is  better placed to react to future increase in natural resource costs. 
16.  There is a serious concern that a TPA regime would, by eroding the capacity of 
gas companies. to sign long term take-or-pay commitments, increase the financial 
cost of gas development and thus, at any given level of prices, reduce the resource 
base  economically  available  to  domestic  producers,  particularly  in  view  of 
increasing long-run marginal cost. 
17.  In addition to the impact of loss of offtake security on highly leveraged projects, 
we judge that a parallel, but less extreme, upward cost pressure would occur even 
where the  producer had the  financial  capability to spread risk  on  a  diversified 
basis.  This is  likely to occur since,  at the margin,  development of oil reserves 
would  be  preferable  to  development of  gas,  and  thus  provide an  incentive  to 
refocus development effort away from gas. 
18.  Thus, we are forced to conclude that, in the industry environment which is likely 
to apply over the next decades, the introduction of TPA would be detrimental to 
the energy objectives of the Community, as set out in September 1986. 
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the  revision  of  policies will  strengthen  the emphasis on  security of supply and 
environmental protection, thus reinforcing our reservations against TPA. 
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Annex  6 
Third Party Access  (TPA)  as defined in the PCCG  final draft 
report is: 
"A  scheme providing for a  qualified obligation on 
companies,  operating natural gas transportation  . 
facilities,  to offer terms  for the use of their system". 
Objections to the introduction of  TPA  centre on three main 
issues: 
TPA  would diminish the financial incentives for gas 
exploration and production.  As  a  result,  security of 
supply would  be  jeopardised. 
Consequent competition might cause bidding up of prices. 
Regulation would  be  complex and disruptive to the market. 
These objections  show  a  misunderstanding of  TPA  as defined. 
They are only valid in a  scenario where the present market 
structure and its related network of  long ter.m  contracts and 
"take or pay"  agreements disappear completely. 
The  TPA  obligation will always  be qualified rather than total. 
It will be  a  matter for regulatory  judgement to ensure that 
TPA  is qualified so that it may  not be introduced in a  manner 
and at a  pace that will allow security of supply to be 
jeopardised,  prices to rise or regulation to stifle the 
market.  This  can be achieved through an evolutionary approach 
whereby  TPA  is, at first,  applicable to the purchase or sale 
of gas in such volumes that only a  few very large consumers  or 
local distribution companies would be qualified to enter the 
TPA  market.  The  total volume sold under initial TPA 
agreements  should be  limited,  by regulation,  so that present 
supply and access arrangements  can at first remain in place 
alongside an evolving TPA  market. 
As  TPA  develops,  new  forms  of contract will emerge to form  a 
portfolio of purchase commitment  and risk sharing 
arrangements,  including long ter.m agreements with take-or-pay 
clauses,  which  financiers may  find acceptable when  deciding 
whether to fund  exploration or production projects.  If market 
attitudes alter,  in response to changes in its structure, 
regulatory authorities will be able to consider the admission 
of  smaller consumers to TPA  while preserving security of 
supply and pricing guarantees.  In due course,  household 
consumers  would benefit from  TPA  through market  success of 
local distribution companies.  It is possible,  and acceptable, 
that TPA  will only thrive while overall gas  demand  is on the 
increase;  if demand  falls,  regulation to ensure security of 
supply may  be more  important than regulation to promote 
further competition through wider TPA  facilities. 
Ian Powe 
Director UK  Gas  Consumers  Council 
10  April  1991 Annex  7 
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GENERAL  STATEMENT 
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PROFESSIONAL  CONSULTATIVE  COMMITTEE  ON  GAS 
1- GENERALITIES 
IPIEC  Burope assessaent. 
The  initial terms of reference proposed by the Commission 
and adopted by all the Delegates  invited to participate in 
the Professional Consultative Committee  on Gas  (PCCG) 
stated: 
To  identify and present the main technical, 
economic  and administrative considerations which 
should be taken into account in Community policy 
on whether and,  if so,  in what  form  and by what 
means third-party access to gas transport system 
should be provided. 
It was  agreed that both transmission and 
distribution systems should be covered by this 
remit.  The  Committee was  asked not to consider 
legal questions. 
The  Committee was  asked,  as a  group of experts,  to assist 
the Commission  in identifying these factors.  An  objective 
view taking into account the various opinions of the 
participants was to be drawn  up  in a  Committee report,  with 
the understanding that any points on which disagreement 
remained should be clearly recorded therein. 
An  IFIEC  Europe Delegate was  invited to participate in the 
PCCG  meetings  on behalf·of Industrial Energy  Consumers.  His 
assessment of the PCCG  procedures is: 
IFIEC Europe 
c/o A. MONGON 
25 Quai Paul Doumer 
F-92408 Courbevoie Cedex 
Tel. 33 1 47 68 16 sa 
Tx Rh6ne X 610 500 F 
Fax. 33 1 47 68 23 77 2 
a)  Throughout all the PCCG  meetings there has been a 
wide range of views expressed by the PCCG 
Delegates.  Although  IFIEC  Europe Delegate does not 
share all these views,  he supports the principle 
whereby divergent views  should be given equal 
expression. 
b)  He  has  always stated that he will accept the Final 
Report on the condition that all views expressed 
are duly reflected,  thus providing  a  balanced and 
objective Report which fulfills the Committee's 
aims as set out in the initial terms of reference. 
The  opportunity has been offered to IFIEC  Europe to make  a 
clear statement of its particular views;  IFIEC  Europe 
welcomes this opportunity and submits the following 
statement,  clearly defining its position. 
2- THIRD  PARTY  ACCESS  (TPA) 
IFIEC  Europe objectives. 
- A -
In the Introduction of the Final Report,  (§5  page 10),  it 
is stated that "the Committee was not asked by the 
Commission to make  specific recommendations  on whether or 
not TPA  should be  introduced in the Community's gas 
transport system".  IFIEC  Europe would therefore like to give 
the main reasons why  its members  support TPA  here. 
*  TPA  is not an end in itself,  but a  means to: 
**  develop a  market for natural gas,  (designated 
hereafter as "gas"),  more  compatible with the spirit of the 
Treaty of Rome; 
**  improve the current situation where  Consumers 
are effectively captive Users.  In most cases they are 
obliged to adapt to tariff structures which are imposed; 
**  introduce more flexibility and competition by 
opening up  new  opportunities of choice for Producers, 
Distributors and End-users. 
* Due  to TPA,  this power of choice may,  as in all other 
competitive markets: 
**  provide strong incentives for .increasing 
efficiency and reducing costs of supply; 
**  achieve a  better balance in the relationships 
between suppliers and Consumers; 
**  improve responsiveness to each party's needs; 
**  facilitate a  greater diversity in contracting 
practices,  offering more  options,  and allowing Consumers  a 
greater role in decisions affecting their supply 
arrangements. 
* Additionally TPA: 
**  would enable new  entrants and  new  technologies 
to participate in the market,  creating a  broader exploration 
and production base,  enhancing differentiation in order to 3 
respond to developing market needs  and attracting new 
sources of capital.  Such new  opportunities would undoubtedly 
increase,  not diminish,  security of supply. 
* Due  to TPA: 
**  large scale Industrial Consumers,  members  of 
IFIEC  Europe,  will be,  and  in some  cases are already,  able 
to sign long term contracts with Producers.  Those  long term 
contracts would aid investment planning and hence,  security 
of supply; 
**  the existing regulatory bodies in Europe,  in 
many  cases,  will become  redundant,  offering to the system of 
regulation an opportunity to become  much  smaller,  more 
flexible and transparent,  for  independent resolution of 
disputes; 
**  in accordance with the Commission  and the 
Parliamentary decisions,  the traditional structures of the 
Supply Industry in place today,  (monopoly rights,  national 
sales obligations etc), will be progressively adapted to 
respond to the need for greater Consumer  choice and 
influence in gas supply. 
As  already stated within the objectives of  a  true gas 
market,  IFIEC  Europe wants  and supports TPA,  providing it 
should not become  a  source of discussions to disguise real 
objectives,  and be confused with references to security of 
supply  issues. 
Similar opportunities of choice in the gas market should be 
extended,  on  a  non-discriminatory basis,  to independent 
Producers and End-users,  including the Gas  Consumer  Industry 
and  Local Distribution Companies acting on behalf of Small 
and  Domestic  Consumers. 
Industries -and the same  applies to Local Distribution 
Companies- must have the option to contract for purchases of 
gas under terms  and conditions which suit them  and which are 
linked to conditions in the market.  Important conditions are 
e.g: 
* Pricing - the ability of buyers to negotiate price 
terms which reflect the needs of their business; 
*  Contract durations - appropriate to business needs, 
investment decisions; 
* Quality:  for  some,  this means  stability in terms of 
firing characteristics;  for others,  chemical composition; 
* Level of reliability of supply - appropriate to the 
needs of buyers  (potential for  interruptible contracts). 4 
- B  -
IFIEC  Europe has  a  high respect for the technical expertise 
and transmission network control experience on which 
security of supply depends.  It accepts the key role of the 
transmission network controllers.  However  from the PCCG 
discussions it appears that there are no  insuperable 
technical obstacles to TPA. 
- c  -
TPA  should be  included in the future Community  Energy Policy 
as  formulated: 
1- In terms of completing the Internal Energy Market, 
the  EC  documents: 
* the Commission working document  COM(88)238  Final; 
* the Communication  from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament COM89(334)  Final; 
clearly raise the issue of TPA  in terms of  implementation of 
a  more  integrated European market; 
2- More  recently,  the draft European  Energy Charter 
proposes,  among  its operational goals,  "the development of 
trade,  particularly through the free functioning of the 
market,  free access to resources and the development of 
infrastructures". 
IFIEC  Europe believes that the ultimate success of such 
emerging Community  initiatives as: 
a- The  development of  independent power; 
b- the development of industrial self-generation, 
highly efficient combined heat and power generation; 
c- the development of renewable,  alternative fuels, 
etc; 
d- the need to increase energy efficiency, 
e- the need to better protect the environment 
f- the development of Community-wide  interconnection 
networks will depend,  in the main,  on the extent to which 
Consumers  are given a  more  active role in the 
decision-making processes associated with these initiatives. 
In the past the Gas  Consuming  Industry has played a  major 
role in gas production across Europe.  As  a  key initiator of 
the existing European gas Industry, ·and as a  vehicle of 
economic development on which economic growth and social 
welfare depend,  the Gas  Consumer  Industry also has the 
expertise and experience to play a  greater part in reaching 
the Internal Energy Charter objectives. 
- D -
A major  argument  in favour of TPA  is the environmental one. 
The  flexibility introduced by TPA  would encourage  CHP 
schemes.  Industry's investments in CHP  will have  a 
significant impact on energy efficiency and will reduce C02 
emissions.  With the TPA  option,  the share of gas in the fuel 
market will increase at the cost of fuel oil.  Lower 
emissions of C02,  sox and  NOx  would be the beneficial 
result. 5 
- E  -
Freedom to obtain the gas supplies best adapted to the 
Consuming  Industry's specific needs is fundamental to 
Consumers'  overall viability,  which is,  in turn,  essential 
to the Community's  long term well-being.  Industrial 
investment is capital-intensive and  long term in scope. 
supply conditions are often a  key factor in the choice of a 
plant site; in addition,  for Industries which have to be 
situated close to their down-stream markets,  energy costs 
may  be  a  critical factor that determines the commercial 
margin and ability to remain competitive.  In many  cases, 
project financing for  industrial development  in the future  • 
will depend,  in part,  on Industry's ability to procure 
long-term energy supplies under competitive conditions. 
The  Gas  Consuming  Industry today is world-wide  in scope and 
obliged to operate in competitive markets that do  not offer 
automatic pass through of costs.  Choice of supply, 
flexibility,  supply security and balanced contractual 
relationships are the "heart"  of TPA. 
IFIEC  Europe  asks that careful,  objective consideration be 
given to the overall long term benefits of  introducing 
competition and  consumer choice to the European gas markets 
as they evolve,  progressively,  into a  more  integrated 
Community  configuration.  TPA  should be at the center of 
energy policy discussions in the coming months,  not as an 
instrument of chaotic change,  but as a  means to flexible 
problem solving that will allow Gas  Consuming  Industry to 
pursue a  course of dynamic  economic  development within the 
Community  in the years ahead. t 
• 
Annex  8 
THE  DESIRABILITY  OF  THIRD  PARTY  ACCESS  CTPAl 
Position statement of a  gas distribution company. 
~  Europe without internal borders 
The  structure of the public gas supply industry in the vari-
ous Member  States is determined on the basis of national 
considerations and has sharp national delimitations.  This 
has  led to the situation that on both sides of the current 
internal borders completely different structures are found. 
on the basis of this mere  fact it may  be concluded that it 
will be  impossible to maintain the current national struc-
tures when  the single internal market has been established. 
So it is not a  matter of whether there will be any  change, 
but of which direction the change will have to take.  In 
fact,  the choice is between  incorporation of the current 
nationally defined structures into a  centrally developed  EEC 
structure and an essentially different approach:  a  more  open 
energy market.  The latter option is to be preferred for many 
reasons.  A more  open energy market offers possibilities for 
better bringing out the diversity within Europe;  by competi-
tion it leads to higher efficiency and it offers the best 
perspectives for further development of the European gas 
market by opening up the East-European gas potential. 
A more  open energy market is not feasible without a  solution 
for the apparent discrepancy between an  open market  and the 
natural monopoly of gas transmission and gas distribution. 
TPA  is that solution.  TPA  provides the conditions for  a  more 
competitive gas market while retaining the efficient use of 
the existing and  future  - expensive - gas supply infrastruc-
ture. 2 
~  Competition in gas supply. 
At present gas to gas competition is totally absent in the 
national gas  supply industries.  The  introduction of such 
competition will  improve efficiency,  which will be to the 
benefit of the consumers.  In this situation it will be 
necessary,  however,  to alter the existing gas pricing method-
ology  (full linking to oil products prices).  By  that method-
ology efficiency gains realised by the LDCs  are automatically 
translated into higher purchase prices and,  consequently, 
into higher revenues  for the transmission/production com-
panies.  Thus,  in the present situation consumers  do not 
benefit from these efficiency gains. 
~  Security of supply. 
One  characteristic of TPA  is that supply and demand  can meet 
directly,  without intervention of the merchant/transmission 
companies.  The  gas price is then determined by the supply 
and  demand  interactions on the gas market  (gas to gas  compe-
tition).  When  there is a  surplus of gas,  the price will drop 
to below the level of the equivalent oil products.  This will 
be to the benefit of the consumers.  In times of relative 
shortage the price will rise  (above the level of oil products 
price),  which is only fair.  If this occurs in the TPA  situ-
ation,  however,  also the large-consumer prices will rise and 
eventually exceed the equivalent oil products prices.  This 
category of consumers will generally be capable of switching 
over to some  other fuel  (e.g.  oil),  causing the gas demand to 
fall. 
In the existing situation the gas price does not reflect the 
supply and demand  ratios of gas,  but of oil products,  while 
in particular to the customers of the LDCs  (~ainly small 
consumers  and  commercials)  oil is no real alternative to gas. 
These users fully depend  on gas  (captive consumers).  More-
over,  in the current situation low oil prices lead to low 
revenues  for the gas producers.  So they get no  incentives to 
raise production,  which may  bring about a  scarcity of gas. 
This may  jeopardise the security of supply.  The right market 
price incentive is inherent in a  TPA  system,  where the gas 
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price will balance supply and demand.  That's why  TPA  is to 
be preferred also for reasons of continuity of supply. 
Of  course,  this system will work properly only if the demand 
side is sufficiently strong and is capable of tuning in to 
the needs of the supply side,  in particular with regard to 
long-term commitments.  It is in this particular area that 
LDCs  may  play an  important role. 
Position of LDCs. 
LDCs  buy large volumes of gas for their multitudinous,  mostly 
small,  consumers.  Further,  they need high level supply 
security,  so they are in a  position and willing to enter into 
long-term contracts for large volumes  of gas.  In the Nether-
lands the LDCs  are organised in an association  (VEGIN)  nego-
tiating with Gasunie  on the gas price on behalf of all LDCs. 
The  negotiations relate to some  20  billion m 3jyear.  So  LDCs 
may,  jointly if relevant,  occupy  a  strong position in the 
market. 
To  this end it will he necessary,  by the way,  that not only 
transmission,  but also all other services that are now  linked 
up with transmission  (load balancing,  storage,  blending), 
become available under the TPA  scheme as unbundled services. 
Implementation problems  surmountable 
Evidently,  the introduction of TPA  is a  major change,  giving 
rise to a  number of technical,  economic  and juridical prob-
lems.  We  are convinced that it will be possible to overcome 
these problems and that a  minimum  of regulation will be 
needed. 
Substantial preventive effect 
We  expect that the introduction of TPA  will act highly pre-
ventive.  As  soon as TPA  will become  a  reality,  all market 
parties will include this option in their commercial pol-
icies,  which will greatly reduce the actual utilization of 
TPA. 